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ARTICLE
A CONTROL-BASED APPROACH TO SHAREHOLDER
LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE TORTS
Nina A. Mendelson*
Some commentators defend limited shareholder liability for torts and
statutory violations as efficient, even though it encourages corporations to
overinvest in and to externalize the costs of risky activity. Others propose pro
rata unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts. Both approaches,
however, fail to account fully for qualitative differences among shareholders.
Controlling shareholders, in particular, may have lower information costs,
greater influence over managerial decisionmaking, and greater ability to ben-
efit from corporate activity.
This Article develops a control-based approach to shareholder liability.
It first explores several differences among shareholders. For example, a con-
trolling shareholder can more easily curb managerial risk aversion and con-
sequently will likely prompt a company to externalize more costs. Further,
because a controlling shareholder can obtain special benefits from corporate
activity, imposing pro rata shareholder liability likely will not fully deter over-
investment in risky activities.
This Article then proposes to hold shareholders with a capacity to con-
trol corporate activity fully responsible for corporate torts and statutory viola-
tions. Compared with the limited liability and pro rata liability regimes, a
control-based liability regime is the most likely to compel corporations to inter-
nalize their costs and to ensure that injured tort plaintiffs are compensated.
However, the regime could potentially overdeter some socially beneficial activ-
ities if insurance is unavailable. While definitively resolving the size of such
effects requires further empirical investigation, a control-based liability regime
more explicitly addresses shareholder differences and appears most likely to
address limited liability's moral hazard. This Article accordingly concludes
that such a regime offers a promising alternative.
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INTRODUCTION
There is little disagreement that limited shareholder liability for cor-
porate torts1 can encourage socially costly corporate activity-risky activ-
ity selected because the corporation and its shareholders do not bear all
the expected costs of the activity. 2 While the size of this externality re-
mains to be quantified, individuals engaging in risky business enterprises
1. Shareholder liability for corporate contracts is beyond the scope of this Article. See
infra note 122.
2. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. Corp. Law
573, 576 (1986) [hereinafter Blumberg, Limited Liability] ("[Elven economists convinced
of the utility of limited liability ... concede that limited liability raises serious problems
because it enables the enterprise to externalize its costs."); Paul Halpern et al., An
Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. Toronto L.J. 117, 126
(1980) ("[Ilt is claimed that a limited liability regime is inefficient because it [creates]
incentives for excessive (inefficient) allocations of social resources to risky economic
activities."); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879, 1879 (1991) [hereinafter Hansmann &
Kraakman, Unlimited Liability] ("[Ilncentives [for excessive risk taking] are
conventionally assumed to be the price of securing efficient capital financing for
corporations."); see also David Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
Colum. L. Rev. 1565, 1620 (1991) (noting that some arguments "suggest that all
shareholders that are corporations . . . should be subject to unlimited liability"). This
recognition has yet to cause any significant change in judicial willingness to honor limited
liability principles. E.g., Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 960 (7th
Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.) (noting that argument that enterprises "should be prevented
from externalizing the costs" of potentially hazardous activities "has not carried the day in
any jurisdiction that we are aware of'), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000).
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are regularly advised to create corporations precisely for the purpose of
shielding their assets, and corporations engaging in risky activities are ad-
vised to create subsidiaries for the same purpose. 3 Federal government
settlement guidelines for civil enforcement actions have explicitly as-
sumed that a corporate defendant's "ability to pay" a government claim
generally should be determined without counting shareholder or parent
company assets. 4 Even given the very limited opportunities for "piercing
the corporate veil," thousands of corporate tort victims have spent money
litigating, trying to obtain compensation from shareholders in cases
where corporate assets and insurance may be inadequate to cover injury
costs.
5
Commentary on limited liability for corporate torts falls into two ma-
jor camps. Some defend limited liability rules against all comers.6
Others propose to abandon it altogether in the case of tort and statutory
violations and substitute a scheme of unlimited shareholder liability di-
vided among shareholders pro rata.7
3. See infra text accompanying notes 177-185.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 150-152.
5. See infra text accompanying note 156.
6. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 41-44 (1991) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure]
(listing advantages of limited liability); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 104 (1985) [hereinafter Easterbrook
& Fischel, Limited Liability] ("[Mjodifying limited liability has its costs and ... moral
hazard would exist without limited liability."); infra text accompanying notes 51-63
(discussing efficiency justification for limited liability).
7. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1880
("[T]here may be no persuasive reasons to prefer limited liability over a regime of
unlimited pro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts."); Leebron, supra note 2, at
1569 ("[Ihf unlimited liability were adopted, it should be pro rata."). Christopher Stone
also proposes pro rata liability. See Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability
in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 Yale. L.J. 1, 74 (1980) ("[E]ach would be liable
only in proportion to his or her equity interest."). A third smaller group argues that
limited liability should be abandoned only for certain categories of corporations, either
closely-held corporations or corporations that are wholly-owned by a parent corporation.
E.g., Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 630 ("If a subsidiary corporation
constitutes only one of a number of components of a corporate group collectively
conducting a fragmented unitary business, the very basis for the establishment of limited
liability as a matter of general legal policy disappears." (internal footnotes omitted));
Halpern et al., supra note 2, at 148 (advocating unlimited liability for "small, tightly held
companies"). Finally, Stephen Bainbridge proposes to abolish veil piercing altogether as
"rare, unprincipled, and arbitrary." Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26J.
Corp. L. 479, 535 (2001). However, he would permit tort liability to be allocated within a
corporate group under enterprise liability approaches. Id. at 527-34. Bainbridge's
justification for eliminating veil piercing in tort cases is based on the vagueness of the veil
piercing standard, the "expensive litigation" it thus generates, as well as its denial of
"certainty and predictability" to investors. Id. at 524. Bainbridge does not, however,
consider a control-based liability rule, which is likely to be considerably easier than the
current veil piercing rule for courts to apply. Occasionally, commentators have proposed
activity-specific or industry-specific solutions, such as compulsory insurance requirements
or minimum capitalization requirements. E.g., id. at 524-25; see Joseph Grundfest, The
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Both groups, however, focus on the corporation as the unit. Inexpli-
cably, neither regime seems to account fully for qualitative differences
among shareholders. Shareholders may have varying access to informa-
tion and ability to influence management decisions, and controlling
shareholders may have special opportunities to benefit from corporate
activity.8 A shareholder liability regime's consequences can differ signifi-
cantly by shareholder. Take limited liability's articulated benefit of re-
ducing information costs. A limited liability regime might indeed save
significant costs for a shareholder with only a tiny proportion of a corpo-
ration's shares and limited access to information. By contrast, when the
shareholder is a parent corporation or a shareholder that otherwise can
control corporate affairs, information costs savings may be less signifi-
cant-or lacking altogether.
The moral hazard created by limited liability for a corporation to
overinvest in excessively risky activity also depends on shareholder charac-
teristics. For example, a controlling shareholder will be more able to in-
fluence a corporation to take excessive risks because the shareholder will
be better able to curb the effects of managerial risk aversion. 9 Further, a
controlling shareholder likely will be more inclined to favor risky corpo-
rate projects because of a general ability to reap a share of corporate
benefits in excess of a pro rata share. 10 Consequently, the presence of a
controlling shareholder likely will prompt a corporation to externalize
more costs than if the corporation's equity is diffusely held by many very
small shareholders. However, neither the limited liability regime nor the
pro rata regime adequately accounts for the differences in incentives and
transaction costs that can face different shareholders in a single
corporation.
In contrast, a control-based liability regime would focus vicarious lia-
bility for corporate torts and tort-like statutory violations only on the
shareholder with the capacity to control the corporation. When liability
exceeds corporate assets, a shareholder with the capacity to control would
be fully responsible for corporate torts or statutory violations. A control-
based regime would thereby respond to the greater incentive for exces-
Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 Yale L.J. 387,
421 (1992) (mentioning "leading alternatives" to shareholder liability rule changes,
including minimum capitalization requirements). To meaningfully solve the problem of
excessive risk taking, however, these solutions require government to anticipate the risks
accompanying a wide variety of corporate activities, despite government's likely inferior
access to information. See Bainbridge, supra, at 525 ("Only with hindsight can one
determine accurately how much capital or insurance will be necessary for any given
corporation."); cf. Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857, 873-74 (1984) (comparing minimum insurance or "adequate"
capitalization with managerial liability and noting that managerial information access is
likely to be superior to that of legislators).
8. See infra Part III.D.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 196-200.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 206-231.
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sive risk taking resulting from the presence of a controlling shareholder.
It also would address a potential shortcoming of the pro rata unlimited
liability regime: the prospect that its incentives for controlling sharehold-
ers might be inadequate to deter excessive corporate risk taking. At the
same time, because it would not treat shareholders identically, a control-
based liability regime could preserve potential efficiencies created by lim-
ited liability for truly small shareholders, such as reductions in transaction
costs. A control-based liability regime is not free from disadvantages. It
could overdeter some socially beneficial activities that cannot be insured,
and the application of a more flexible liability standard could generate
transaction costs compared with a detailed ex ante rule. Definitively
resolving the relative size of these effects requires further empirical inves-
tigation into issues such as the value of control and the location and sig-
nificance of transaction costs. Nonetheless, because a control-based lia-
bility regime more explicitly responds to differences among shareholders
and appears most likely to compel corporations to internalize the costs of
their risky activities, it deserves serious consideration.
A control-based liability regime deserves such consideration for prag-
matic reasons as well. Implementing it would be comparatively straight-
forward. Of course, retaining the status quo is generally easiest-but that
would also require retaining the undiluted moral hazard of limited liabil-
ity. However, compared with a pro rata liability regime, a control-based
liability regime could be more easily adopted. Congress or state legisla-
tures could pass statutes imposing such a regime, and courts could also
implement it by simply building on the common law rules of veil
piercing. 1 1
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the history of the limited
liability regime and discusses how limited liability arose separately from a
host of other features typically associated with an independent corporate
form. Part II outlines the prevailing justification for limited liability-
limited liability as an efficient investment incentive-and discusses how it
critically depends on positing a "typical" corporation as one owned by
numerous small shareholders and a "typical" shareholder as an individual
without great wealth or the ability to control the corporation. It then
questions the justification in view of current data regarding corporate eq-
uity holders and the distribution of ownership in domestic private and
public corporations. Part III discusses limited liability's moral hazard and
how it is exacerbated by the presence, within a corporation's ownership,
of a controlling shareholder. It also responds to arguments that other
aspects of the current legal system may tend to blunt the moral hazard.
Part IV outlines the basic framework of a control-based liability regime,
11. Both the issue of transition rules and whether such a step would best be taken at
the state or federal level are beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of this latter
issue, see, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a
Procedural Lens, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 387, 389 (1992) (arguing that expansion of vicarious
liability by state statute would present claimants with significant procedural difficulties).
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
which would impose liability on a shareholder that possesses the capacity
to control a corporation. It then compares the control-based regime to
limited liability and to a pro rata regime of shareholder liability. Part IV
includes an analysis of a control-based liability regime's potential disad-
vantages, including the prospect that when insurance is unavailable,
shareholders might turn away from socially beneficial corporate opportu-
nities. Part IV further argues that, despite these disadvantages, a control-
based regime is still preferable to a pro rata regime because a pro rata
rule would inadequately address limited liability's moral hazard. Because
a controlling shareholder can obtain value from corporate operations in
excess of the shareholder's pro rata share, the shareholder would still
face incentives to encourage a corporation to underinsure and to take
excessive risks. Further, under a pro rata regime, substantial transaction
costs are likely to hinder plaintiffs from obtaining full compensation from
multiple corporate shareholders. A capacity to control regime is likely to
better assure that corporations internalize the costs of risky corporate ac-
tivity, including through adequate insurance.
I. SOME BACKGROUND ON LIMITED LIABILITY
The corporation has become the dominant form of American busi-
ness organization. In 1998, business done in the corporate form
amounted to $37 trillion worth of receipts, compared with $1 trillion of
receipts attributable to partnerships and sole proprietorships com-
bined. 12 The presumed availability of limited liability for shareholders-
a characteristic that has typically been associated with the corporate
formt 3-could well be a reason for the corporate form's dominance. Ac-
cording to some commentators, limited liability "is regarded by most per-
12. In 1998, at least 4.7 million corporations filed tax returns with the IRS. U.S.
Internal Revenue Service, Number of Business Income Returns, 1980-1998 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). In the same year, the IRS received 1.8 million returns from
partnerships and 17 million returns from proprietorships. Id. Further, the total number
of corporate tax returns understates the number of domestic corporations, since some
corporate groups file a single consolidated tax return.
The overwhelming majority of corporations are not publicly traded. For example, the
New York Stock Exchange lists just under 3000 corporations-less than 0.1% of the total
number of corporations that filed tax returns with the IRS. New York Stock Exchange,
Fact Book for the Year 2000, at 5 (2001) [hereinafter NYSE Facts 2000].
13. Among other typical corporate features are a corporation's legal existence and
capacity to act separately from the identity and actions of its owners, continuous succession
(an existence separate from the changes in its membership), unified management, the
power to sue and be sued, and the ability to take or convey property in the corporate
name. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 253, 258-67 (1911);
see I Joseph Stancliffe Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations 5
(1917) (stating that a corporation was "[as early as the American colonial period], as now,
a group of individuals authorized by law to act as a unit").
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sons as the greatest advantage of incorporation" and "perhaps the distin-
guishing feature" of corporate law. 14
A. The Development of Limited Liability
Despite its current status, limited liability for corporate shareholders
has not always been associated with corporations. It arose separately from
and apparently later than the other characteristic corporate features,
such as the capacity to take legally binding action. 15 Early on, some
American states, such as Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island,
14. I. Maurice Wormser, Disregard of the Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporation
Problems 14 (1927); Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 40.
Limited liability has been called "'the greatest single discovery of modern times ... even
steam and electricity are far less important."' William Rands, Domination of a Subsidiary
by a Parent, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 421, 422 (1999) (quoting unnamed Columbia University
president); see LaBelle v. Crepeau, 593 A.2d 653, 655 (Me. 1991) (stating that principal
benefit of corporate form "is limited liability for shareholders"); Halpern et al., supra note
2, at 118 ("'The economic historian of the future may assign to the nameless inventor of
the principle of limited liability... a place of honour with Watt and Stephenson, and other
pioneers of the Industrial Revolution.'") (quoting Economist, Dec. 18, 1926); see also
Richard G. Lipsey et al., Economics 174 (9th ed. 1990) ("From a stockholder's viewpoint,
one of the most important aspects of the corporation is its limited liability."); James B.
Zimpritch, Maine Corporation Law'& Practice § 4.5 (Supp. 1992) ("A principal purpose in
most incorporations is to obtain limited shareholder liability."); Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual
Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 Yale L.J. 1413, 1427 (1998) [hereinafter LoPucki,
Judgment Proofing] ("Limiting liability is widely understood to be the principal reason for
the separate incorporation of subsidiaries."). Limited liability is also characterizing new
forms of organization, such as the Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) and the Limited
Liability Company (LLC). Hansmann and Kraakman have recently argued, however, that
the essential aspect of corporate personhood should be understood, if anything, as the
"reverse of limited liability"-ensuring that the assets of a corporation (or other legal
entity) are shielded from "claims of the creditors of the entity's owners or managers."
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
Yale L.J. 387, 390 (2000).
15. See James Williard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law
of the United States, 1780-1970, at 19 (1970) (noting development of other features
beginning in late eighteenth century); see id. at 26 ("On balance, and from the outset, the
corporation was an instrument to provide firm central direction for the enterprising use of
pooled assets."); see id. at 27 (noting development of judge-made law of limited liability
beginning in early nineteenth century); Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 588
(noting businessmen used corporate form "primarily to achieve perpetuity of existence
and ready transferability of shares"); id. at 576 (noting substantial industrial development
in corporate form "before limited liability emerged in the United States around 1825").
English corporation law similarly did not consider limited liability, at the outset, to be
"among the essential attributes of the corporation." Id. at 579-80 (discussing Coke,
Blackstone, and Kyd); E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American
Industry: Massachusetts, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1351, 1356 (1948) ("[E]ven in England, the
evidence as to what the men of the eighteenth century thought on [the subject of limited
liability] is extremely meager and in the United States it is almost nonexistent."). Early
American corporate charters did not discuss liability at all.. Id. ("Several of the early
Massachusetts manufacturing corporation charters were completely silent with respect to
what rights, if any, corporate creditors would have against individual shareholders."). But
see 1 Davis, supra note 13, at 5 ("Normally [corporate] property was not liable for
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1203
granted corporate charters with the express proviso that shareholders
would be fully liable-apparently on the theory that unlimited liability
would best ensure economic growth and development because creditors,
assured of repayment, would loan more capital. 1 6 Many states had en-
acted provisions expressly holding shareholders liable for amounts in ex-
cess of the value of their shares.1 7
Eventually, however, most state legislatures chose limited liability as
the best means of encouraging investment and thereby economic
growth. 18 By 1840, most state legislatures had determined that the "fur-
thering of capital formation could best be accomplished by encouraging
shareholders to invest through limiting their liability."'19 Perceived
targets of these incentives were apparently the "small-scale entrepreneur"
and companies with public functions, 20 but large-scale industrialists prob-
obligations of members, and their private property was likewise not subject to be taken to
pay debts of the corporation.").
The ability to take legally binding action was not always vested in a board of directors,
but sometimes was dependent on significant shareholder involvement. See Hurst, supra,
at 25 (giving examples and stating that "courts were at first hesitant to recognize implied
powers in boards of directors"); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law,
1870-1960, at 87-89 (1992) (discussing need for unanimous or majority shareholder vote
for some transactions).
16. See Dodd, supra note 15, at 1375-76; Stephen B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate
Veil § 1.03[1] (2001) [hereinafter Presser, Piercing]; Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the
Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 148, 155 (1992) [hereinafter Presser, Thwarting].
17. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 588-89 (noting presence of
direct or indirect shareholder liability in several industrial states); Hurst, supra note 15, at
27 (noting that shareholders in industrial states sometimes faced double their investment
or more in liability for particular debts). The common law had, however, "evolved to the
point of presuming limited shareholder liability in the absence of any legislative rule" by
the mid-1800s. Horwitz, supra note 15, at 94.
Through this period, the corporation was still perceived as not dissimilar to a
partnership in the sense that a corporation could be seen as a group of shareholders acting
in concert, rather than an entity sui generis. For example, Professor Horwitz notes that in
the 1880s, a corporation could not sell its assets without unanimous shareholder consent.
Id. at 87-88. In that sense, the distinction between corporate shareholder liability and the
liability of a member of a partnership was largely a "matter of degree." Id. at 94.
18. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 604 (noting that limited liability
was "intended to stimulate economic activity by encouraging widespread investment in
corporate shares"). Evidence on whether the change in approach actually did encourage
investment during the early period is mixed. For example, "Rhode Island... adhered to
the full-liability principle until 1847 without thereby losing its position as the second state
in the union in the value of its cotton-textile products." Dodd, supra note 15, at 1376
(footnote omitted).
19. Presser, Thwarting, supra note 16, at 155.
20. Id.; see also Halpern et al., supra note 2, at 118 (explaining that limited liability
supporters in England argued that middle and working classes would be encouraged to
invest); Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 593 (noting earlier acceptance of
limited liability for companies with "public function or financial objectives").
1210
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ably pressured the political process for limited liability. 21 By the late
1800s, most states had begun to grant at least some limited liability corpo-
rate charters.2 2 Even with these decisions, limited corporate shareholder
liability was far from fully established until the early part of the twentieth
century.23
Now, however, the overwhelming majority of state corporation stat-
utes, which provide the "default terms" under which companies may in-
corporate, include express limitations on shareholder liability. Section
6.22 of the Model Business Corporation Act specifies that the share-
holder's obligation to the corporation is solely to "pay the consideration
for which the shares were authorized to be issued."24 A shareholder is
"not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that
he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct."25
21. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 592-93 (noting that industrialists
.pressed" for extension of limited liability).
22. See Dodd, supra note 15, at 1375-78.
23. Horwitz, supra note 15, at 94 ("[T]ruly limited shareholder liability was far from
the norm in America even as late as 1900."). Compare Thomas Gold Frost, A Treatise on
the Incorporation and Organization of Corporations § 16 (1906) ("It has been the rule of
the courts from time immemorial to recognize and enforce the power of the corporations
to sue and be sued . . . as incident to such corporate existence."), with id. § 65 (noting
special requirements in several states before stockholders may avoid personal liability for
corporate debts).
24. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.22(a) (1985).
25. Id. § 6.22(b). See generally Presser, Piercing, supra note 16, §§ 2.01-.52
(reviewing state laws on corporate veil piercing). Section 6.22(b) of the Model Business
Corporation Act has been adopted in Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming. Ark. Code
Ann. § 4-27-622 (Michie 1987); Colo, Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7-106-203 (West 1999); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 33-673 (West 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-622 (1994); Haw, Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 414-83 (Michie 2001); Idaho Code § 30-1-622 (Michie 1999); Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-26-3
(Michie 1999); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.6-220 (Michie 1989); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 450.1317 (West 1990); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-6.22 (1972); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-534
(2001); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2041 (1997); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:6.22 (1999); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 55-6-22 (1999); Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.151 (1988); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-6-220 (Law.
Co-op. 1990); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-16-203 (1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. llA, § 6.22 (1997);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-16-622 (Michie 1996). The statutes of Arizona, Iowa, and Utah state
generally that a shareholder is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-622 (West 1996); Iowa Code Ann. § 490.622 (West 1999); Utah
Code Ann. § 16-10a-622 (2001). Absent an express statement in the articles of
incorporation, Delaware's statute similarly removes personal liability of shareholders for
the "payment of the corporation's debts except as they may be liable by reason of their own
conduct or acts." Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (2001). Generally, the states limit
shareholder liability by statute. See William L. Cary and Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
Corporations 165 (7th ed. 1995) ("The basic rule of corporate law is the statutory rule of
limited liability.").
Two exceptions are the New York and Wisconsin statutes, which impose liability on
shareholders for employee wage claims if the corporation fails to satisfy those claims. New
York's default articles of incorporation impose liability on the ten largest shareholders of a
corporation. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 103 (McKinney 1986) (applies to all corporations); id.
§ 630 (imposing joint and several liability on ten largest shareholders of corporations,
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1203
B. The Relationship Between Corporate Shareholders and Corporate Entities
Historical evidence suggests that limited liability was developed as a
broad-based investment subsidy. 26 As discussed below, limited liability
also serves to encourage excessively risky activity by permitting companies
to externalize costs for which they would otherwise be compelled to pay
tort damages. Possibly mindful of the social costs resulting from this
"moral hazard," commentators have sought to go beyond the historical
evidence and articulate more persuasive justifications for limited liability.
In the early part of the century, some commentators suggested that
limited liability was justified because the corporation had a legal status
"independent" of its shareholders. Corporate activities were distinct from
shareholder activities, and a change in shareholder ownership would not
necessarily affect the corporate enterprise. 27 In other words, the corpora-
tion is like a new person: The "state's approval of the corporate form sets
up a prima facie case that the assets, liabilities, and operations of the
corporation are those of the enterprise." 28 And natural persons, of
course, have liability limited to their own property.29
excepting "investment compan[ies]"); see also Grossman v. Sendor, 392 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999
(Sup. Ct. 1977) (applying section 630). Wisconsin makes all shareholders personally liable
for wage claims, but limits their responsibility to the "par value of shares owned by them
respectively." Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.0622 (West 1992).
26. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21; see also Easterbrook & Fischel,
Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 44 ("The increased availability of funds for projects
with positive net values is the real benefit of limited liability.").
A related justification, though one that has received little promotion in the limited
liability literature, is that limited liability can be justified by the "positive externalities"
businesses produce, such as employment and taxes. Because the vast majority of such
benefits are priced and traded in well-functioning markets, however, they generally cannot
be conceptualized as externalized. Rather, businesses can internalize the value of the
benefits by charging for them. For example, the value employment provides to employees
is reflected in wage levels. Similarly, the value of new products is generally reflected in the
prices charged. See generally Joseph Stiglitz, Economics 154-57 (2d ed. 1997) (describing
role externalities play in pricing of goods). Although corporations pay taxes, which could
be conceptualized as a positive externality, they also benefit from the public goods funded
by those taxes, such as highways and other infrastructure. While some businesses might
produce goods with positive externalities (for example, unpatentable basic research), a
blanket subsidy for corporate shareholders to reward "positive externalities" is likely both
overbroad in that it rewards all corporations irrespective of activity and underinclusive to
the extent it does not reward partnerships or sole proprietorships. Positive externalities
would be more appropriately compensated through the use of targeted subsidies. Cf. infra
text accompanying notes 373-374 (discussing targeted subsidies for industries such as
those engaged in pharmaceutical research).
27. See Horwitz, supra note 15, at 100-07 (discussing "entity theory").
28. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 343, 344
(1947). Berle's language evokes the historical strain in corporation theory that sees the
corporation as a creature of the state. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 15, at 71-72
(discussing "grant" theory of corporations in nineteenth-century America and view that
corporation is an "entity created by the state").
29. Natural persons have limited liability in the sense that courts will only enforce a
liability judgment against a person's property. A person retains the ability to work, an
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This justification has been largely abandoned, except for echoes in
the occasional judicial opinion.30 As shown by its development indepen-
dent from the development of the corporation, limited shareholder lia-
bility clearly seems to be an "attribute of the investment rather than of
'the corporation."' 31 Another limited liability justification-based on ef-
ficiency arguments-has now assumed the dominant position and is dis-
cussed below.
3 2
Nonetheless, the "artificial person" justification is worth considering
if only because its rhetoric suggests the need for a close look at the reality
of the relationship between corporate shareholders and corporate enti-
ties. The "artificial person" justification suggests substantial corporate in-
dependence from shareholders. That seems apt for the corporation com-
posed of numerous individual shareholders, each of which individually
holds only a tiny percentage of shares-the Berle-Means corporation. 33
As a practical matter, such a corporation is management-controlled. The
individual shareholder's ability to influence corporate management is
very limited, and the shareholder is largely powerless with regard to a
particular operational or financial decision. 34
But the shareholder's relationship with the Berle-Means corporation
is quite different from the shareholder's relationship with the company
wholly owned by a parent or by a few entities or individuals. In the latter,
the shareholder or shareholders may possess considerable potential or
actual influence over the corporation's activities. A shareholder may be
able to control capital investments, dividend payments, and operational
decisions. Although the shareholder may not be able to directly bind the
important income-producing asset, even after declaring bankruptcy. See Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale LJ. 1, 9 & nn.21-22 (1996) [hereinafter LoPucki,
Death of Liability] ("imprisonment for debt offends deeply held American values").
30. E.g., United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1498 (D. Utah 1987)
(discussing termination of shareholder liability after corporate dissolution in terms of
whether corporation is "dead" or "dead [and] buried").
31. Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 11; see also
Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 595 (arguing that limited liability arose as a
"political response to economic and political pressures, rather than as a necessary
consequence of the entity concept"). This point is easily demonstrated by the fact that a
court's piercing of a corporate veil to hold a shareholder responsible for corporate
misconduct does not destroy the corporation's legal capacity to act.
32. See infra Part II.
33. Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property 47-65 (1932).
34. For such corporations, management is primarily conducted by the corporation's
officers and other managers, and the law grants shareholders only minimal checks on
manager decisionmaking. For example, in shareholder derivative actions, the "business
judgment rule" accords significant latitude to corporate managers. Implicit in that rule is
the concept that corporate decisions are those of the corporation; the managers possess
some autonomy relative to shareholder desires. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc., 698 A.2d
959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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corporation,3 5 the practical reality is that the shareholder and corpora-
tion are not very separate. The corporate form is relatively manipulable
and controllable. At the outset, for example, the shareholder could have
incorporated the corporation to limit the shareholder's assets at risk from
a particular activity conducted by the corporation. The shareholder can
also, through membership on or control over the board of directors, see
that the corporation is operated to continue to keep assets separate from
risky corporate activities through, for example, the prompt payment of
dividends or the use of subsidiaries. 36 Here, the corporation is far from
"independent" of the shareholders.
Consider the relationship of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
the public utility serving northern and central California, and its parent
company, the PG&E Corporation. Although the example does not relate
to tort liability, it provides an illustration of close shareholder control by a
majority shareholder. Together with a subsidiary, the PG&E Corporation
holds 100% of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's common stock and
95% of its total voting stock, obviously giving it control over the com-
pany's board.3 7 When California suffered a major energy shortage in
2000 and 2001, Pacific Gas and Electric Company requested a substantial
rate increase to help it meet the costs of providing energy to utility cus-
tomers, arguing that it had insufficient cash reserves to cover spikes in
wholesale energy prices. Pacific Gas and Electric Company later filed for
bankruptcy.3 8 An independent audit revealed, however, that between
1997 and 1999 the company had sent $4.1 billion to its parent company
that in turn was used for dividends, stock repurchases, and investments in
other subsidiaries. These payments depleted the corporation's cash
reserves, raising the question whether it had been adequately funded to
cope with a potential rise in the wholesale price of energy.3 9 The transfer
benefited the parent and its other companies, however: The nearly $1
35. See Cary & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 118 (stating that a shareholder "as such,
has no right to bind the corporation to a contract").
36. See infra text accompanying notes 163-167, 204 (discussing State Dep't of Envtl.
Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983), in which parent exercised control over
subsidiary to pay itself dividend of more than 75% of land held by subsidiary); infra text
accompanying note 205 (discussing Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966)). In
Walkovszky v. Carlton, the sole shareholder of several taxicab corporations had them
constantly pay him dividends, which effectively limited corporate ability to pay tort
judgments: "[A]II income was continually drained out of the corporations for the same
purpose." 223 N.E.2d at 11. While a natural person could theoretically transfer away her
assets to avoid liability as well, such a move is likely to be deterred by the resulting loss of
use of the assets.
37. See PG&E Corporation, Pacific Gas & Electric Company, Joint Notice of 2001
Annual Meetings and Joint Proxy Statement 1 (Apr. 16, 2001) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
38. Laura M. Holson, California's Largest Utility Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 7, 2001, at Al.
39. Laura M. Holson, Audits Fuel Debate on Curbing California Power Shortage, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 31, 2001, at A16.
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billion investment in subsidiaries facilitated the ability of a sister subsidi-
ary, National Energy Group, to buy unregulated power plants and to
grow, in only ten years, to become the nation's third largest unregulated
utility.
40
In the last couple of decades, the reality of corporate ownership has
moved toward greater ownership concentration, less like the hypothe-
sized Berle-Means corporation and more like the relationship between
PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas & Electric Company. A substantial
number of American corporations have significantly concentrated owner-
ship or else are susceptible to direct control by particular shareholders.
While empirical research in this area is far from exhaustive, several pieces
of evidence support this conclusion. First, nearly half the corporate in-
come tax returns filed with the IRS are S Corporation returns. 4 1 Chapter
S Corporations must be completely owned by seventy-five or fewer indi-
vidual shareholders to qualify for special tax treatment. 42 Over 90% of S
Corporations are owned by three or fewer shareholders. 43 More gener-
ally, approximately 60% of close corporations, both S and C corporations,
have a shareholder that owns 51% or more of the equity. Seventy-nine
percent of close corporations have a shareholder that holds 50% or more
of the equity. 4 4 Moreover, of all active corporations filing tax returns
with the IRS in 1994, 74% reported that they received dividends from a
company in which they held 20% or more of the equity.45
Second, in the largest publicly-traded corporations, despite stock ex-
change requirements of significant numbers of shareholders, 46 stock
ownership is often concentrated. Harold Demsetz has reported that
"roughly speaking, about 50% of large corporations fall into the owner-
40. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Laura M. Holson, While a Utility May Be Failing, Its
Owner Is Not, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2001, at Al.
41. Susan Wittman & Robert Grant, S Corporation Returns, 1996, Stat. Income Bull.
(Internal Revenue Serv.), Spring 1999, at 40, 40. S Corporations constitute a "small
though growing percentage" of corporate net income. For Tax Year 1996, S Corporation
income represented 17.6% of corporate net income. Id. at 42.
42. Myron Scholes et al., Taxes & Business Strategy 80 (2002).
43. Less than 10% of S Corporations had four or more shareholders. Ninety-nine
percent had ten or fewer shareholders. Wittman & Grant, supra note 41, at 42.
44. Venky Nagar et al., Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Closely-held
Corporations 28 (June 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.tar?,abstractid=234336 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The analysis is based
on a 1992 Federal Reserve Board survey of a sample of small, nonfarm, nonfinancial firms
from the National Survey of Small Business Finances. See id. at 9.
45. Of 4.8 million active corporation returns, 4.5 million corporations reported that
they received dividends from domestic corporations in which they owned 20% or more of
the equity. See Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income, 1994 Corporation Income
Tax Returns, tbl.20 (1997). The data is likely to represent an undercount of subsidiaries
because consolidated reporting is permitted for 95%-owned subsidiaries.
46. See, e.g., NYSE Facts 2000, supra note 12, at 37 (noting that 500 shareholders at
minimum are required for initial listing).
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controlled category.' 47 Two economists have identified over 650 publicly-
traded companies with majority shareholders. While the study did not
also specifically identify companies with a minority shareholder possess-
ing a significant portion of equity-enough to confer on the shareholder
the capacity to control the corporation-the data is strongly suggestive
that a substantial number of public corporations are likely to be far from
the Berle-Means type.48
Third, wholly- and mostly-owned subsidiaries are obviously far from
independent of their parent corporations. Over seventy-five percent of
corporate subsidiaries are wholly owned. 49 Because parent corporations
and their subsidiaries very often file consolidated tax returns, it is ex-
tremely difficult to estimate the amount of economic activity attributable
to corporate subsidiaries, but in view of the large numbers of corporate
subsidiaries, it is probably quite significant. Twenty-two firms randomly
47. Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26J.L.
& Econ. 375, 388 (1983). Although Demsetz reaches a conclusion on the presence of
ownership control, he is unclear as to the precise criteria for "owner-controlled." He
observes that the term could refer to the satisfaction of any of a number of different
standards, ranging from the percentage of outstanding shares held by the largest
shareholder to the percentage held by the twenty largest shareholders, and the "number so
identified varies inversely with the toughness of the criterion adopted." Id. at 388; see also
Harold Demsetz & Bel~n Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance 13
(2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (observing in
sample of 223 firms, "the fraction [of shares] owned [by the five largest shareholders]
exceeds 20% in 60% of the firms in the sub-sample that excludes the regulated sector").
48. Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders
in Publicly Held Corporations, 20J. Fin. Econ. 317, 319 (1988). Holderness and Sheehan
exclude companies in which one shareholder has a stake of 95% or more, in order to
exclude wholly-owned subsidiaries. Id. at 320. To provide some context for Holderness
and Sheehan's figures, approximately 8400 companies are currently listed on the three
major stock exchanges-the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange,
and the NASDAQ. These include non-U.S. companies. See NASDAQ in Black and White
4-4 (2001), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/NBW01_Sec04.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review); NYSE Facts 2000, supra note 12, at 5 (noting that there are 2862
NYSE-listed companies; domestic operating companies had global market capitalization of
$17.1 trillion). Holderness and Sheehan apparently did not search for companies with a
shareholder with capacity to control that held less than 51% of shares.
It is worth noting that in a recently conducted smaller study, only 10% of forty
selected publicly-held corporations were found to have a shareholder with a 20% or larger
ownership block. See Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from
Corporate Control, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539, 562, 604 (2000). The firms Roe selected were the
twenty largest publicly-held firms and the first twenty publicly-held firms with market
capitalization above $500 million. As Roe notes, "Perhaps there is a size beyond which only
public firms can exist, because, for example, private parties lack the wealth to take on a
major ownership interest." Id. at 563.
49. Leebron, supra note 2, at 1620 (citing Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2,
at 626); see also David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers,
61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 153, 162 n.35 (1986) (stating that vast majority of corporate acquisitions
by tender offer result in ownership of entire equity).
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selected by James J. White from the petroleum, chemical, and pharma-
ceutical industries had, in 1996, on average, eighty subsidiaries.50
Current data on the structure of corporate ownership, while not con-
clusive, suggests that most corporations have only one or a few controlling
shareholders. While many of these corporations are small, a substantial
share of corporate economic activity probably is attributable to corpora-
tions that fit the "controlling shareholder" form. So, even if ownership
and control are not vested in exactly the same entities, they are closely
linked in a substantial number of American corporations representing an
important part of corporate economic activity. Rather than functioning
largely independently of shareholders, these corporations more likely
function as instruments of shareholders.
II. THE EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATION FOR LIMITED LIABILITY
The primary justification for limited liability for corporate torts is
efficiency-based: 5' Limited liability not only encourages investment in so-
cially beneficial activities, but, by addressing market imperfections, it en-
courages an efficient level of investment.52 For limited liability in tort,
the argument is that limited liability efficiently facilitates economic invest-
ment in two ways: (1) by reducing information costs, thereby facilitating
the efficient separation of "capital" from "skill"; and (2) by correcting risk
aversion among shareholders.
According to the information costs justification, limited liability effi-
ciently enables individuals with money, but with neither the skill nor the
information needed for business management, to invest in the enter-
prises of others. 53 Under unlimited liability,54 a small investor could con-
50. JamesJ. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's The
Death of Liability, 107 Yale L.J. 1363, 1388 n.97 (1998).
51. Another limited liability justification-that limited liability is justified as a means
of democratizing opportunities to obtain wealth-applies explicitly to the shareholder with
a small budget. Presser, Piercing, supra note 16, § 1.03[1]; Presser, Thwarting, supra note
16, at 154. The argument that limited liability functions as an efficient default term in
contracts between corporate creditors and shareholders will not be considered further
here, as it does not address the situation of tort creditors. See Easterbrook & Fischel,
Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 41 ("If limited liability were not the starting point[,]
firms would create it by contract."). Tort creditors, however, generally lack an ex ante
opportunity to negotiate.
52. A variant of this justification is that limited liability is worthwhile because it
encourages people to take risks. Risk taking per se is not beneficial, however. It is
warranted only if the risk taken is to engage in an activity whose expected social benefits,
on the margin, outweigh its expected social costs. As discussed infra text accompanying
notes 116-126, limited liability may encourage overinvestment in activities with excessive
social costs.
53. Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability, supra note 6, at 94.
54. These analyses of limited liability appear to assume an alternative regime of
unlimited joint and several liability. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure,
supra note 6, at 41-42 (arguing that limited liability reduces costs of monitoring other
shareholders); see infra note 56.
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ceivably lose an entire portfolio if any single investment went truly sour.
If the investor were to properly manage the risk, she would have to ac-
quire detailed information on corporate operations, potential corporate
liability, and her potential individual qxposure in the event of such liabil-
ity.5 5 Obtaining the information could be pricey, 56 as would be analyzing
and acting on the information.
57
Faced with the high monitoring costs associated with unlimited lia-
bility, the individual investor might simply forego the investment-even a
worthwhile investment with positive net present value. As the argument
goes, limited liability solves this problem by permitting the investor to
manage risks by diversifying investments, rather than spending resources
on monitoring.58
Efficiency justification advocates also argue that limited liability cor-
rects excessive investor risk aversion. Under unlimited liability, a risk
averse investor might suffer an additional cost "resulting from the uncer-
tainty about whether a loss will occur."59 The investor will avoid worth-
while investments or spend too much on risk avoidance because she will
be averse to the risk of losing all of her assets, no matter how small the
risk. 60 The argument essentially is that the risk averse individual investor
is a poor risk bearer. 61 By reducing the shareholder's risks, a limited lia-
bility rule both reduces the cost of risk bearing to a shareholder and the
55. See Halpern et al., supra note 2, at 136 (noting that under unlimited liability,
shareholders also must monitor each others' wealth).
56. Efficient market assumptions include perfect, costless information. Id. at 127.
57. Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability, supra note 6, at 94 (beyond a certain
point "more monitoring is not worth the cost").
58. Similarly, because a shareholder's exposure under limited liability would not
depend on the wealth held by other shareholders, limited liability reduces the information-
gathering costs that would be entailed by the need to monitor other shareholders. Id. at
94. Easterbrook and Fischel describe the need to monitor wealth of other shareholders
under a rule of joint unlimited liability. As others have noted, such costs also can be
eliminated under a rule of pro rata liability. See Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited
Liability, supra note 2, at 1906; Leebron, supra note 2, at 1607-08.
59. Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and
Damages, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 995 (1986).
60. Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability, supra note 6, at 94.
61. Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing 136 (1971) ("[1]t is
profitable for all concerned that risks be shifted to the agency best able to bear them
through its wealth and its ability to pool risk."). For example, suppose the corporate
activity is to produce assembly-line machinery used by manufacturers. The manufacturer-
buyer might be in a better position to bear the risk of the corporation's torts-negligent
production of faulty machinery-than the owner of 100 shares of the corporation's stock.
The buyer might invest less in bringing the risk to a manageable level, either by
monitoring the corporation's activities, by examining the product, or by buying insurance,
while the investor would continue to invest in the corporation and obtain utility from the
investment. Overall, the sum of the manufacturer's utility and the investor's utility would
be higher if the manufacturer bore the risk. This point is compellingly explained in Steven
Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 189-92 (1987).
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cost of capital, and increases the availability of funds for "projects with
positive net values."' 62 By hypothesis, these are socially desirable projects.
These efficiency-based justifications, 63 however, treat all corporate
shareholders as pretty much indistinguishable. That is clearly not the
case. Once variations in shareholder characteristics are considered, both
efficiency-based justifications seem to have most persuasive power for the
less wealthy individual shareholder holding a tiny fraction of corporate
equity. The justifications are considerably weaker when the shareholder
is a corporation or institution, is relatively wealthy, or is in a position to
control the corporation.
A. Parsing the Efficiency Justification
Consider, first, the information costs justification. Its conclusion
that limited liability enhances efficiency is based on the assumption that
obtaining corporate operations information is costly for the shareholder.
For parent corporations and other shareholders with a significant
ownership share, however, the assumption is highly questionable at best,
and at worst, it is wrong. For these shareholders, information about the
business is likely to be readily and cheaply available. 64 For example, in
State Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp., a parent com-
pany known as Velsicol incorporated a subsidiary, Wood Ridge, for the
sole purpose of purchasing and continuing the operation of a mercury
processing plant.65 The lawsuit concerned responsibility for the multi-
million dollar cost of cleaning up the plant's extensive mercury contami-
nation of a tidal estuary of the Hackensack River in New Jersey.6 6 The
parent company had "constant involvement" with the subsidiary's day-to-
day operations. 67 Parent company employees were on the subsidiary's
board of directors and attended monthly board meetings at which they
monitored the minutiae of the subsidiary's business, including the details
of the daily operations-"personnel practices, sales efforts, and produc-
62. Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 44. But see Presser,
Piercing, supra note 16, § 1.04 ("[I]t is the quality of the investment opportunity itself, and
not the elimination of possible personal liability that leads an investor to commit his or her
capital.").
63. The following analysis takes as a given that efficiency is the criterion against which
to measure limited liability's effects. Distributional consequences, although they are not a
traditional focus of law and economics analyses, weigh against limited liability. The
distributional concern is that individuals who benefit from corporate activity may be able
to shift some of its costs to others who benefit little or not at all from the corporate activity.
64. "[T] he parent as sole shareholder is almost invariably engaged in the managerial
functions of establishing policy, determining budget, providing administrative support,
and participating in the decisionmaking of the subsidiary corporation." Blumberg,
Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 623.
65. 468 A.2d 150, 155 (N.J. 1983).
66. See id. at 154 ("For a stretch of several thousand feet, the concentration of
mercury... is the highest found in fresh water sediments in the world.").
67. Id. at 155.
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tion."68 The parent faced no practical obstacles to acquiring information
about environmental risk from the subsidiary's operations.
The assumption that shareholders face significant information costs
is also dubious when the shareholder is another corporation or an institu-
tion. Even without occupying a position of potential or actual control in
the corporation, an institutional shareholder's information costs are
likely to be low. A corporation, bank, mutual fund, pension fund, or in-
surance company generally will be an able compiler and analyzer of cor-
porate information. 69
That leaves the individual shareholder with a small share of equity.
Even for this shareholder, acquiring analyses of a company's perform-
ance and prospects, either from a market intermediary or on the In-
ternet, may be straightforward. Furthermore, an expanded shareholder
liability regime might lead small shareholders to more regularly demand
the creation and dissemination of appropriately tailored analyses. None-
theless, the assumption of significant information costs is most plausible
for the individual shareholder with a small share of equity. Such a share-
holder could find it difficult (or expensive) to acquire and effectively ana-
lyze detailed information about corporate operations.
Now consider the risk aversion correction justification. Prelimina-
rily, of course, limited liability does not address investor risk aversion by
reducing risks, but by shifting them. In the case of corporate tort and
statutory liability, limited liability shifts these risks from shareholders to
tort victims and the community at large. If the total social costs spent on
managing risk are to be reduced, the new risk bearers must be better risk
bearers than the shareholders. Generally, then, risk shifting will improve
social welfare (measured as total social utility) only if two conditions are
satisfied.70 First, the shareholder must not be better positioned to moni-
tor or influence the risky corporate activity than the tort victim. 7 1 If it
68. Id. at 155; see also Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 624 ("[F]ull
information about the subsidiary's operations is always available to the parent
corporation.").
69. Institutional investors also are likely to have ready access to information. See, e.g.,
Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445, 450 (1991) ("The heads of public employee pension funds have
become high profile players in the corporate governance process .... At the same time,
consultants have emerged who advise, encourage, and organize institutional investors.");
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 571 (1990)
[hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity] ("[M]ajor public pension funds have gone
beyond voting against management proposals, and are offering their own corporate
governance proposals.").
70. The following analysis builds in significant part upon Steven Shavell's work. See
generally Shavell, supra note 61.
71. See id. at 175-76. Social welfare also will not be improved by the shifting of risk if
the party that would have borne the risk could have procured insurance to spread it. See
id. at 176 n.17 (arguing that to extent that shareholders could purchase liability insurance
in absence of limited liability, "it is not clear that protection of risk-averse shareholders
against risk should be considered an affirmative advantage of limited liability"). While
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were otherwise, risk shifting would create greater inefficiency by remov-
ing a monitoring incentive for the party that could most cheaply antici-
pate and avoid a loss. Second, the victim must be less risk averse than the
individual shareholder, and thus more able or more willing to bear the
risks72 associated with a particular corporate activity. 73
The risk aversion correction justification does not apply equally to all
varieties of shareholder. For many shareholders, as discussed below, both
conditions are unlikely to be satisfied simultaneously.7 4 While the condi-
tions are not assured of satisfaction even in this case, the justification has
most persuasiveness when the shareholder is a less wealthy individual with
a small share of the corporation's equity.
The first condition also focuses on information costs, but this time
looks at their relative significance for different actors: Can the share-
holder, compared with a tort victim, more easily (or cheaply) anticipate
or avert injury from corporate activity? Assuming that the injury is the
type that can be anticipated, most types of corporate shareholders will be
better placed than tort victims to do so. Again, controlling and institu-
tional shareholders will face relatively low information costs associated
with monitoring their corporate investments. Suppose the firm's risky
some risks are difficult to insure, so-called "comprehensive general liability insurance" is a
standard type of policy. See also Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability Insurance
Law 24-25 (1991) (analyzing "Comprehensive General Liability" insurance). Moreover,
environmental insurance has become increasingly available. See Marialuisa S. Gallozzi &
Alice V. Stevens, Transactional Uses of Environmental Risk Policies, in Practising Law
Institute, New Solutions to Environmental Problems & Real Estate Deals 301, 320 (2000)
(noting that environmental insurance coverage limits have "increased steadily," while price
has not "increased appreciably," and "available coverages continue to broaden"); Eric M.
Jacobs, Emerging Issues in Pollution Insurance: Limiting Risk in the New Millennium, in
ALI-ABA Course of Study, Environmental Insurance 319, 321 (2000) (noting increased
capacity, reduced expense, and broadened coverage of current pollution insurance
market).
72. Limited liability does not shift the entire risk of loss to the tort victim. See Shavell,
supra note 61, at 191 n.6 ("[1]t is never optimal for the entire losses [sic] to be shifted from
one risk-averse party to a second."). For example, even under limited liability,
shareholders bear some risk, in the sense that shareholders risk a decline in share value as a
corporation pays a tort loss. Beyond that, the risk of loss is borne by the victim of the tort
or statutory violation.
73. See, e.g., Cooper Alexander, supra note 11, at 390 ("Limited liability is said to
produce a net gain to society because the rule shifts risk to better risk bearers.");
Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 45 (noting the argument that
limited liability's benefits to shareholders will be exactly offset by detriment to creditors
depends on questionable assumption that "risk is borne equally well by creditors and
stockholders"). In the case of "involuntary" creditors, Easterbrook and Fischel do not
attempt to argue that tort victims are less risk averse than individual shareholders, but
instead argue that the question of whether limited liability should be retained for torts and
statutory violations depends on an empirical analysis of the size of the moral hazard versus
the benefits of retaining limited liability. Id. at 49-50.
74. If only one condition is satisfied, then limited liability's effect on efficiency is
indeterminate. Whether the efficiency-enhancing effect will predominate over the
efficiency-reducing effect is an empirical question.
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activity is manufacturing a risky product. Compared with an individual
tort victim, controlling and institutional shareholders both can better
monitor the extent of the firm's research into product risks and act on
that information to influence the corporation to address the risks,
whether the shareholders influence the corporation directly through cor-
porate governance mechanisms or indirectly through the sale of shares.
The individual shareholder holding only a tiny fraction of equity in a
large, publicly-traded corporation may face significant information costs.
Consequently, she may be no better able than a potential tort victim to
influence corporate activity directly. However, relative to a potential tort
victim, such a shareholder still may have better access to corporate infor-
mation, and, of course, she can sell her shares. For example, suppose the
mercury processing plant in the Ventron case had had small individual
shareholders. Those shareholders likely would have been better posi-
tioned than the downstream neighbors of the Wood Ridge processing
plant to know that the plant was engaged in mercury processing and that
it was discharging process waste into the river and thus to anticipate that
the plant's operations were environmentally risky.7 5 In short, controlling,
institutional, and even small individual shareholders under some circum-
stances, will be better than tort victims at anticipating and averting risks
from corporate activities.7 6
Suppose that the risks presented by corporate activities could not
possibly be anticipated.7 7 Shareholders would have no comparative ad-
vantage in monitoring or influencing corporate decisions. Even then,
however, limited liability does not appear generally to satisfy the relative
75. Of course, in other cases, the individual shareholder's relative ability to anticipate
risk may be less clear, such as where the tort victim purchases products with obvious risks.
See infra note 76.
76. This might not be the case for torts in which the tort victim has a long course of
dealings with the corporation or for certain types of product purchases. For example, a
small individual shareholder in a medical products company is not necessarily better able
than a tort victim to anticipate that the company's manufacturing processes are resulting
in leaky syringes. This may be especially true if the tort victim is an institution, such as a
hospital. This might also be the case for a business tort, such as tortious interference with
contract. However, the presence of some dealings between the tort victim and the firm
(e.g., the purchase of a product) hardly means that the tort victim will be as able to
anticipate the risks of the corporation's activities as the corporation and at least some of its
shareholders. The vast majority of tort cases are brought by individual plaintiffs. See
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bull., Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large
Counties, 1996, at 3 & tbl.3 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
ttvlc96.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reviewing state court trials in seventy-
five largest counties nationwide). Of product liability cases brought in 1996,
approximately 70% involved asbestos or other toxic chemicals, defective medical products,
and defective motor vehicles. Id. For these types of categories, concluding that an
individual tort victim could better anticipate product risks than someone connected with
the firm's operations seems difficult at best.
77. Cf. Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14J. Legal Stud. 689, 691 (1985) (discussing
when risks are reasonably "knowable").
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risk aversion condition-that shareholders are better risk bearers than
tort victims. The answer to this question is more complex than the an-
swer to whether most types of shareholders are better than tort victims in
anticipating and averting risk. Nonetheless, for most combinations of
shareholders and tort victims, there seems no persuasive reason to con-
clude that the tort victim would be consistently better at bearing risk than
the shareholder.
Under a traditional economic analysis, the risk preferences of a tort
victim will be a function of the type of injury from the tort (whether it is
injury to property, person, or the environment) and the total costs of the
tort imposed on the individual relative to the individual's wealth.7 8 This
in turn will relate to whether there are others who would bear a portion
of the loss, which would be a function of the type of tort as well as the
liability rule. Whether others might bear a portion of the loss would also
depend on whether insurance is available. For example, a potential tort
victim might find health insurance to be readily available. For an injury
to a shared environmental resource on which the individual relies (say, a
body of water in which the individual fishes), finding insurance would be
more difficult. Moreover, due to the substantial debates on how to value
them, environmental injuries and severe health injuries (for example,
death) do not fall neatly into such a framework. 79
Similarly, for an individual shareholder, her risk aversion is a func-
tion of the proportion of her wealth that would be represented by the size
of her loss from the injury.8 0 This in turn is a function of the loss attribu-
table to the tort and whether there may be others that would bear a por-
tion of the loss, which in turn depends on the liability rule and insurance
78. E.g., Shavell, supra note 61, at 189 ("The importance of risk aversion will
ordinarily depend on the size of risk in relation to an individual's assets and to his needs.
... [Wjhere a person with assets of $300,000 faces a $5,000 risk, risk aversion will likely be
an unimportant factor."). Of course, when a tort is suffered by multiple individuals or a
community (as with a plane crash or an environmental injury), an individual's particular
loss might be only a fraction of the loss for which the tortfeasor (say, a single shareholder)
might be responsible.
79. The debate over the appropriateness of valuing human life is well-known and
need not be discussed further here. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Strategic and Ethical Issues
in the Valuation of Life, in Strategy and Choice 359, 359-61 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed.,
1991) (recounting the debate over methodological approaches for the valuation of human
life). In the environmental context, there is an ongoing debate regarding whether the
appropriate measure of social welfare should be a summation of individual preferences.
See, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 Ecology L.Q. 545, 579 (1997) ("It is not at all clear
that public decisionmaking should reflect the aggregate of private preferences.").
80. See Shavell, supra note 61, at 189. An individual risk preference reflects that
individual's marginal utility of income. For example, where the marginal utility of income
to an individual is diminishing, the individual will prefer to avoid risks. See Lipsey et al.,
supra note 14, at 165 n.7. Further, wealthy individuals, unlike presumably less wealthy tort
victims, are generally in a better position to diversify risks. "Wealthy people and financial
institutions are in a position to diversify, notwithstanding shareholder liability." Blumberg,
Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 613.
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availability. A shareholder who stands to lose all her wealth likely will be
more risk averse than one with only a small portion of her wealth at
risk."' Consequently, the greater an individual's wealth, the easier it is
for her, as a general matter, to bear the risk of a given loss.
Take first the simplest case of risk shifting: a choice between
whether a single tort victim will bear a financial loss that exceeds the
corporation's assets or whether a single corporate or institutional share-
holder will bear that loss. Generally, corporate and institutional share-
holders can be seen as risk neutral. 82 For example, a parent company
can spread the loss among its shareholders or fairly easily obtain liability
insurance.8 3 Even the most conservative institutions, such as private pen-
sion funds, are not likely to be especially risk averse.8 4 Such investors are
likely to have larger portfolios that can be diversified even in the absence
of limited liability. Meanwhile, the wealthy person seems no more likely
than anyone else to be a tort victim; tort victims generally are individu-
als8 5 and are likely to be randomly distributed by income.8 6
Thus, assuming that neither has an advantage in obtaining insur-
ance, a tort victim is likely to be relatively more risk averse than such a
corporate shareholder.87 Moreover, a tort victim's loss, even if expressed
81. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1886
(noting that controlling shareholder of close corporation could be risk averse); Shavell,
supra note 61, at 189.
82. Institutional investors hold approximately half of the corporate equities in the
United States. NYSE Facts 2000, supra note 12, at 61. Institutional investors other than
mutual funds accounted for over 40% of the total holdings. Id.
83. See Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1882 n.6
(arguing that parent corporations are likely to be risk neutral); Note, supra note 59, at 995
("[Alny loss the parent might suffer would be spread widely among its shareholders and
customers .... [Moreover, the parent] is in a good position to insure against the risk of
[injury or liability].").
84. Even pension funds, which some might consider risk averse, are free, within
Department of Labor rulings, to invest in securities issued by small or new companies and
venture capital partnerships, provided they do not endanger an entire portfolio. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Report to the Congress on the Availability of Credit to
Small Businesses 44 (Oct. 1997) [hereinafter Bd. of Governors, Rep. to Congress],
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/sbc-rep.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). Pension funds are increasing their investments in riskier
businesses. Id. (noting that pension funds have become major investors in comparatively
risky businesses through venture capital partnerships).
85. See supra note 76 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics study).
86. Consequently, it cannot be easily assumed that tort victims as a group are risk
neutral or risk preferring. The assumption that tort victims are likely to be randomly
distributed by income seems conservative, given that environmental hazards, for example,
tend to be concentrated in low income areas. Further, a wealthy individual could afford to
take more risk-reducing actions, such as investing in more precautions (a safer car) or not
purchasing a home near a major industrial facility. On the other hand, greater wealth also
might be related to risk-increasing actions, such as traveling to more places or buying more
consumer products.
87. For simplicity, this analysis assumes that the victim of the potential corporate tort
is a single individual. There is no reason to think that in cases of collective injury, such as
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in financial terms, may be something more significant or difficult to di-
versify, such as physical injury or death. 88 Shifting risk in this case would
reduce social utility.89
Assuming that the corporate or institutional shareholder can no less
easily insure against the risk than the individual tort victim is clearly rea-
sonable and even conservative. The assumption is appropriate, given the
apparent availability of liability insurance to businesses9° compared, for
example, with the significant number of individuals whose health is ei-
ther uninsured or underinsured. 9 1 Further, to the extent the share-
holder possesses the capacity to control the corporation, the shareholder
may be a better risk bearer because the shareholder can influence the
corporation to buy insurance, thereby spreading risks.
92
Even compared with the individual shareholder, a tort victim will not
necessarily be a better risk bearer. Take the less wealthy individual share-
holder (and again, assume an unforeseeable loss, so the shareholder's
ability to monitor and influence the corporation is not relevant to the
question). Assuming an equal ability to procure insurance, it is simply
unclear whether such an individual shareholder will, on average, be a
better risk bearer than the "average" individual tort victim.
Now assume that the individual shareholder is wealthy. Since tort
victims are likely not to be especially wealthy, such a shareholder proba-
bly will be a better risk bearer than the victim. Finally, take the case in
environmental torts, a community either would be able to more readily predict and avoid
the particular injury or would be less risk averse and thus better able to bear a particular
risk than the tortfeasor. However, the analysis might change, for example, if each member
of the community could be said to bear only a fraction of the injury. But see supra note 79
(noting theoretical debate on measures of environmental injury). Further, to the extent
the victim of the potential corporate tort is another corporation, the corporation could be
assumed to be risk neutral.
88. See Leebron, supra note 2, at 1602-03 & n.116 ("tort injuries are in large part
nondiversifiable and uninsured").
89. See Shavell, supra note 61, at 207 ("In the case where victims are risk averse and
injurers are risk neutral, it will be optimal . . . for injurers to bears the risk of victims'
losses.").
90. Under an expanded shareholder liability rule, a shareholder's risks would be
covered if either the shareholder purchased insurance or the corporation did. Liability
insurance is generally available for "most businesses," even for environmental injuries. See
Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1888 & n.23 ; supra note 71
(finding environmental insurance increasingly available).
91. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance,
and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 Colum.
L. Rev. 75, 80 (1993) (noting that "more than thirty million Americans have no private or
socially provided health insurance, and about one-quarter of those who are covered by
health insurance of some sort have inadequate coverage" (footnote omitted)). Moreover,
even those individuals with first party insurance are unlikely to be fully insured for
noneconomic losses, such as pain and suffering. See Leebron, supra note 2, at 1603.
92. Even if a particular corporate risk is completely unforeseeable, a corporation's
purchase of insurance for foreseeable liabilities-say, comprehensive general liability
insurance-still may help cover liabilities from an unforeseeable risk.
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which the shareholder has the capacity to control the corporation. Here,
it is fair to conclude that the shareholder can more easily, through insur-
ance, spread risks than the tort victim. Even if the shareholder herself
cannot afford to or chooses not to purchase insurance, the shareholder
can influence the company to buy insurance.
In short, it cannot be assumed, all else being equal, that a potential
tort victim will be more risk neutral or risk preferring than the corporate
shareholder, whether an individual or institution. In most instances, the
stronger case is that the shareholder will be a better risk bearer.
Generalizations are even more difficult in complex cases, such as
when both the victims of a single corporate tort and the shareholders that
might bear excess liability are numerous. Tort victims certainly could be
better risk bearers than shareholders if, for example, the class of poten-
tial tort victims was as numerous as the class of shareholders, but the tort
victims generally were wealthier or were (presumably risk neutral) corpo-
rations or institutions. Tort victims also could be better risk bearers if a
particular tort loss were shared among numerous victims, leading to a
smaller potential loss per victim-and one that is significantly smaller
than the potential per shareholder loss.
The data suggest, however, that tort victims are far less likely than
shareholders to be corporations or institutions and, further, are likely to
be less wealthy than shareholders. Moreover, we lack data suggesting that
corporate tort victims will tend to be more numerous than the number of
potential shareholders that might bear a loss in excess of corporate assets.
In short, the risk aversion correction justification (again assuming
the simple case) argues that a shareholder will be less able than a tort
victim to anticipate and influence risky corporate activity and will be a
poorer risk bearer than a tort victim. Again assuming the simple case,
this seems unlikely for the shareholder that is a corporation or institu-
tion. The strongest case for this conclusion involves the individual share-
holder who is not particularly wealthy, 93 who may have significant infor-
mation costs, and for whom a loss may represent a substantial portion of
her portfolio. For more complex cases, it is simply unclear whether
shareholders are poorer risk bearers than tort victims.
It is fair to say, however, that both the information costs justification
and risk aversion justification are relatively weak for the institutional
shareholder and the shareholder with the capacity to control. They re-
tain force primarily for a particular type of shareholder-an individual
possessing only a small share of equity in a large corporation. For such a
shareholder, information costs are relatively high, and the shareholder is
not in a position to influence a corporation to insure or avoid risks. The
93. Cf. Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 576 (stating that most of limited
liability's "theoretical advantages, however, are valid only when limited liability is
interposed for the protection of the ultimate investors in the enterprise").
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risk aversion story is less clear. 94 However, to the extent the individual's
portfolio would be threatened by a large corporate tort liability, the
shareholder also may be risk averse. She may be more risk averse than
the victim of a corporate tort, especially if the corporate tort victim is also
one of a large class or has better insurance.
This is the shareholder, so the argument goes, who would forego a
socially beneficial investment (i.e., one where the investment's social util-
ity exceeds its social cost) either because monitoring costs are too high or
because of aversion to a small risk of a significant corporate liability. For
this shareholder, it might be socially "efficient" to have a less risk averse
tort victim bear the costs of an unforeseeable risk.
95
B. Describing Shareholder Characteristics
Sentimental notions aside, the reality is that the risk averse, small
individual shareholder simply may not be "typical." There are many indi-
viduals whose only experience with shareholding consists of purchasing a
few shares of a company traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Sev-
eral pieces of evidence, however, suggest that most corporate sharehold-
ers do not fit the image of the "typical" small, less wealthy, risk averse
shareholder facing significant information costs. Most shareholders look
different.
First, most corporate equity is not held by individuals. Individual in-
vestors directly hold under 40% of corporate equity, and around 60% if
mutual funds and pension funds are treated as individual investment.
96
94. The information costs justification and risk aversion justification are in some
tension with each other with regard to the proportion of ownership held by the
shareholder. Take a class of shareholders, each of whom owns the same percentage of the
corporation's stock. The information costs justification seems stronger the more
numerous the class of shareholders (and thus the smaller likelihood each individual will
cheaply obtain information and influence corporate operations decisions). Assuming that
the limited liability alternative is a pro rata liability rule, the risk aversion justification
seems stronger with a smaller shareholder class because, holding shareholder wealth
constant, each shareholder will bear a larger proportion of total tort costs under the pro
rata rule.
95. Perhaps needless to say, this analysis takes at face value the notion that
maximizing total social utility should be the appropriate goal of these liability rules. Even
if shifting risk from corporate shareholders to tort victims could be conceptualized as
efficient, distributional concerns of course might weigh against such a shift. See supra
note 63.
96. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United
States: Flows and Outstandings Fourth Quarter 2001, at 45 (2002) [hereinafter Flow of
Funds 2001]. These statistics almost certainly overstate individual holdings of corporate
equity, as the data on household holdings includes the holdings of nonprofit institutions
and the equities data excludes intercorporate holdings. See New York Stock Exchange,
Shareownership 2000, at 33 [hereinafter Shareownership 2000] (noting inclusion of
nonprofit data), available at http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/shareownersurvey.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Flow of Funds 2001, supra, at 45 (noting that data
on corporate equities excludes intercorporate holdings). That statistic includes not only
publicly-traded corporate equities, but estimates of closely-held shares (equity issued by
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The remainder is held by institutional investors, including other corpora-
tions.9 7 Moreover, institutional investors often hold a significant share of
a given company's equity,9 8 improving their ability to monitor it. Institu-
tional investors are more likely to be risk neutral than risk averse. Moreo-
ver, it is difficult to assume that institutional shareholders will tend to be
more risk averse than tort victims, who are generally individuals. Institu-
tional investors, including mutual funds, also can more easily obtain and
analyze corporate information, placing them in a position to anticipate
and potentially influence hazardous corporate activity.99
The individual shareholders of large, publicly-traded corporations
listed on one of the three major stock exchanges (the NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ)-like the holder of 200 shares of General Electric-would
seem most likely to conform to the image of the small, not especially
wealthy, risk averse stockholder with no control over the corporation and
with significant information costs.
However, directly-held individual equity holdings, as noted, are a mi-
nority of all corporate equity. And well over one-third of individual eq-
uity holdings, whether held directly or through the intermediary of a mu-
tual fund, are not in publicly-traded equities 0 0 In 2000, moreover,
private corporations, not publicly traded). Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Flow
of Funds Accounts of the United States: Flows and Outstandings Third Quarter 1999
(2000) (discussing table L.213), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). Mutual funds and pension funds, which own
approximately 20% of all corporate equities, are considered institutional investors in these
statistics. That seems appropriate in view of their superior access to corporate information
and generally superior ability to diversify holdings. Even if mutual fund shares held by
individuals were treated as "individually-held" corporate equity, and pension funds and
other intermediaries were included as well, total individual holdings of U.S. corporate
equity still would amount to something over 60% of the total equity. See Shareownership
2000, supra, at 33. Of the corporate equities held by mutual funds, a little over half of the
investment in mutual funds is contributed by individuals; the remainder of the equity is
held by institutional investors apart from mutual funds. See Inv. Co. Inst., Institutional
Investors and Mutual Funds, Fundamentals, July-Aug. 1995, at 1 at http://www.ici.org/
economy/institutionalinvestors.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing 1994
figures).
97. Institutional investors hold 50.8% of all outstanding corporate equities. See NYSE
Facts 2000, supra note 12, at 6. "At yearend 1989, the 50 largest institutions owned... 27%
of the entire U.S. stock market. The 13 largest institutions held over half of this amount-
an average of over 1% of the U.S. market each." Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note
69, at 567-68 (footnote omitted).
98. See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 69, at 568 ("Legal obstacles
notwithstanding, institutions are talking about, and occasionally moving toward, owning
substantial stakes individually, or forming groups to hold such stakes.").
99. See supra note 96.
100. An analysis of the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finance, a triennial survey
conducted for a time by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center and currently
by the University of Chicago National Opinion Research Center, see Arthur B. Kennickell
et al., Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 7-11 (1997) (discussing survey methodology), indicates that
a little over half of household corporate equity holdings consists of stock in publicly-traded
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household sector holdings of both publicly-traded and closely-held corpo-
rate equity totaled $7.3 trillion and approximately $9.5 trillion adjusting
for mutual fund investments.1 01 By comparison, the total market capitali-
zation of the New York Stock Exchange alone at that time was over $17
trillion.1 02
We do not possess information enabling us to fully assess the risk
preferences of individual shareholders. However, at least one characteris-
tic of this group weighs against assuming that they are more risk averse
than potential victims of corporate tort and statutory violations. The vast
majority of corporate stock held by individuals is held by wealthy individ-
uals. In 1998, shares on any of the major stock exchanges held by individ-
ual investors with total stock portfolios of $50,000 or less accounted for
less than 10% of all shares traded on any listed exchange owned by indi-
viduals. 10 3 This includes shares held through mutual funds. Eighty-seven
percent of shares held by individuals, either directly or through mutual
funds, were held by individuals with stock portfolios exceeding
$100,000.104 This is not to say that an individual with a portfolio of
$100,000 in the stock market might not be risk averse-a retiree, for ex-
ample, is likely to be quite risk averse, as may be someone evaluating an
activity that would risk her entire portfolio. However, shifting a given risk
only increases social utility when the shifting is to a person who is rela-
tively less risk averse. The data on wealth does suggest that it is questiona-
ble to assume that these individuals should be presumed more risk averse
for a given risk than a corporate tort victim, who cannot be presumed
wealthy.
Assuming that individual investors are risk averse may be questiona-
ble for another reason: Just over 82% of households with investments in
the stock market polled in a broad-based study sponsored by the Federal
corporations, held either directly or through mutual funds. The remainder constitutes
equity in all types of privately-owned businesses. See Carol Bertaut & Martha Starr-
McCluer, Household Portfolios in the United States 26-27 (Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors
Working Paper, Apr. 2000) (finding that household stock holdings, either directly or
through mutual funds, totaled 21.7% of household assets while "business equity" totaled
16.9%; business equity figure includes both privately-held corporations and partnerships);
see supra text accompanying note 12 (vast majority of business receipts attributable to
corporations, compared with partnerships and sole proprietorships).
101. Flow of Funds 2001, supra note 96, at 90 tbls.L.213 & L.214 (listing fourth
quarter 2001 data); supra note 96 (discussing individual holdings of mutual funds). But
see supra note 96 (arguing that mutual fund investments are more akin to institutional
investments than individual investments).
102. See NYSE Facts 2000, supra note 12, at 5.
103. Of 84 million individual investors holding common stock in 1998, approximately
60% had total stock portfolios of $50,000 or less. Shares held by these investors accounted
for approximately 6% of all shares owned by individuals. See Shareownership 2000, supra
note 96, at 15, 27.
104. Id. at 27. This statistic probably underestimates these individuals' total wealth,
since it does not take into account wealth other than holdings of common stock.
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Reserve Board 105 viewed themselves as willing to tolerate an average,
above average, or substantial amount of risk.' 0 6 (Thirty-five percent
viewed themselves as tolerating an above average or substantial amount of
risk.) It could be argued that these responses were made against the
backdrop of limited liability and thus do not represent the levels of risk
aversion that would be present in the absence of limited liability (and
furthermore, survey results do not always reliably predict actual behav-
ior). However, the survey results at least raise questions regarding
whether an individual investor can be assumed to be more risk averse
than an individual tort victim.
The composition of the shareholder population also raises questions
about the information costs justification. As noted above, corporate and
institutional shareholders, especially those in a position of control, such
as parent corporations, are likely to face low information costs. 10 7
Like the risk aversion justification, the information costs justification
has greater force in the case of individual shareholders. However, even as
to those shareholders, the story is not altogether clear. A substantial pro-
portion of individual equity holdings are in close corporations, and share
ownership in those corporations tends to be highly concentrated.10 8 The
S Corporation shareholder generally is one of a very few. S Corporation
returns represent approximately half of the 3.9 million corporation in-
come tax returns filed with the IRS, and somewhere between one-fifth
and one-sixth of corporate economic activity. 109 As discussed above, over
90% of S Corporations are owned by three or fewer shareholders. 110 For
close corporations generally, 79% have a shareholder with 50% or more
of the equity."' Small uninvolved shareholders are apparently relatively
rare. "Relatively few small businesses raise equity from external
sources." 112 The information costs justification would seem to have no
105. Id. at 8 (basing data on Survey of Consumer Finances; observing, "There is a
broad consensus that the Survey of Consumer Finances provides the best available
information on household asset holdings.").
106. Id. at 30 (analyzing University of Michigan's Survey Research Center data
collected in 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, on behalf of Federal Reserve Board).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
108. See supra note 100 (discussing individual shareholdings in close corporations);
infra text accompanying notes 109-111.
109. Wittman & Grant, supra note 41, at 40. Not surprisingly, perhaps, S
Corporations are a "small though growing percentage" of corporate net income. For Tax
Year 1996, S Corporation income represented 17.6% of corporate net income. Id.
110. See supra note 43. Less than 10% of S Corporations had four or more
shareholders. Ninety-nine percent had ten or fewer shareholders. Wittman & Grant,
supra note 41, at 47.
111. See supra note 44.
112. Bd. of Governors, Rep. to Congress, supra note 84, at 41. In this report, the
Board of Governors commented that the definition of "small business" used by the Small
Business Administration included firms with fewer than 500 employees. More than 99% of
all businesses in the United States fit this definition. Id. at 1-2. Small businesses in high
technology are a recent and notable exception, as such firms apparently do attempt to
raise equity from external sources. Id. at 41.
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application to these shareholders. An individual shareholder in a pri-
vately-held corporation very often will be in a position of actual or poten-
tial control. At a minimum, she can easily monitor the corporation, in-
cluding the adequacy of its liability insurance.
In short, shifting responsibility for foreseeable risks away from a
shareholder in a small private corporation-who almost certainly will be
better able than a potential tort victim to anticipate and influence corpo-
rate activity-seems likely to generate more inefficiency, not less. Even
supposing the shareholder is risk averse because a liability loss could af-
fect a substantial portion of the shareholder's portfolio, the net effect on
efficiency of shifting the risk to a potential tort victim is indeterminate at
best. 113
For the case where a risk is genuinely unforeseeable and uninsur-
able, an individual shareholder with a large stake in a close corporation
could be a poorer risk bearer than an individual tort victim, particularly if
the tort victim is one of many. Again, however, it is difficult to assume
that this will generally be the case. 114
So what conclusions can be drawn from all of this? While many indi-
viduals do invest in corporate equity, a substantial portion of the market
for both publicly-traded and privately-held corporate equity consists of
investments from institutions and other corporations. They may possess
the capacity to control, and even if not, their characteristics differ sharply
from the profile of the "typical" less wealthy, risk averse investor with only
limited access to corporate information. Further, a substantial number of
individual investors in small corporations likely can easily monitor and
exercise some influence over corporate operations. Meanwhile, limited
liability is fully available not only to all small individual investors, but to
these institutional investors, investment intermediaries, parent corpora-
tions, and controlling shareholders.
At a minimum, for these shareholders with characteristics divergent
from those of the "typical" shareholders, limited liability seems overbroad
and inefficient. Shifting the risks inherent in these investments to tort
victims or victims of statutory violations does not increase social utility.
For these shareholders, monitoring a corporation is cheap and easy. Rel-
ative to potential victims of corporate torts and statutory violations, they
are far better placed to anticipate and influence potentially hazardous
corporate activity. Finally, it cannot readily be concluded, especially as to
institutional shareholders, that such shareholders will be more risk averse
113. See Shavell, supra note 61, at 175-76 (arguing that such a shift would have a
disadvantageous effect upon corporate incentives to control risk-creating behavior); supra
text accompanying notes 70-73 (discussing conditions under which shifting liability risks
will enhance efficiency).
114. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 105-106 (noting that most individual
corporate investors considered themselves willing to tolerate "average" to "substantial"
levels of risk); supra text accompanying notes 85-86 (regarding wealth of tort victims).
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than tort victims. Consequently, shifting the costs of excessively risky cor-
porate behavior likely will not increase social utility, but will reduce it.11
5
III. EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY
Limited liability's moral hazard is the incentive created for corpora-
tions to engage in excessively risky activity, shifting the costs of this activity
to tort and environmental victims. Much commentary has recognized the
problem as a general matter. The following Sections outline the basic
problem and provide some additional comments on evidence collected
to date. These Sections also discuss the phenomenon of the corporation
with a controlling shareholder. The corporate temptation to choose ex-
cessively risky activity will be especially pronounced when corporate eq-
uity is in the hands of a parent corporation or controlling shareholder.
A. The Basic Moral Hazard Problem
At least with respect to risky activities for which tort victims might
seek to obtain legal recourse, limited liability presents an opportunity to
avoid paying the appropriately-sized tort judgment. A corporation may
be created or operated in a way that renders it 'judgment-proof'-having
only nominal assets available to pay a tortjudgment.116 Or, a corporation
simply may have inadequate assets available to fully cover its responsibil-
ity. 117 And once the corporate assets are exhausted, the shareholder typi-
cally has no personal responsibility for the judgment except under quite
limited circumstances-when the corporate veil can be pierced or when
the shareholder's own conduct violates the law.' 18
115. Some might argue that the pervasive adoption of limited liability in the United
States and other countries provides evidence of its efficiency. Certainly, limited liability
cannot be lightly dismissed, and more empirical work would clarify the relative worth of
the various shareholder liability rules. But legislative decisions to select limited liability
would not seem to establish its credentials as the most efficient. For example, domestically,
many other features of limited liability apart from efficiency might lead a state legislature
to adopt it: uniformity with other state laws (limited liability is in the Model Business
Corporation Act), or the legislative perception that the benefits of a business operating
within the state will disproportionately benefit in-state residents, but that the costs will be
spread among residents of many states. Finally, the interests of undercompensated tort
plaintiffs likely are underrepresented in front of legislatures, not only because of free rider
problems, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 9-16 (1980), but because of
the simple difficulty of anticipating who will be affected by third party effects such as
environmental injuries.
116. Corporate veil piercing rules imposing liability on a shareholder when a
corporation has been undercapitalized provide little protection from this problem. See
infra text accompanying notes 233-253.
117. See LoPucki, Death of Liability, supra note 29, at 46-47 (discussing "soft"
judgment- proofing).
118. As discussed below, the opinion in United States v. Bestfoods has indicated that
both such opportunities are very limited. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). See infra text accompanying
notes 264-273.
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Consequently, corporate managers may select overly risky projects
more often than is socially optimal.1 19 As a matter of economic theory, a
shareholder will favor increases in risky activity as long as the anticipated
marginal benefit to the shareholder from an increase in risky activity (for
example, the present value of increase in expected dividends from corpo-
rate income) exceeds the anticipated marginal loss (present value of re-
duction in expected dividends or share price from costs of the activity,
liability judgments, and the like), up until the point where the marginal
benefit and marginal loss from an incremental increase in risky activity
are equal. 120 Under limited liability rules, the shareholder's total losses
are capped at the value of the shareholder's potential lost equity. Thus,
such risky projects may appeal to the shareholder even though they may
be socially costly.
Further, as between two projects with equal benefit, each of which
presents, say, a 10% risk of some liability that exceeds the corporation's
assets, the shareholder will be indifferent between them, even though
one might be more socially costly than the other. Suppose now the two
projects are characterized by different potential benefits. Because the
corporation will bear the project's costs only up to the amount of total
corporate assets, rather than bearing full costs, the shareholder will pre-
fer the project with a greater potential benefit, even if the net social bene-
fit is smaller.
More generally, limited liability reduces the shareholder's incentive
to gather and process information regarding a subsidiary's potentially
hazardous activities, 12 1 even when the shareholder is in a position of con-
trol or for other reasons can cheaply acquire that information. Conse-
quently, even a risk averse shareholder may make fewer attempts to en-
courage management to obtain more insurance, take more precautions,
or avoid the risky activity altogether. Thus the costs of excessively risky
119. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 49-50
("Because limited liability increases the probability that there will be insufficient assets to
pay creditors' claims, shareholders of a firm reap all of the benefits of risky activities but do
not bear all of the costs. These are borne in part by creditors."); Halpern et al., supra note
2, at 143-45 ("[L]imited liability could result in an incentive to firms to undertake
excessively risky investment activities."); Stone, supra note 7, at 71 (describing how limited
liability offers incentive for undercapitalized companies to engage in high risk projects).
120. This discussion assumes that the marginal benefit of a particular decision to
shareholders and the firm's assessment of marginal benefit are identical. The marginal
benefits and costs to the firm's managers can diverge, of course, from the marginal
benefits and costs faced by the shareholder. A considerable literature discusses the
problems shareholders have in ensuring that firm's managers serve the shareholder's
interests. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 1
(presenting argument that managers are "able to keep investors in the dark," creating a
"potential for misconduct"). As discussed below, however, any tendency by firm managers
to select less risky opportunities than those favored by shareholders is not likely to offset
fully the moral hazard of limited liability, especially when the shareholder is in a position
of control. See infra text accompanying notes 254-255.
121. See Shavell, supra note 61, at 175-76.
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corporate decisions for which shareholders bear no responsibility (be-
cause corporate assets have been exhausted) are shifted to third parties,
including tort victims, the environment, and the community, as well as
other "involuntary creditors" to which the corporation is liable.
122
This moral hazard has a number of consequences. The easy availa-
bility and effectiveness of limited liability in protecting the corporation's
shareholders or parents will lead companies to select corporate restruc-
turing as a means of managing the risk presented by hazardous corporate
activities.1 2s Restructuring is essentially an investment in transaction
costs.
Because corporations can limit liability by forming subsidiaries, the
corporate tendency will be to divert investment from other, more effi-
cient risk management strategies. For example, a corporation will be less
likely to purchase adequate insurance or otherwise allocate risk through
contracts.1 24 Further, a corporation may invest less in directly reducing
the risks of its hazardous activities-say, by changing technologies or ad-
ding additional safeguards. 12 5 With respect to environmentally hazard-
ous activities, for example, because application of limited liability could
be as, or more, effective in reducing potential environmental liability as
investing in pollution-reducing technology, corporations whose managers
122. By comparison, contract creditors generally are in a better position to anticipate
a risk of corporate nonpayment and to negotiate an expected payment that would
compensate for the risk. See Halpern et al., supra note 2, at 128 ("The voluntary creditor
will consider the probabilities that these outcomes will occur and determine an expected
yield at which funds will be lent to the corporation to compensate for the risk."); see also
id. at 135 (arguing that "for small companies with limited liability creditors often require
personal guarantees [thus converting] the limited liability company into one with
unlimited liability"); Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 51-52
(showing that voluntary creditor can, ex ante, charge premium to compensate for risk);
Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in
Bankruptcy, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 589, 623 (1975) (contending that creditors may have
opportunity to protect themselves); Leebron, supra note 2, at 1601 ("Tort claimants differ
from contract creditors in important ways.").
123. Given the wide array and effectiveness of devices that have traditionally been
available for insulating the corporation from liabilities, corporate lawyers have been able to
discharge their responsibilities by focusing principally upon insulating techniques for
minimizing a corporation's exposure to environmental risks. See Peter Menell, Legal
Advising on Corporate Structure in the New Era of Environmental Liability, 1990 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 399, 402-03; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note
2, at 1881 (noting that strong empirical evidence indicates that "increasing exposure to
tort liability has led to the widespread reorganization of business firms to exploit limited
liability to evade damage claims").
124. These latter methods are preferred ways of insulating the company from the
effects of risk, since the risk bearers are likely to monitor the companies to minimize the
possibilities of risk taking and encourage the company to take adequate precautions to
avoid tort liability.
125. See Shavell, supra note 61, at 168 (arguing that incentive for injurer to take
adequate care to avoid risk is significantly diluted if injurer can shield assets).
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decide to engage in environmentally risky activities often will direct their
resources to creating a new corporate layer.
1 26
For example, in one case, a company engaged in oil transport incor-
porated separate subsidiaries, each of which owned a number of barges
that transported oil on Lake Champlain. The companies had identical
officers and directors, and the subsidiaries remitted profits to the parent
by way of dividends. The parent had substantial involvement in subsidi-
ary operations. Poor barge operation led to a number of spills on Lake
Champlain. The spills resulted from employees continuing to pump oil
into the water after encountering a leak, employee failures to cap pipe-
lines, and disregard of navigation agreements.1 27 The limited liability
doctrine apparently encouraged resources to be devoted to corporate re-
structuring as a way to minimize environmental liability. Instead, the par-
ent should have invested (or encouraged the subsidiary to invest) in train-
ing barge employees regarding appropriate measures to avoid oil spills.
B. Preferred Risks Under Limited Liability
The tendency toward excessive risk taking under limited liability will
be skewed toward risky activities that present the risk of large losses.
128
For example, suppose a parent company with a subsidiary owning $2 mil-
lion in assets compares a choice of two risky projects for the subsidiary.
One presents a 1% risk of a $10 million loss in the next year; the other
presents a 25% risk of a $400,000 loss in the next year. With unlimited
liability for a parent corporation, and assuming that the corporation is
risk neutral, these choices might well be evaluated equally: Expected loss
would equal risk of loss times projected loss. With limited liability, how-
ever, the preferred project is clearly the first one-the small risk of a
large loss-since the parent corporation will not bear the full costs in case
126. See supra note 123.
127. These facts are taken from United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F.
Supp. 110 (D. Vt. 1973). While the district court did agree to issue an injunction against
the parent company, the case's decision, at the limits of veil piercing, seems somewhat
atypical. Id. at 119. Although the parent company had observed proper corporate
formalities, the court held that "[t]he public interest in preserving the environmental
integrity of Lake Champlain ... is sufficiently paramount that the parent corporation,
Bushey, which profits from the operations of its alter-ego subsidiaries, should be
accountable." Id. More typically, the strategy of investing in multiple subsidiaries to
manage risk succeeds. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 9-10 (N.Y. 1966)
(refusing to pierce veil to shareholder in multiple subsidiary taxicab case).
128. See Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1883 (noting
that small risk of large losses may encourage shareholders to overinvest in firm, assuming
creating subsidiaries is easy).
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the gamble fails. 129 The company is simultaneously less likely to purchase
adequate insurance to cover the risk.130
As among excessively risky projects, corporations will be more in-
clined to select those with a relatively delayed realization of expected
costs. Projects where the risky activity leads to a latent injury-one not
immediately detectable, such as pollution or cancer-will be preferred.
Projects with costs that cannot be imposed without ajudgment in a court
of law (e.g., common law tort litigation) will be preferred to projects with
costs that can be imposed more quickly (say, through administrative
fines). This is so even if the delayed costs have the same present value as
if they were imposed today (if, for example, a court judgment rendered
later were to include interest). If there is delay, a corporation and its
shareholders can more easily separate corporate assets from the risky cor-
porate activity. For example, the corporation is more likely to have suffi-
cient time to distribute dividends to shareholders. Once the payments
are made, a tort victim generally cannot gain access to those funds unless
the corporate veil is pierced. 3 1
While some have argued that tort victims may be indirectly protected
from excessive corporate risk taking by contractual creditors that will in-
sist on a showing that the corporation is maintaining adequate operating
129. Hansmann and Kraakman also discuss the possibility that a shareholder might
underinvest in a particular firm engaged in risky activities. Limited liability results in the
partial externalizing of the marginal increase in tort damages from expansion of the firm's
risky activities. That generally would encourage a shareholder to overinvest in the firm.
On the other hand, an increase in the value of the firm may make more assets available to
pay damages to all tort claimants, which would discourage shareholder investment. As
Hansmann and Kraakman acknowledge, however, the second effect is likely only when the
risk facing the firm is a relatively large probability of damages that do not substantially
exceed the firm's value. In other words, underinvestment is likely only when the marginal
investment increases the probability that a firm will actually be fully responsible for its
liabilities. Overinvestment in such firms is more likely when the activity presents a small
risk of a large tort judgment and when it is easy for a firm to limit assets available for tort
judgments by creating subsidiaries. See id. at 1883 & n.9.
130. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 77, at 709 (noting that a firm's incentives to insure
against knowable risk dissipate when "its liability exposure greatly exceeds its wealth").
Schwartz also observes that the incentive to insure is reduced when the imposition of costs
is delayed. Id. at 714-15 (arguing that when harms from a firm's action "do not
materialize for several years ... limited liability actually can create a pathological incentive
for entrepreneurs to operate firms without full insurance and thereby to externalize risk").
While potential claimants also may have insurance for, say, medical expenses and property
damage, see, e.g., White, supra note 50, at 1365 ("[v)ictims of random and conventional
negligence are usually covered by insurance"), such policies may not cover extraordinary
losses. Further, the firm (and its insurers) generally remain in a better position to
anticipate and to avert potential injuries. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92
(regarding relative ability of tort victims to anticipate losses and procure insurance).
131. On rare occasions, a court will hear arguments from tort creditors to recover
directly from shareholders on a fraudulent conveyance theory or if the corporation has
been dissolved. See infra note 274-277 and accompanying text.
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reserves, 132 the judgment values of tort suits still may greatly exceed avail-
able capital, leaving victims unprotected.
Tort judgment statistics suggest that the largest risks may involve de-
fective products, toxic substances, and environmental injuries. 13 3 In the
case of environmental risks, the combination of "small risk/large loss"
and "delayed cost realization" is typical. 134 First, environmental losses
tend to be delayed because the injuries to human health and the environ-
ment of particular substances may take years to manifest themselves. Sec-
ond, once an environmental injury has occurred, cleaning it up or restor-
ing the natural environment can be very expensive due to technological
difficulty.1 35 Third, the process of enforcing environmental liabilities-
especially large ones-is likely to take place years after the original con-
duct that created the environmental injury. Moreover, as a practical mat-
ter, legal action to address environmental harm faces significant obsta-
cles. Lack of scientific knowledge often presents an obstacle to
discovering environmental damage and to documenting such damage in
court.136 Fourth, the probability of liability is reduced because environ-
mental enforcement is predominantly pursued by federal, state, or mu-
132. See White, supra note 50, at 1396-99. But see Stephen L. Schwarcz, The
Inherent Irrationality ofJudgment Proofing, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 11 n.49 (1999) (noting that
such protection may not reach tort claimants because "a company could compensate
voluntary creditors without compensating involuntary creditors").
133. For example, in a survey of 1996judgments in state court cases, plaintiffs in cases
involving product liability claims or injury from toxic substances had, together with
medical malpractice claims, the highest median awards of any tort cases. In over 10% of
these cases, plaintiffs received awards of over $1 million (combined compensatory and
punitive damages). See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pub. No. NCJ
173426, Bull., Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996, at 7 (1999), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). By comparison, the median award in auto accident cases was $18,000; only 3.4%
of such cases involved awards of over $1 million. Id. Environmental injuries also involve
large potential liabilities. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
134. See Menell, supra note 123, at 404 n.20 ("Many environmental risks are remote,
though of great potential magnitude.").
135. For example, over 80% of the approximately 1300 hazardous waste disposal sites
on the Superfund National Priorities List involve groundwater contamination with
hazardous substances. EPA, Groundwater Cleanup at Superfund Sites 1 (1996), available
at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/tools/gw/brochure.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). Groundwater extraction and treatment remedies run in
the millions of dollars and "can take anywhere from several years to many decades," if it is
feasible to clean up the groundwater at all. Id. at 3. Generally, the Congressional Budget
Office has estimated the average cost of cleaning up a National Priorities List site,
including both capital investments and operations and maintenance (which can extend for
decades), at over $20 million per site, in present day dollars. Probst and others have
estimated an average cleanup cost for National Priorities List sites of $29.1 million and
note that cleanup costs range widely by type of site, from $12.7 million, on average, to
clean up an asbestos site, to $170.4 million, on average, to clean up a mining site.
Katherine N. Probst et al., Footing the Bill for Superfund Cleanups 36, app. A, at 132
(1995).
136. See, e.g., Robert Percival et al., Environmental Regulation 4 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing uncertainty of mechanism and effect of environmental damage).
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nicipal government entities. 137 Liabilities are frequently large, but many
violations are not pursued. For example, in fiscal year 1997, the EPA ob-
tained, on average, a penalty of over $700,000 in Clean Water Act settle-
ments, in addition to the costs of action to abate the violation, but the
total number of such judicial settlements was only thirty-five. 138 One esti-
mate is that between 18% and 27% of "major" facilities holding such per-
mits (a total of 7000, at that time), were in significant noncompliance
with their permits. In the hazardous waste context, as well, the EPA has
taken enforcement action at only a fraction of the hazardous waste sites
that warrant cleanup under its standards.139
137. Because environmental injuries so often involve shared resources such as water
or air, private common law actions generally have been inadequate to address
environmental harm. See, e.g., Frank P. Grad et al., Sen. Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works,
serial No. 97-12, 1 Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes-Analysis and
Improvement of Legal Remedies 96-132 (1982) (discussing shortcomings of various
common law actions for environmental harm). This was one reason for the enactment of
the current array of state and environmental statutes, most of which are enforced primarily
by governmental entities. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
484 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1987) (holding that government has primary Clean Water Act
enforcement responsibility, while citizen suits should serve supplementary role). A
number of state and federal statutes do provide private rights of action, including citizen
suits, but these often are available only to enforce prior government action or when the
individual plaintiff already has made a significant financial investment. For example, the
citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act authorize citizen suits against polluters only
for violation of effluent standards or limitations under the chapter, or for violation of an
order issued by the Administrator or a State. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). Similarly,
CERCLA's citizen suit provisions authorize suit against a polluter only if it is "alleged to be
in violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement or order which has become
effective pursuant to this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
CERCLA's liability provisions authorize a private suit only to recover "necessary costs of
response" to a hazardous substance release. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(B) (1994).
Consequently, environmental enforcement is still dominated by federal, state, or
municipal action.
138. Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA, EPA-300-R-98-003,
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Accomplishments Report FY 1997, at A1-A2
(1998). Over the same period, the EPA noted that it reached administrative settlements
for penalties in 205 cases of Clean Water Act violations (collecting a total of $4.2 million),
and issued 815 administrative compliance orders. Id. There is perceived
underenforcement of minor violations. See, e.g., Gen. Accounting Office, Letter Rep.
GAO/RCED-96-23, Water Pollution: Many Violations Have Not Received Appropriate
Enforcement Attention 2 (1996) (addressing violations of National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permits); see also Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-91-
166, Environmental Enforcement: Penalties May Not Recover Economic Benefits Gained
by Violators 1-2 (1991) (stating that EPA does not calculate a penalty that would prevent a
violator from profiting from a violation). Generalized underenforcement alone could
encourage regulated entities, including corporations, to take more minor risks. However,
that does not dispel the point that limited liability also may encourage corporations to take
major risks where liability, if imposed, would exceed corporate assets. Thus, strengthening
enforcement to address minor violations as well as major violations would only partially
address the problem. See, e.g., supra note 135 (discussing cost of groundwater cleanups).
139. The EPA has announced that, in addition to the 1300 sites on the National
Priorities List where the EPA is pursuing hazardous waste cleanup and cost recovery from
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As noted, the presence of large liabilities is also likely to be marked
in areas such as new product development, pharmaceuticals, and other
areas presenting health and environmental risks. For example, the cost
of damages from asbestosis alone amounted to $1.2 billion by 1986 and is
expected to exceed $31.7 billion. 140 Current cases involving the separa-
tion of treads on Firestone tires used on Ford Explorers are expected to
exceed the hundreds of millions of dollars.1 4 1 Whether investment in
corporate activities presenting these risks can be seen as "excessive" de-
pends in part on whether the liability costs are likely to be paid. In some
of the preceding examples, companies did pay liability costs. Nonethe-
less, the scale of these liabilities suggests that even large companies could
take "excessive" risks (i.e., risks likely to be externalized).
C. The Evidence of Excessive Risk Taking
As a general matter, there is little disagreement that limited liability
encourages companies to engage in excessively risky activity. Excessively
risky activity could be defined as the activity generating externalized so-
cial costs-those not, as a practical matter, collectible through tort liabil-
ityjudgments. Since we lack the "control set" of an industrialized regime
without limited liability, the extent of the overinvestment in this type of
excessively risky activity remains an empirical question that is difficult to
answer precisely. 14 2
Some commentators have suggested that bankruptcy cases or unpaid
tortjudgments of corporate subsidiaries might prove to be an indicator of
this excessive risk taking. 14 3 However, even a systematic examination of
reported cases in which tort or statutory plaintiffs attempted to obtain
responsible parties, there are between 1700 and 3000 "NPL-caliber" sites that meet the
NPL-listing criteria of health and environmental threats that are not included in the
federal remedial action program. See, e.g., Testimony of the Association of State and
Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials: Hearing on H.R. 2500 Before the
Subcomm. on Water Res. & Env't, House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 104th Cong.
1, 133 (1995) (statement ofJames Coleman) ("U.S. EPA and State Waste Managers project
that there are potentially another 1700 NPL caliber sites yet to be remediated in this
country.").
140. Driesen, supra note 79, at 596.
141. See, e.g., Chief of Bridgestone Says He Will Resign, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2001, at
W1 (noting Firestone parent company to take $750-million charge against earnings in light
of lawsuits). While total revenue figures for Firestone, the subsidiary that actually
manufactured and marketed the tires, are hard to come by, at least one press release
suggests that Firestone's net earnings may be significantly less than the liabilities expected
by its parent. See Bridgestone Corporation Announces Decline in Consolidated Net
Earnings and Sales Despite Strong Performance by Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., at http://
www.bridgestone-firestone.com/news/corporate/news/ 1 7.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2000)
(projecting total 1999 net earnings at $769 million for Bridgestone and its subsidiaries)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
142. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 50; see also infra
note 373 (discussing Weinstein's analysis of change in California from pro rata liability to
limited liability).
143. See infra note 158.
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compensation from corporations or their controlling shareholders likely
would seriously underestimate the association of limited liability with ex-
cessive risk taking. This is because claims are very often resolved out of
court prior to judgment. A large study of state court tort cases found that
nearly three-fourths were resolved through settlement and the details of
settlement generally were unknown.1 44 Moreover, claims frequently are
resolved, explicitly or implicitly, in the shadow of limited liability rules
and with the recognition that tort claimants do not fare well under bank-
ruptcy rules.
Bankruptcy filings could be a more reliable indicator of excessive
risk taking in mass tort cases, where the presence of large numbers of
uncoordinated plaintiffs (or perhaps an overly aggressive plaintiffs' class
action attorney) might lead some or all of the plaintiffs to litigate tojudg-
ment, with the combined weight of the suits forcing the company into
bankruptcy.
However, in tort cases where there are only a few plaintiffs, the plain-
tiffs are well-coordinated, or the government is the plaintiff, bankruptcy
filings would tend to underrepresent the size of the externality. 145
Again, environmentally risky activity presents a good example. Here,
corporations clearly rely on limited liability as a means of minimizing lia-
bility exposure, but not in a way that lends itself to systematic documenta-
tion.146 As noted, this type of activity can present the small risk of a large
liability likely to be favored under a limited liability regime. The federal
government, for example, brings large claims under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 147 for clean-
ing up hazardous substance releases. Claims under this statute very often
are in the millions of dollars, 148 and the statute authorizes courts to im-
144. See Steven K. Smith et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Special Report, Tort Cases in Large Counties, 1992, at 1-2 (reporting that of 378,000 tort
cases in the nation's seventy-five largest counties, 73% of cases were resolved through
agreed settlement, and noting that "details of tort settlements are unknown [; accordingly,
v]ery few systematic data are available regarding why cases are settled or the cost of
settlement for either party").
145. More information on the characteristics of tort litigation might help illuminate
the usefulness of bankruptcy filings as an indicator of excessive risk taking.
146. Although the research is now somewhat outdated, Thompson notes that prior to
1986, arguments to pierce the corporate veil were made in only six environmental cases,
and the veil was pierced in five of those cases. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1036, 1062 n.135 (1991)
[hereinafter Thompson, Empirical Study]. Although he concluded that judges might be
more likely to pierce the veil in environmental cases, he has since concluded based on later
data that piercing in that category has a frequency "that [has] receded toward the mean of
the entire sample." Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups:
Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 Conn. J. Int'l L. 379, 385 & n.35 (1999).
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
148. See, e.g., supra note 135 (discussing cost of groundwater cleanup).
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pose response costs on a wide array of entities with some connection to
the hazardous substance release.1 49
If corporations used subsidiaries for environmentally risky activities,
one might expect to observe a significant number of subsidiary bankrupt-
cies in response to government enforcement. However, the vast majority
of government claims are settled, very often for less than the face value of
the claim. The government guidelines for settlement expressly internal-
ize limited liability rules as the backdrop to settlement. For example, the
EPA's settlement policies based on a defendant's "ability to pay" judge a
company as "unable to pay" if paying would result in "undue financial
hardship. 1 50 "Undue financial hardship" means that a company would
go out of business, have its viability jeopardized, or lack the ability to pay
"ordinary and necessary business expenses. '"151 In determining "ability to
pay," the settlement policies assume that parent company assets are un-
reachable: "A corporation's owners (i.e., shareholders) generally enjoy
limited liability for any of the corporation's debts or legal claims .... In
assessing the financial health of a corporation, only the financial re-
sources of the corporation are relevant. 1 5 2 Consequently, any count of
the number of actual subsidiary bankruptcies in the face of large govern-
ment environmental claims would substantially undercount the number
of companies that have tried to limit exposure to environmental claims by
moving their hazardous activities to a subsidiary.
. The explicit government settlement policy for environmental claims
simply codifies the more general calculation of a tort plaintiff that is con-
sidering settlement and attempting to determine expected returns from
litigating. What a private plaintiff is likely to be able to obtain in court
from a subsidiary also is constrained by current limited liability rules.
Bankruptcy's high transaction costs and low priority for unsecured credi-
tors will discourage invoking the bankruptcy court's protections. Thus,
the general incentive for "tort victims suing under a regime of limited
liability . . . to accept a settlement for less than the full value of the
firm" 153 suggests that subsidiary bankruptcies in the face of tort or statu-
149. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994) (imposing liability on "owners," "operators," those
that "arranged for disposal," or generators, and "transporters" of hazardous waste).
150. EPA General Policy on Superfund Ability to Pay Determinations 1, 2 (Sept. 30,
1997) [hereinafter EPA General Policy] (stating that party's "ability to pay" Superfund
cleanup costs judged against "undue financial hardship" standard), available at http://es.
epa.gov/oeca/osre/970930-4.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also EPA
Guidance on Determining a Violator's Ability to Pay a Civil Penalty 1 (Dec. 16, 1986)
(noting that civil penalties can be adjusted for "extreme financial hardship"), available at
http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ore/aed/comp/acomp/al.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
151. EPA General Policy, supra note 150, at 2.
152. Id. at app.B. Assets of the corporation are deemed to exclude profits paid out to
shareholders, although profits paid after notice of the environmental claim are viewed with
considerably more suspicion.
153. Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1895 & n.43
(arguing that tort victims will accept less than full value in order to avoid costs and delay of
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tory claims are likely to understate the extent to which corporations ex-
ternalize the costs of risky activities.1 54
So what can be learned about the reality of excessive risk taking by
corporations, especially corporations with a parent company or control-
ling shareholder? Several pieces of evidence suggest that such risk taking
is significant and that incorporating represents a strategy to reduce liabil-
ity flowing from the risk taking.
First, a plaintiff's attempt to pierce the corporate veil generally
means that the plaintiff, at least, believes that the liable corporate entity
lacks sufficient assets to compensate the plaintiff and that a major share-
holder has significant additional assets. Otherwise, the plaintiff would
have simply filed against the corporation alone and would not have spent
the resources necessary to file a lawsuit against a shareholder.1 55 In the
1970s and 1980s, approximately 1500 out of 2000 cases that mentioned
veil piercing or a similar phrase actually consisted of attempts by plaintiffs
to pierce the corporate veil. In Robert Thompson's study of these cases,
as well as with the approximately 2100 veil piercing cases between 1985
and 1995, a little over half involved tort claims or claims of statutory
violations. 15 6
Second, anecdotal evidence regarding bankruptcies and claims
against subsidiaries supports the claim of excessive risk taking. Again, on
an aggregate level, the most relevant information might be the extent to
which judgments against a corporation that arise out of tort or statutory
claims exceed the assets available to a corporation, even though share-
holders have significant assets. Judgments against a close corporation or
a wholly- or largely-owned subsidiary would be of particular interest, since
the shareholders more likely could have affected the corporation's ability
to pay legal claims by influencing dividend distribution policy or other
obtaining litigated judgment). The presence of limited liability also may prompt an
attorney to decline a potential lawsuit against the shareholder of a corporate tortfeasor,
leading to further understating of the extent to which corporations externalize costs of
risky activities.
154. The absence of observable data on settlements makes it difficult to conclude that
limited liability is not accompanied by meaningful externalization of costs. See, e.g.,
Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 500 (arguing that presence of mass corporate torts does not
justify increased shareholder liability).
155. Of course, plaintiffs may try to pierce the corporate veil even when the
underlying claim lacks merit. Further, a plaintiffs attorney conceivably might try to sue a
parent company for strategic reasons-such as a better trial venue-even when the
subsidiary is well-capitalized and capable of paying compensation. The cost of litigating
and the difficulty of persuading a court to pierce the corporate veil likely will deter such
activity. To the extent strategic suits against parent companies take place, however, the
presence of reported veil piercing cases might overstate the extent to which corporations
seek to externalize their costs through the creation of subsidiaries.
156. Thompson, Empirical Study, supra note 146, at 1048, 1058; Telephone Interview
with Robert Thompson, Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School (May 14, 2001)
(discussing unpublished research updates).
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operational decisions. 157 As noted, such aggregate data is difficult to ob-
tain and almost certainly understates the amount of excessive risk taking
that takes place.
However, subsidiary bankruptcies do occur. 15 8 Litigation over inju-
ries from the Dalkon Shield and breast implants resulted in A.H. Robins
and the Dow Corning Company, respectively, filing in bankruptcy. 159
Further, in 1992, an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against
Gulf USA Corp. for its inability to pay $70 million in cleanup costs at a
mining and smelting complex at Bunker Hill, Idaho. Gulf had been con-
trolled by a series of individual shareholders that apparently had drained
assets from its operations.1 60 After reorganization, the company paid less
than $17 million toward cleanup.1 6 1
Although no bankruptcy filing took place, the Exxon Valdez oil spill
provides another example. Oil from that ship devastated Alaska's Prince
William Sound. The tanker was owned by a subsidiary of the Exxon Cor-
poration, the Exxon Shipping Corporation. Had Exxon claimed limited
liability-which public embarrassment deterred it from doing-the sub-
sidiary could not possibly have paid the cleanup costs. The parent com-
pany, however, had relatively little trouble covering the costs.1 6 2
In some ways, less visible examples are more telling. Although pub-
lic pressure compelled Exxon to pay the judgment against the subsidiary
that owned the tanker Exxon Valdez, public pressure may never come to
bear in the cases of smaller business enterprises. For example, in State
Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp.,163 the parent com-
157. Other useful information might include the extent to which the creation of
subsidiaries is more common in especially risky industries.
158. Bankruptcy filing data is suggestive of a broader corporate strategy to limit
exposure to tort liability by forming subsidiaries, although drawing firm conclusions from
bankruptcy filing data is extremely difficult. Compare White, supra note 50, at 1379-80
(arguing that aggregate trend downward in dividends to creditors in bankruptcy is
attributable to higher rate of personal bankruptcy filings), with LoPucki, Judgment
Proofing, supra note 14, at 1419-20 (arguing that "only remaining explanation" for trend
downward in dividends to unsecured creditors is that debtors could encumber more assets,
leaving fewer for unsecured creditors).
159. See Cooper Alexander, supra note 11, at 424; supra text accompanying notes
295-302.
160. See And Forgive Us Our Trespasses, Forbes, May 24, 1993, at 42 (noting that
Gulf's major shareholder at time of bankruptcy filing made "bondholders and
shareholders [in his various companies] upwards of $400 million" poorer).
161. News Briefs, Around the Valley and Idaho, Idaho Statesman, July 2, 1995, at 2B.
162. Apparently due to the high level of public indignation, Exxon "did not choose to
contest its liability for the negligence of its subsidiary." Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing
Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation
Liabilities, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 295, 334 (1996) [hereinafter Blumberg, Increasing
Recognition]. Paying the liabilities associated with the spill injured, but did not disable,
Exxon's finances. See Most Players in the Big Spill Have Moved On, Seattle Times, Mar.
20, 1994, at A16 (noting that Exxon Corp.'s usual net earnings of "about $5 billion a year
fell to $3.5 billion the year of the spill, but rebounded in succeeding years").
163. 468 A.2d 150, 155 (N.J. 1983).
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pany, Velsicol, was not vicariously responsible for the contamination
caused by a mercury processing plant owned by Velsicol's wholly-owned
subsidiary, Wood Ridge. Wood Ridge was formed specifically for the pur-
pose of operating the mercury processing plant. The plant had dumped
mercury process waste into a tidal estuary of the Hackensack River in New
Jersey, resulting in extraordinary contamination: "For a stretch of several
thousand feet, the concentration of mercury ... is the highest found in
fresh water sediments in the world."164 The parent company's involve-
ment with the subsidiary's day-to-day operations was "constant," the sub-
sidiary's board of directors were all officers of the parent, and the subsidi-
ary's board reviewed not only finances and public relations, but also the
details of daily operations such as personnel practices and production.
Seven years after its incorporation, the subsidiary subdivided its forty acre
parcel of land and declared a thirty-three acre land dividend-the land
on which the factory did not sit and the subsidiary's major asset apart
from the factory-to the parent.' 65 Nonetheless, the parent company did
not voluntarily undertake responsibility for its subsidiary's liability and
was not held vicariously liable because the subsidiary had not been cre-
ated to "perpetrate a fraud or injustice.' 66 Cleanup costs are expected
to be several million dollars. 1
67
Further, in Craig v. Charter Consolidated P.L.C.,168 the parent com-
pany, Charter Consolidated, P.L.C., an industrial and mining conglomer-
ate incorporated in the United Kingdom that held 62.5% of a U.K_ sub-
sidiary known as Cape Industries, was held not responsible for its
subsidiary's asbestos tort liability. Cape mined asbestos fiber in South Af-
rica and sold it in the United States through a wholly-owned subsidiary.
169
An individual injured as a result of his exposure to asbestos fibers
brought suit against Charter, attempting to pierce the corporate veil and
hold Charter responsible for Cape's stipulated personal injury liability.
164. Id. at 154.
165. Id. at 155.
166. Id. at 164; see also State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Arky's Auto Sales, 539 A.2d 1280,
1284 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (refusing to pierce corporate veil to two sole
shareholders of site where drums full of hazardous contaminants were dumped, despite
showing of extensive control). Although the parent company in Ventron eventually was
held responsible for cleaning up the mercury contamination under a state statute, the N.J.
Spill Compensation and Control Act, NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 58:10-23.11-.24 (West 1992), such
statutes now seem unlikely to provide a meaningful solution for the excess risk taking
occasioned by limited liability. See infra text accompanying notes 264-273.
167. EPA, Ventron/Velsicol: NPL Site Narrative at Listing (1984), available at http://
www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/narl49.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
168. 843 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1988).
169. The parties to the case stipulated that corporate separateness between Cape and
its wholly-owned subsidiary would be disregarded for purposes of the litigation, and that
the veil piercing issue should be approached as though Cape had been found liable to
plaintiff. See Craig v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. C1V.A.82-0321, 1987 WL 10191, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1987), rev'd, 843 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1988).
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Cape had engaged in a number of maneuvers to reduce its own lia-
bility to asbestos suits, including reorganizing to conduct business in the
U.S. market through a new, "seemingly independent" corporation.
170
Cape later made a policy decision not to appear in any United States
asbestos litigation; over $78 million in unpaid litigation judgments had
been entered against it by the time the Craig case was tried. 171 Mean-
while, evidence was presented in litigation that Charter, with nominees
on Cape's board of directors, was generally aware of Cape's operational
and financial decisions and was specifically aware of the decision of Cape
(and Cape's subsidiary) to reduce warehouse inventory to "the lowest pos-
sible level" following Cape's loss in an asbestos personal injury suit.1 7 2
Charter took a majority share in Cape in 1969, after the first asbestos
personal injury suits had been filed. 173 Charter's purpose was to assure
its control, so that Cape would serve as the "main channel for the expan-
sion of Charter's industrial activities of the [building and light engineer-
ing] type."' 1 7 4 Charter had the authority to control the board of directors,
its directors closely monitored Cape's finances, and a Charter statement
suggested that it would "maintain... close scrutiny of [Cape's] new capi-
tal expenditure projects. v17 5 Among other things, Charter used its au-
thority to make recommendations regarding Cape's dividend payments.
Charter clearly could influence Cape's operational and financial deci-
sions, probably including its decisions to take actions to minimize or
avoid personal injury liability in United States courts. Nonetheless, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined to pierce
the corporate veil and hold Charter responsible for Cape's liability for
Craig's personal injury.176 These cases are anecdotal, but they illustrate
that limited liability can result in corporations externalizing their costs
and shifting them to tort victims.
Finally, corporations purposely rely upon limited liability devices as a
strategy of minimizing liability risks. 177 The fact patterns in cases such as
United States v. Bestfoods,1 78 as well as in Craig and Ventron, suggest that
170. Id. at *9.
171. Id. at *1.
172. Id. at *8 (quoting memo of Cape executive director Dr. R. Gaze).
173. See Bill Sanderson, Former Asbestos Factory Workers Sue Over Illnesses, The
[Bergen) Record, June 10, 1987, at DI, available at Lexis, News Group File (mentioning
1950s asbestos suit and 1960s and 1970s asbestos litigation; noting that "asbestos
manufacturers have apparently known for decades that asbestos fibers are dangerous").
174. Craig, 1987 WL 10191, at *13 (quoting Charter share offer document)
(alteration in original).
175. Id. at *15; Craig v. Charter Consol., 843 F.2d 145, 151-52 (5th Cir. 1998).
176. Craig v. Charter Consol., 843 F.2d at 152.
177. Because much corporate data, including tax returns, consolidates (at the
election of the corporation) parent and subsidiary information, the most readily available
information on this topic is anecdotal. See, e.g., White, supra note 50, at 1388 (noting that
because of "consolidated data, reports on insurance and secured debt also fail to give any
reliable information about the financial status of wholly owned subsidiaries").
178. 524 U.S. 51 (1998), discussed infra text accompanying notes 264-273.
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companies choose to create subsidiaries for the purpose of conducting
risky activities, while minimizing the risk to parent company assets. 179
Moreover, corporations contemplating entry into a risky industry are tra-
ditionally advised to create subsidiaries.1 80 While companies may not at-
tempt to become completely judgment-proof, the creation of subsidiaries
is a dominant strategy to reduce exposure to claims for environmental
injury and other potentially large tort claims.181
A corporation attempting to insulate itself from liability by moving
hazardous activity to a subsidiary probably will not seek complete 'judg-
ment-proofing."1 8 2 Corporations certainly have legitimate reasons to use
subsidiaries, including managerial and organizational efficiencies and the
need to comply with foreign and domestic rules that implicitly or explic-
itly require separation of functions. 183 Further, should a corporation
form a subsidiary as a means of reducing corporate exposure to tort liabil-
ity all the way to zero, such a subsidiary would be less likely to assure
contract creditors of satisfaction,1 84 something necessary for the subsidi-
ary to do ordinary business. Finally, the public would be more likely to
view the subsidiary negatively.
However, the anecdotal evidence suggests that even if corporations
do not seek complete judgment-proofing, they do use subsidiaries as a
means of significantly reducing tort liability exposure. This seems espe-
cially likely for torts presenting some risk of a judgment substantially
larger than, say, the size of contract debts that the subsidiary regularly
179. See State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 155 (N.J. 1983)
(creating Wood Ridge subsidiary to purchase and operate mercury processing plant); see
also, e.g., Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 649 (N.D.
Ohio 1995) (forming subsidiary "for the purposes of manufacturing semiconductor-related
products and '446' polyester at the Site").
180. LoPucki, Judgment Proofing, supra note 14, at 1421; Menell, supra note 123, at
404 ("The principal risk-insulating strategy would be to set up the new production
operation in a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation."); see Hansmann & Kraakman,
Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1881.
181. E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1881 &
nn.3-4 (noting efforts by tobacco and environmental services firms to use subsidiaries to
evade tort liability); LoPucki, Death of Liability, supra note 29, at 21 ("This parent-
subsidiary ownership strategy is in wide use among the largest companies in America.").
182. Lynn LoPucki has argued that in creating a subsidiary, a corporation's goal is to
completely insulate itself from an adverse legal judgment. He contends that the creation
of a subsidiary is a convenient 'Judgment-proof structure," because it can justify a transfer,
to the parent, of excess earnings of the operating entity (as dividends), thereby making
them unavailable to tort or statutory claimants. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure
of Judgment Proofing, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 147, 153 (1998).
183. See White, supra note 50, at 1389-90. White also notes that firms are highly
unlikely to use subsidiaries to reduce their liability to zero in any event, because of public
perception and the threat of veil piercing, among other things. Id. at 1399. But see supra
text accompanying notes 163-167 (providing examples of subsidiaries having been used to
deflect tort liability); infra text accompanying notes 233-253 (discussing veil piercing).
184. But see LoPucki, Judgment Proofing, supra note 14, at 1422-25 (noting that
contract creditors commonly rely on assurances of repayment other than presence of
unencumbered corporate assets).
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incurs.185 For these types of tort liability, the corporation can limit its
exposure while simultaneously assuring contract creditors that corporate
contractual debts are likely to be paid.
D. The Special Case of the Controlling Shareholder
Every corporation does not face an equivalent moral hazard from
limited liability. Some have argued that a small, closely-held corporation
may be more likely to select excessively risky activity than a big corpora-
tion, 18 6 and that a wholly-owned subsidiary may face different incentives
from a company owned by numerous individual corporate investors.18 7 A
common thread unites these observations: Limited liability's moral haz-
ard appears to be different for differently positioned shareholders. When a
controlling shareholder, including a parent, is present, a corporation will
be more likely to pick excessively risky, socially costly activity. When cor-
porate ownership is dispersed, that tendency will be reduced.
This is likely for three reasons. First, when corporate ownership is
dispersed, managerial risk aversion is likely to temper any shareholder
tendency to take excessive risks. By comparison, a controlling share-
holder can more easily compel managers to carry out its profit maximiz-
ing, risk taking preferences. Second, a controlling shareholder will be
better able to strategically time dividend payments or equity sales to as-
sure that the benefits from risky corporate activity are vested in share-
holders before lawsuits are filed against the corporation. Finally, because
a controlling shareholder obtains special benefits from corporate activi-
ties, such a shareholder will be more likely to encourage a corporation to
take excessive risks.
To elaborate the first point, the well-documented phenomenon of
managerial risk aversion will more likely blunt a tendency to select exces-
sively risky activity. Limited liability's moral hazard is a temptation prima-
rily for shareholders, not for managers. Limited liability subsidizes those
costs from liability judgments that potentially exceed the corporation's
assets. Unless constrained to do so by shareholders, however, managers
are relatively unlikely to select corporate activities that present a risk of
just these types of costs. They will be unwilling to select activities that
amount to a bet-even a pretty good one-on the corporation's exis-
tence, because that also means betting their (undiversified) jobs. 8 8 Man-
185. See, e.g., LoPucki, Death of Liability, supra note 29, at 46-47 (noting use of
"[s] oft judgment proofing").
186. E.g., Halpern et al., supra note 2, at 141 ("The moral hazard problem is likely to
be more severe for small, tightly held companies than for larger companies.").
187. E.g., Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 630 ("If a subsidiary
corporation constitutes only one of a number of components of a corporate group
collectively conducting a fragmented unitary business, the very basis for the establishment
of limited liability as a matter of general legal policy disappears." (internal citations
omitted)).
188. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 53 ("Human
capital, for example, is notoriously difficult to diversify. Managers who have firm-specific
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agers will seek to avoid activities involving risks of devastating losses (de-
stroying the corporate entity and their employment) even if the risk is
remote, and even if selecting the activities might be to the benefit of the
corporation's shareholders.'8 9 Consequently, managers might not maxi-
mize profits in the strictest sense, which might involve selecting an activity
whose downside costs could be subsidized by limited liability. Instead,
managers might prefer to select corporate activities that achieve "target
levels of profits," or other goals that will satisfy stockholders enough to
keep managers' jobs, even if such an approach does not obtain every pos-
sible profit dollar for stockholders.' 90 Some have described this as oper-
ating at an "aspiration level"-one that protects managers from ouster,
while avoiding high risks associated with activities for which a corporation
may not be able to bear the full costs.' 91
When shareholders are numerous and dispersed, this managerial
tendency could significantly offset excessive risk taking. Consider the
small. "passive" corporate shareholder, one of thousands of stockholders
in a large corporation, who favors a level of corporate activity up until the
point where expected marginal benefit to the shareholder is equal to ex-
pected marginal cost. The shareholder's calculation might well favor ex-
cessively risky activity, because, under limited liability, the shareholder
will not fully bear the costs of such an activity. Agency costs, however, will
prevent the shareholder from ensuring that managers fully maximize
profits on the shareholder's behalf.'9 2 Small shareholders will face this
investments of human capital cannot diversify the risk of business failure."); Merritt B. Fox,
Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section
16(b), 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2088, 2097 (1994) ("A corporate manager, like anyone else, can be
expected to value compensation, perquisites . . .and job security."); Zohar Goshen,
Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 Yale L.J. 881, 887-88 & n.32 (1995) (discussing
managerial tendency to retain earnings to avoid business failure and potential loss of
human capital).
189. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the
Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 881, 889 ("Managers fear risk more than
shareholders do because managers cannot diversify their investment of human capital as
shareholders can diversify their investments of money."); Leebron, supra note 2, at 1606
n.124 ("Managers have human capital that is incapable of diversification invested in the
firm. As a result, managers tend to be more risk averse than shareholders."); Roe, supra
note 48, at 542 ("[U]nconstrained managers often prefer to maximize the firm's size, to
avoid severe but potentially profitable risks, and to defer hard, disruptive actions.").
190. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1986) (noting that managers seek "that level of
profits that will suffice to prevent external interventions by dissatisfied creditors or
stockholders"); Lipsey et al., supra note 14, at 320 (discussing "satisficing" behavior in
firms).
191. See Schwarcz, supra note 132, at 26-27.
192. The presence of limited liability's distortion places us in the world of the
"second-best." E.g., P.R.G. Layard & A.A. Walters, Microeconomic Theory 181 (1978) ("If
one of the standard efficiency conditions cannot be satisfied, the other efficiency
conditions are no longer desirable."). Were there no other efficiency problems (e.g., no
costs that a corporation could externalize), we might prefer that a shareholder be able to
costlessly ensure that corporate managers fully maximize profits. Given the perverse
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agency problem for two reasons. First, the small shareholder is unlikely
to have easy or inexpensive access to information necessary to evaluate
managerial quality. A small shareholder interested in monitoring and
participating in corporate management can face significant information
gathering costs. 193 Second, even if a small shareholder can acquire the
information necessary to evaluate fully corporate management perform-
ance, influencing corporate management is difficult. Occasionally, take-
overs and proxy fights can serve as avenues for groups of small sharehold-
ers to communicate preferences to corporate management or to ensure
that they focus strictly on maximizing profits. 19 4 However, small share-
holders-especially those acting alone-generally are unlikely to partici-
pate significantly in month-to-month operations, or to know day-to-day
operational details. 195
When the corporation's ownership includes a controlling share-
holder, however, the agency problem is reduced and the risk taking dy-
namic consequently is more pronounced. The controlling shareholder's
agency costs are lower. The controlling shareholder generally has ready,
low-cost access to information regarding operations or marketing
plans.1 9 6 Depending on the jurisdiction, a parent corporation can, as
part of normal operations, keep the books, approve the budgets, require
that major capital expenditures be subject to approval, appoint the sub-
sidiary's board of directors, 19 7 and place its own employees in positions of
incentives created by limited liability, though, the argument here is that we prefer the
existence of the second distortion-the agency costs associated with shareholder
monitoring of managers-because it tends to offset the distortion from limited liability.
Id. at 180 ("A first-best optimum is ruled out, and the problem is now to do the best we
can, subject to the additional constraint.").
193. See Edward S. Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power 25 (1981); supra
text accompanying notes 69-70 (discussing information costs faced by small shareholders).
194. But cf. Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the
Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 989, 1002 (1993) (noting that when control of a
company with widely dispersed ownership is sold to one controlling shareholder, "[t] he
market for corporate control no longer acts as a check on management's decision-
making").
195. See Herman, supra note 193, at 25 ("[T]he small, absolute and relative size of
their holdings, their impersonal and distant relationship to the organization, and the high
cost of obtaining detailed knowledge about a company and communication among
numerous stockholders normally limit the cohesion and power of ordinary owners."). Of
course, small shareholders still may have better information than potential tort victims.
See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
196. Herman, supra note 193, at 25 ("These investors are knowledgeable, in close
communication with one another, and interested in corporate affairs because of the size of
their holdings."); Loftus C. Carson, II, The Liability of Controlling Persons Under the
Federal Securities Acts, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 263, 317-18 (1997) ("[C]ontrolling
shareholders may confer with directors and executive officers about a range of corporate
matters from the selection of officers to various corporate policy and operational
matters.").
197. Committee on Corporate Laws, Guidelines for the Unaffiliated Director of the
Controlled Corporation, 44 Bus. Law. 211, 212 (1988) [hereinafter CCL, Guidelines] ("In
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control at the subsidiary. 198 Further, managers obviously will respond
more readily to a controlling shareholder's concerns than those of a
shareholder with a small ownership stake. 199
Thus, the controlling shareholder can more easily detect managerial
risk aversion and can strongly encourage or even compel managers to
select the most profitable opportunities. Such opportunities may include
those that appear profitable, only after taking into account limited liabil-
ity's subsidy of liability exposure.
Further, where the controlling shareholder is a parent corporation,
the shareholder may be able to address managerial risk aversion in other
ways. For example, the parent may be able to find a position for a loyal,
displaced manager who was the victim of an ultimately realized small risk.
This possibility may comfort the manager who is considering whether to
select an excessively risky corporate activity. 200
In addition to overcoming the effect of managerial risk aversion,
controlling shareholders will be better able than small shareholders to
ensure that they preserve their gains from the corporation's risky activi-
a controlled corporation, all of the directors (including the unaffiliated directors) are
usually voted into office with the support of the controlling shareholder.").
198. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69 (1998). Majority shareholders of
an enterprise have "authority to ratify and monitor with regard to certain organizational
personnel and affairs because they have the legal right to select and remove directors and
to veto significant proposed corporate changes of a structural nature." Carson, supra note
196, at 281-82 (footnotes omitted). A parent company can retain substantial control and
the other incidents of ownership and possesses considerable access to information
regarding the company's operation. See, e.g., Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 11.01(a)
(1984) (requiring shareholder approval for mergers); id. § 12.02(a) (conditioning
corporation's sale of all or substantially all its assets on shareholder approval); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 275(b) (2001) ("If a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation
entitled to vote thereon shall vote for [a] proposed dissolution, a certificate of dissolution
shall be filed with the Secretary of State."); see also Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 357
(1944) (holding that owner of banking stock cannot escape liability by transferring shares
to holding company, "[f] or he retains control and the other benefits of ownership without
substituting in his stead any one who is responsible for the risks of the banking business").
199. See Carson, supra note 196, at 316-17 ("[C]ontrolling shareholders have the
power to select the board and they can and frequently do exert pressure on directorial
decision making that may be dispositive."); see also Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations § 1.10 cmt. (1994) [hereinafter Principles] (defining as a
controlling shareholder any person who exercises control by virtue of position as a
shareholder).
200. Some might argue that even when share ownership is dispersed, managerial risk
aversion could be curbed effectively simply by providing stock options to managers. Stock
options may encourage a manager to take greater risks, as the manager has the option to
share in the corporate activity's gains while avoiding its losses. However, they seem
unlikely to offer any compensation for corporate activities that present a risk of bankruptcy
and consequently the loss of the manager's firm-specific investments in human capital.
Harold Demsetz and Belfn Villalonga have recently presented the results of an empirical
investigation treating both ownership structure and firm performance as endogenous
variables; they observe that firm-specific risk (an exogenous variable) was not significantly
affected by the fraction of ownership shares held by management. Demsetz & Villalonga,
supra note 47, at 20.
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ties. A corporation's parent could, for example, compel the corporation
to pay dividends promptly when the corporation is engaged in very risky
activities. The parent also might simply sell the subsidiary. This might
mean that the parent (as well as other shareholders) could lock in bene-
fits from those activities before a tort or statutory claimant threatens or
files a lawsuit, or, in some instances-such as with activities involving
health or environmental risks-before the risky activity has even created
known social costs. The parent thereby redistributes corporate income to
itself and away from the victims of corporate torts and statutory violations.
LoPucki describes a generalized version of this phenomenon as sepa-
rating the corporation's risky business from the corporation's assets-
even those generated by the risky business itself.20 ' The subsidiary can be
capitalized appropriately, but after its initial creation, the parent can
strongly encourage the subsidiary to distribute the proceeds of its busi-
ness, beyond its immediate cash needs, as dividends. Once distributed to
the parent, these dividends generally cannot be reached based on a sub-
sidiary's tort or statutory violation unless the corporate veil is pierced.
20 2
Dividend-paying behavior of this type is not unusual.20 3 For exam-
ple, in the Ventron case, after a corporate subsidiary had operated a mer-
cury processing plant for several years, the parent corporation took pos-
session of thirty-three of the subsidiary's forty acres as a "land dividend,"
leaving the subsidiary in possession only of the seven acres on which the
plant itself stood and limiting the subsidiary's ability to pay tort judg-
ments based on nearby mercury contamination. 20 4 Further, in the fa-
mous case of Walkovszky v. Carlton, the sole shareholder of several taxicab
corporations arranged for constant dividend payments, thereby limiting
the corporations' ability to pay tort judgments. 20 5
Finally, a controlling shareholder can obtain special benefits from
corporate activity. As a result, the controlling shareholder likely will pre-
fer a risky corporate activity even when a shareholder without control
201. LoPucki, Judgment Proofing, supra note 14, at 1414.
202. Unless a shareholder has (or should have) knowledge of a likely lawsuit,
fraudulent conveyance law generally will not preclude this type of transfer. Knowledge
that the corporation is selecting risky activity is not likely to suffice. See infra text
accompanying notes 274-277. When shareholders elect to dissolve a corporation, they
may be responsible for corporate debts for a limited period of time after the corporation's
dissolution. Id.
203. Small shareholders generally will not be able to use a lawsuit to compel
corporate dividend payments. In general, the decision of corporate managers to pay or
not to pay dividends is reviewable under the highly deferential business judgment rule.
See, e.g., Sinclair Oil v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that business
judgment rule requires court not to disturb decision of board of directors "unless there is a
showing of gross and palpable overreaching," or unless "fiduciary duty is accompanied by
self-dealing").
204. State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 155 (N.J. 1983).
205. 223 N.E.2d 6, 11 (N.Y. 1966).
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1203
would not favor such an activity, because the marginal benefit from the
corporate activity to the controlling shareholder will be higher.20 6
A controlling shareholder's share of benefits from corporate activity
is likely to exceed the shareholder's pro rata share of corporate equity. A
70% shareholder will have, as a practical matter, 100% authority to con-
trol corporate activity, while the 0.1% shareholder will possess a minus-
cule or zero ability to influence corporate activity. The extra increment
of control carries value with it. The intuition that control represents tan-
gible value to the shareholder that possesses it is strongly supported by
the size of premiums normally paid for controlling shares. Purchasers of
controlling shares very often pay a premium per share acquired of 30% to
40% above the market price for the share.20 7 In the 1980s, takeover pre-
miums averaged 50% over market.20 8 Although measuring premium size
in privately-held companies is more difficult due to the lack of a public
market for minority shares, buyers typically pay control premiums for
controlling shares in these companies as well. 2 °9
206. The accentuated tendency to take excessive risks could be offset if a controlling
shareholder is more risk averse than noncontrolling shareholders-for example, if the
shareholder had invested most or all of its assets in a single business enterprise. As
discussed above, however, a controlling shareholder can prompt a corporation to pay
dividends, which can reduce the assets a controlling shareholder will have at risk in the
corporation's business. Further, controlling shareholders very often will be corporations
or other institutions. For those entities, there seems to be no reason to conclude that risk
aversion will be typical. For the individual controlling shareholder with the bulk of her
assets invested in a company, however, the shareholder could well be risk averse, and that
would clearly reduce any tendency to encourage the corporation to take excessive risks.
207. As noted, controlling shares are typically purchased at a significant premium.
For example, cash tender offers made in 1977 for a controlling share included an average
cash premium of 32% above the market price. Michael Maher, An Objective Measure for a
Discount for a Minority Interest and a Premium for a Controlling Interest, 57 Taxes 449,
454 (1979). More recently, premiums have ranged well over 40% and as high as 100% in
tender offers, such as IBM's 1995 purchase of the Lotus Development Corporation and
Vivendi's 2000 purchase of the Seagram Company. E.g., Judith H. Dobrzynski, The Art of
the Hostile Deal, N.Y. Times,June 22, 1995, at DI (discussing sale of Lotus to IBM in which
control premium was over 100%); Geraldine Fabrikant & Andrew Sorkin, French
Company Agrees to a Deal to Buy Seagram, N.Y. Times, June 20, 2000, at Al (noting that
44% premium was paid). Two-thirds of acquisitions with known control premiums involved
a control premium of over 25%. See The Fastest Lane in the Deals Market, Mergers &
Acquisitions, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 23-24 (reporting 1998 data showing that of tender offers
whose control premiums were known, two-thirds of such premiums ranged from 25% to
95% over target's stock price); see also Stuart Elliott, The $1.9 Billion Saatchi Deal Vaults
Publicis to the Top Tier, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2000, at C6 (reporting Publicis S.A.'s
purchase of Saatchi & Saatchi at premium of over 50%); Seth Schiesel, Web Hardware
Maker Buys Digital 'Plumber' for $41 Billion, N.Y. Times, July 11, 2000, at C1 (reporting
JDS Uniphase Corp.'s purchase of SDL Inc. at "takeover premium of almost 50 percent").
208. Ragazzo, supra note 194, at 1012.
209. Telephone Interview with Bruce A. Gutenplan, Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison (Sept. 28, 2000); see, e.g., Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 39 F.
Supp. 2d 915, 934 (N.D. IIl. 1998) (calculating control premium for sale of interest in
privately-held corporation).
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This Article will not attempt a detailed analysis of the precise manner
in which a controlling shareholder realizes the benefits of control.
2 10
However, even briefly explained, it seems clear that a shareholder's pos-
session of corporate control confers tangible and unique benefits on the
shareholder.
A major reason for acquiring control, of course, is the ability to real-
ize greater profits by improving or changing the corporation's manage-
ment. Minority shareholders may also benefit from this, since better
management can be reflected in increased dividends, which are paid pro
rata.21 1 However, a controlling shareholder also can obtain benefits not
shared with minority shareholders.
First, a controlling shareholder can benefit from synergies between
the corporation and the shareholder's other businesses.21 2 For example,
Ford Motor Company's ownership of Volvo, Mazda, and other car manu-
210. Some have argued that control buyers overpay for control. See generally
Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597 (1989)
[hereinafter Black, Bidder Overpayment] (arguing that control buyer overpayment partly
explains patterns of shareholder gains after takeovers). However, it is hard to imagine that
overpayment accounts systematically for the presence of the control premium. Further,
Stephen Choi and Eric Talley have argued recently that block shareholders can obtain a
variety of special benefits, including not only the synergy opportunities and tax advantages
described below, but also selective information disclosure. See Stephen J. Choi & Eric L.
Talley, Playing Favorites With Shareholders, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 271, 284-310 (2002).
211. A controlling shareholder may be willing to pay some premium per share for the
possession of control in order to improve corporate profits, and hence the payment of
dividends, even if minority shareholders benefit equally from the increased dividends
payable per share. The controlling shareholder may find the prospect of improving
management so attractive that it is willing to tolerate some free riding by minority
shareholders. Cf. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 19-21 (1998) (arguing that individuals join in
collective action despite free rider problem because of nonmaterial advantages such as
moral motivation, solidarity values, and political entrepreneurship). This phenomenon
may be reflected in the observed increase in the value of minority shares in a company that
is the target of an acquisition. See Karen Hopper Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration
and Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity Financings, 23 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 12 (1989)
(observing that presence of controlling shareholder tends to increase firm's value because
of better management); Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20J. Fin. Econ. 293, 306 (1988) (noting that firms with
significant percentage of equity held by board member have higher profits). However, the
continuing presence of a substantial difference between the per share price of a minority
share and the per share price of a controlling share strongly suggests that the prospect of
improving management in a way that would benefit each shareholder pro rata explains
only some of the value a controlling shareholder expects to receive upon acquiring
control.
212. See Black, Bidder Overpayment, supra note 210, at 608 (describing possible
synergistic effects of merger created by economies of scale, improved management of
target, and more efficient use of human resources and capital); John C. Coates, IV, "Fair
Value" As an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict
Transactions, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1275 (1999) ("[s]ynergies can arise on the input and
output sides of a firm"); Telephone Interview with Sam Frieder, Principal, Kohlberg &
Company (Sept. 22, 2000).
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facturing entities presumably allows economies of scale in automobile de-
sign and manufacturing, and improved bargaining leverage in the
purchasing of parts from suppliers. The shareholder may benefit not
only as a result of investing in the acquired business, but the share-
holder's other businesses-in which minority shareholders likely have
not invested-also may be more profitable as a result.
Second, possession of the controlling share may provide the share-
holder with an opportunity for, using the terms loosely, self-dealing or
expropriation. 21 3 For example, suppose Ford exercised its control as a
majority shareholder in Hertz to require it to buy Ford cars. Ford, but
not the minority shareholders in Hertz, could capture the seller's surplus
from such transactions. While this type of self-dealing is constrained by
the shareholder's fiduciary duty to minority shareholders, a controlling
shareholder nonetheless will have some legal latitude to influence the
corporation to select actions that will benefit the controlling shareholder
more while benefiting minority shareholders less. 2 14 Consider Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien. 215 There, a 97% parent corporation systematically ar-
ranged for the payment of corporate dividends that exceeded, by 30%,
the corporation's earnings over the same time period, apparently because
the parent corporation was short of cash.2 16 Although they received their
pro rata share of dividends, the minority shareholders viewed these divi-
dend payments as against their interest because they prevented the cor-
poration from making capital investments that would improve its value
over the long term.217 Nonetheless, in the face of a legal challenge by
minority shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the dividend
213. True "self-dealing," such as the outright expropriation of corporate assets for
private purposes, could, of course, expose the shareholder to liability for violating a
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders.
214. E.g., CCL, Guidelines, supra note 197, at 212 (stating that controlling
shareholders might permissibly seek to cause corporation to contract with controlling
shareholder, try to eliminate noncontrolling shares through "cash-out merger," or cause
controlled corporation to repurchase shares from controlling shareholder); Coates, supra
note 212, at 1275-76 (stating that expropriation value includes "excessive retention of
assets; excessive distributions; payment of above-market, but not clearly excessive, amounts
for goods or services; or freezeouts priced to take advantage of a 'blockage' of non-material
information" (footnotes omitted)); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Down the Rabbit-Hole
and Into the Nineties: Issues of Accountability in the Wake of Eighties-Style Transactions
in Control, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1130, 1137 (1993) (describing minority shareholder
action against controlling shareholder for alleged self-dealing in violation of fiduciary
duty).
215. 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971).
216. Id. at 719, 720-21.
217. Needless to say, perhaps, the assumption here is that two shareholders may not
have the same view of the utility of an equivalent dollar payout in dividends. This is
because opportunity costs may differ by individual. Even if one shareholder favors the
payout, another, as in Sinclair, may perceive that the opportunity cost of the payout-
forgoing an investment in capital that would increase firm size, say-outweighs the value of
the payout. Id. at 720.
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payments as a reasonable exercise of business judgment.218 Further, a
controlling shareholder can control the timing and form of corporate
distributions (for example, dividends as opposed to share repurchases),
which may confer significant tax advantages on it, but not on other
shareholders. 219
Third, a controlling share investment comes with the ability to direct
operations and thus is a lower risk investment, on a per share basis, than
an investment in shares that lack control. The controlling shareholder
does not face the risk, faced by the minority shareholder, that the corpo-
ration will come under the control of others who may do a poor job man-
aging the corporation, try to expropriate assets, or run it solely to benefit
the business of others. 220 The controlling shareholder thus is likely to
value the controlling shares more highly, relative to other shares.22 1
Fourth, in addition to the form of corporate distribution advantage
mentioned above, a controlling shareholder may be able to gain tax and
accounting advantages unavailable to a minority shareholder of the same
corporation. For example, a corporation that holds 80% of a couple of
subsidiaries will be able to write off the losses of one subsidiary against the
income from another. Further, the tax treatment of dividends is differ-
ent: A corporation that receives dividends from another corporation that
is a member of the same "affiliated group" will pay no taxes on the divi-
dends at all; a corporation that owns 20% or more of a distributing corpo-
ration will be able to deduct 80% of the dividend before taxes are calcu-
lated. By comparison, a corporation that holds a minority interest can
deduct 70% of the dividend, while an individual who owns a minority
interest will pay ordinary income tax on 100% of the dividends. 222
Moreover, an 80% controlling shareholder will be able to file consol-
idated tax returns even if the shareholder does not own all the cash flow
from the subsidiary. This might make the shareholder's cash flow look
high and make financing easier to obtain. In other words, a controlling
218. Id. at 721-22.
219. For example, individual shareholders would normally prefer sale or exchange
distributions to dividends because they could have gains taxed at capital gains rates, rather
than ordinary rates (and only the portion of proceeds in excess of the basis is taxed).
Corporate shareholders, however, may prefer dividends because corporations, especially
those with large controlling shares, can take the dividends-received deduction. Scholes et
al., supra note 42, at 311.
220. Edward F. Greene & James J. Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of
Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 660 (1984).
221. See Coates, supra note 212, at 1277 (noting that because of value attached purely
to management capacity, "pure control value may be considerably higher than intuition
would suggest"); cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1890
("Differences in risk aversion or in the form of investment (for example, human capital
versus financial capital) inevitably lead shareholders to value a firm's potential projects
differently.").
222. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Corporate Income Taxation
§§ 2.2.1-.2 (5th ed. 2001) (discussing tax treatment of dividends as ordinary income and
dividend-received deductions for corporate shareholders).
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shareholder might be able to reduce its overall cost of capital by virtue of
control ownership in a corporation with positive cash flow.
223
Fifth, the buyer of a controlling share can gain additional value be-
cause, depending on the size of the controlling share, the controlling
shareholder may have the option of cheaply acquiring the shares held by
minority shareholders.22 4 Because a controlling shareholder can affect
dividend payout schedules and the timing of earnings reports, the buyer
may be in a position to depress the value of the minority shares and gain
additional value from the repurchase of those shares on favorable
terms.2
25
Moreover, a controlling shareholder's opportunities to obtain most,
if not all, of these control-based benefits likely will increase as a corpora-
tion takes on new projects and grows in size. For example, as a corpora-
tion expands, a controlling shareholder's ability to obtain tax advantages,
such as the deduction for dividends and the ability (in the case of an 80%
shareholder) to write off losses of one subsidiary against the income of
another, clearly will increase. And a controlling shareholder's opportu-
nity to benefit by altering the form of corporate distribution also will in-
crease as the corporation undertakes more projects. Thus, a control-
based shareholder likely will benefit in excess of that shareholder's pro
rata share of ownership not only from corporate activity in general, but
from a particular new project, risky or not.
Finally, while not every controlling shareholder may be able to avail
itself of each of these sources of additional per-share value, the control-
ling shareholder can sell the control block to a buyer that will value con-
trol for these reasons and, accordingly, will pay a premium. In such a
transaction, the controlling shareholder will capture some of the surplus
attributable to these additional sources of value. This type of transaction
223. Id.; Telephone Interview with Bruce Gutenplan, Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison (Sept. 29, 2000).
224. See In re Sea-Land Corp. S'holders Litig., 642 A.2d 792, 802 (Del. Ch. 1993)
("Under Delaware law, a purchaser may acquire a block of stock from one shareholder at a
premium, and thereafter may offer a lower price for the corporation's remaining shares.");
see also Ragazzo, supra note 194, at 1002 (observing that minority shareholders'
investment value depressed by sale of controlling interest).
225. E.g., Dent, supra note 189, at 890 ("Shareholders ... want dividends. Managers
prefer to retain earnings."); Goshen, supra note 188, at 887-88 (contending that managers
prefer to retain excess earnings in part to increase corporate size and in part to decrease
business failure risks); see Coates, supra note 212, at 1275-76 (stating that control
premium may include value of ability to undertake "freezeouts priced to take advantage of
a 'blockage' of non-material information"). Again, while majority shareholders possess a
fiduciary duty toward minority shareholders, that duty is unlikely to constrain this type of
activity. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in
Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1695, 1709 (1985) ("Current takeout law allows
successful bidders to pay minority shareholders a consideration with a nominal value lower
than the bid price."); Ragazzo, supra note 194, at 1002 (arguing that negative impact of
controlling interest sale on minority shareholders' investments justifies requiring company
to prove "that control provides the largest possible benefits to shareholders").
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is likely because the vast majority of corporate acquisitions take place
through transactions other than tender offers.226 In these transactions, a
buyer seeking control likely will prefer to approach a controlling share-
holder rather than trying to assemble a controlling share from minority
shareholders. The buyer generally can more easily obtain control by
purchasing a block of shares from a shareholder that already possesses
control.
Nor are minority shareholders likely to benefit when the controlling
shareholder sells its shares. The controlling shareholder is free to sell its
controlling ownership interest at any price it can negotiate, even if that
price is not available to minority shareholders. The seller of a controlling
share need not share the premium with other shareholders. 227 The pre-
mium paid represents an immediate gain for the controlling share-
holder.2 28 Further, once the acquirer has paid a premium to the control-
ling shareholder and acquired control, the acquirer is unlikely to pay any
premium to purchase the shares of minority shareholders.2 29
An analysis of the extra value attributable to control raises a number
of further questions that are beyond the scope of this Article, such as the
size of the unique benefit that controlling shareholders can gain. For
example, while a controlling shareholder clearly can obtain value not
shared with other shareholders, some of the premium such a shareholder
is willing to pay for control certainly could include benefits shared pro
rata with other shareholders, such as increased dividends that would
226. In 1998, tender offers accounted for only 2.2% of all 9129 corporate acquisitions,
although they accounted for 8.3% of the total dollar volume. The Fastest Lane In the
Deals Market, Mergers & Acquisitions, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 23, 23.
227. For example, in Citron v. Steego Corp., the court held:
Our law does not regard a control premium as a corporate asset that must be
shared among all shareholders. A fortiori a shareholder without control, even if
he is a director, and thus owes a duty of loyalty to the corporation and its
shareholders, may qua shareholder negotiate the sale of his stock on whatever
terms he is able to arrange.
Civil Action No. 10171, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 119, at *21 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 1988) (internal
citations omitted); see also Principles, supra note 199, § 5.16 (stating that controlling
shareholder has "right to dispose of voting equity securities ... for a price that is not made
proportionally available to other shareholders"). Of course, to the extent a control buyer
acquires control by making a tender offer, that price must be made available to all
tendering shareholders. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(7) (1994).
228. Alfred Rappaport, Creating Shareholder Value: A Guide for Managers and
Investors 159 (2d ed. 1998).
229. See Ragazzo, supra note 194, at 1002 (stating that minority shareholders would
lack "opportunity to sell their stock at a premium in the future"); see also Bebchuk, supra
note 225, at 1696 (noting that minority shareholders expect that shares after takeover will
be worth less than bid price). A controlling shareholder could, of course, have already
paid a premium for a control block that she later tries to sell at a premium and could take
a loss on the sale if, for example, she overpaid initially in purchasing the control block.
The point, however, is that the controlling shareholder has an asset to sell-the ability to
control the corporation and to profit from synergies and other opportunities-that does
not belong to minority shareholders.
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come with an improvement in management. Another such question is
whether unique control benefits would tend to increase proportionately
with the size of a company. In public corporations, for example, an in-
crease in a company's size might be correlated with greater marketplace
monitoring. This might reduce the extent to which a controlling share-
holder might take "synergistic" opportunities. 230 In addition, some con-
trol benefits could vary with the size of the controlling share held. For
example, some tax benefits are not available to a shareholder with less
than an 80% share. Moreover, a shareholder with a bare majority seeking
to take synergy opportunities could face a greater risk of a fiduciary duty
suit filed by minority shareholders.
In general, though, the controlling shareholder or parent can realize
a benefit from a new corporate activity in excess of its pro rata share.
Depending on the structure and operation of the corporation and the
controlling shareholder's other businesses, the benefit could substantially
exceed the pro rata share. Moreover, leaving aside the small chance of
vicarious liability, there seems no obvious reason why a controlling share-
holder would benefit any less when the corporation's new project is a
risky one.23 1
Thus, a corporation whose equity is held in whole or in part by a
shareholder with a capacity to control the corporation is more likely to
select excessively risky activities. Because of the greater ability to benefit,
a controlling shareholder is more likely to find hazardous activities attrac-
tive and to prompt corporate management to approve the activities that
present the small risk of a large loss. The shareholder can more effec-
tively monitor corporate management's conduct so as to ensure that man-
agement will maximize profits on the shareholder's behalf, and the share-
holder is in a better position to ensure that it promptly reaps the benefits
of the activity through dividend payments. The corollary is that, under
limited liability, there is a set of risky activities that a company with a
dispersed share ownership would not select, but a company with a con-
trolling shareholder would.
230. Some control-related benefits-such as a corporation choosing to contract with a
corporation related to the controlling shareholder rather than seeking the lowest bidder-
could be less likely if there is greater market monitoring. Further, the amount of such
activity may vary with the level of control. For example, a parent company that owns all or
virtually all of a subsidiary may be perfectly comfortable contracting with a subsidiary, while
an 80% owner may be deterred by the risk of a minority shareholder suit brought for
breach of fiduciary duty.
231. Arguably, a shareholder's possession of additional control might reduce the
value to the shareholder of excessively hazardous corporate activity because the control
would increase the shareholder's liability exposure under the veil piercing doctrine. The
risk of greater liability exposure under the veil piercing doctrine, however, appears to be
very small. See infra text accompanying notes 233-253.
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E. Possible Neutralizers
Some commentators have identified features, either of the legal sys-
tem or of corporate structure, that might tend to blunt the effect of lim-
ited liability's moral hazard. Five major possibilities have been identified:
(1) current veil piercing rules; (2) managerial risk aversion; (3) new stat-
utes purporting to bypass limited liability rules; (4) fraudulent convey-
ance rules; and (5) free transferability of shares in publicly-traded corpo-
rations.232 However, none of these is likely to compensate adequately for
excessive risk taking, especially when a controlling shareholder or parent
corporation is present.
1. Veil Piercing Rules. - Current equitable veil piercing rules are not
a significant deterrent for companies that want to rely on limited liability
as a means of reducing liability exposure for hazardous activities. Al-
though there are some limited exceptions, current law generally retains
limited liability for a corporate shareholder even when the shareholder
exerts a considerable degree of influence-or even direct control-over
corporate action.
Corporate shareholders, with or without some level of control, gen-
erally have limited liability unless they have liability arising directly from
their own conduct,23 3 a statute imposes liability upon them, or a court
pierces the corporate veil. 234 Since this Article focuses on vicarious share-
holder liability, the first exception need not be discussed further. The
second is relatively rare and looks to be unsuccessful. 2 35 Veil piercing is
the primary means of holding shareholders vicariously responsible for
corporate torts.
232. A sixth suggestion-a judicial doctrine that corporate managers have a duty of
some kind to creditors-is not available under current law. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
55, 68-69 (1999). Compulsory insurance and minimum capitalization requirements are
likely to represent incomplete solutions. See supra note 7.
233. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 955 (7th
Cir. 1999) ("[T]he status of being a shareholder does not immunize a person for liability
for his, as distinct from the corporation's, acts.").
234. Of course, the shareholder may also agree to take on liability.
235. The federal Superfund law, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, or CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), is a notable example of an attempt to create
statutory liability for shareholders. See infra note 265 (discussing cases imposing liability
directly on shareholders as "operators"). However, the effectiveness of such attempts to
impose shareholder liability notwithstanding limited liability has been undermined by
decisions like United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). See infra text accompanying
notes 264-273 (discussing parent corporation liability under CERCLA). Further, very few
state laws expressly impose responsibilities directly on corporate shareholders. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 630 (1961) (imposing responsibility for employee wage claims on
ten largest shareholders); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.0622(2)(b) (West 1992) (making all
shareholders-with some exceptions-personally liable for wage claims up to amount of
consideration paid for shares).
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Currently, limited liability protections are equally available to indi-
vidual shareholders and corporate shareholders, such as parent corpora-
tions. Veil piercing doctrine does not distinguish explicitly between the
individual shareholder and one that is a corporate entity. While the ex-
tent of corporate ownership and actual influence over corporate deci-
sionmaking may be relevant to some of the equitable factors considered
by a court, the veil piercing doctrine also does not focus specifically on
shareholders that are in a position to control the corporation.
While judicial veil piercing rhetoric often is framed broadly in terms
of precluding the use of a legal entity to "defeat public convenience, jus-
tify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime,"2 36 courts rarely pierce the
veil. There is considerable variation among states, and between state
common law doctrines and federal common law. However, judicial veil
piercing inquiries generally focus on whether the corporate form has
been used to accomplish "fraud, injustice, or the like" and whether the
"subsidiary was 'a mere instrumentality of the parent corporation.'"237
To satisfy this "mere instrumentality" requirement, also known as the "al-
236. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D.
Wis. 1905); see also Kelley v. Austell Bldg. Supply, Inc., 297 S.E.2d 292, 297 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982) ("[T]he corporate fiction ... may be disregarded where the defendant has over
extended [sic] his privilege in the use of a corporate entity in order to defeat justice,
perpetrate fraud or to evade contractual or tort responsibility.").
237. State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 164 (N.J. 1983)
(quoting Mueller v. Seaboard Commercial Corp., 73 A.2d 905, 908 (N.J. 1950)) (applying
New Jersey law); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985)
(noting under New York law, veil can be pierced only if "corporate form is being used
fraudulently or as a means of carrying on business for personal rather than corporate
ends"); L.B. Indus. v. Smith, 631 F. Supp. 922, 926 (D. Idaho 1986) (describing unity of
interest and inequitable result necessary to pierce veil under Idaho law). While state
doctrines do vary, most of them, like those of New York and New Jersey, require some
indication that the corporation is the shareholder's "alter ego" and that "fraud" is present.
For example, in Pennsylvania, "[f ] actors which may justify disregarding the corporate form
include undercapitalization, failure to adhere to corporate formalities, substantial
intermingling of corporate and personal affairs and use of the corporate form to
perpetrate a fraud." Kaites v. State Dep't of Envtl. Res., 529 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1987). In Ohio, a court must find, as a prerequisite to veil piercing, that control by the
shareholder "was so complete that the corporation has no separate mind, will, or
existence"; that the control "was exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an
illegal act"; and "injury or unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff." Belvedere Condo. Unit
Owners' Ass'n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 1086 (Ohio 1993). By comparison,
Texas takes a "flexible fact-specific approach focusing on equity." Castleberry v. Branscum,
721 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. 1986), reh'g denied (1987), cited in Matthews Constr. Co. v.
Rosen, 796 S.W.2d 692, 693-94 (Tex. 1990). That approach, however, subsumes instances
in which the "fiction is used as a means of perpetrating fraud" or "where a corporation is
organized... as a mere tool or business conduit of another corporation." Castleberny, 721
S.W.2d at 272. See infra note 240 (discussing Castleberry). For an example of highly
questionable shareholder conduct, see, e.g., People v. V & M Indus., 700 N.E.2d 746,
751-53 (Ill. App. 1998) (piercing corporate veil where there was undercapitalization,
failure to issue stock, "failure to observe corporate formalities," absence of dividend
payments, absence of corporate records, company was insolvent at trial, "corporate officers
and directors were nonfunctioning," and corporation "was a mere facade for the operation
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ter ego" requirement, a claimant typically must show that the owner so
dominated the subsidiary that it "had no separate existence but was
merely a conduit for the parent.'"238 This largely turns on the absence of
corporate formalities-the intertwining of checking accounts, the par-
ent's use of the subsidiary to transact the parent's business, or the lack of
subsidiary directors' or shareholders' meetings. 2 39
While showing that a shareholder holds a substantial ownership
stake is relevant, and perhaps even necessary, for a judicial finding that a
corporation serves as a shareholder's "conduit," the showing of a substan-
tial ownership stake or even the close intertwining of parent and subsidi-
ary management is not sufficient, under present law, to hold a shareholder
responsible for corporate torts. Because courts generally look for the ab-
sence of corporate formalities, demonstrating substantial ownership or
control generally is not adequate to show either that the corporation is
the shareholder's alter ego or that "the parent has ... us [ed] the subsidi-
ary to perpetrate a fraud or injustice, or otherwise to circumvent the
law."240 Nor is proof that the subsidiary has committed a tort (apart, in
some circumstances, from torts involving fraudulent representation re-
of the dominant stockholder"). See generally Presser, Piercing, supra note 16, § 2 (1991 &
Supp. 1998) (discussing veil piercing standard and variations on state-by-state basis).
238. Ventron, 468 A.2d at 164.
239. One example is the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 494, 496-99 (1918), finding
that a railway subsidiary was a "mere agency or instrumentality" of its two 50%
shareholders. The subsidiary had no stations or freight depots, only two engines, and
twenty to thirty employees; it was managed by a "Managing Committee" that consisted of
the general manager of one shareholder and the general superintendent of the other.
The shareholders selected the superintendent and exercised approval over business
agreements. Seven of the nine members of the subsidiary's board of directors were officers
of one of the two parents.
240. Ventron, 468 A.2d at 164; cf. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272 ("[T]he separateness of
the corporation has ceased."). The Castlebeny court took a relatively liberal approach to
"alter ego" veil piercing, however, requiring no fraud or inequitable conduct, but instead
holding that alter ego could be shown:
[F] rom the total dealings of the corporation and the individual, including the
degree to which corporate formalities have been followed and corporate and
individual property have been kept separately, the amount of financial interest,
ownership and control the individual maintains over the corporation, and
whether the corporation has been used for personal purposes.
Id. Reacting to Castlebery, the Texas legislature amended its corporate code in 1989 to
specifically overrule any suggestion in that opinion that a failure to observe corporate
formalities could be a factor in proving an "alter ego" theory. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 2.21 (A) (3) (Vernon 1993); W. Horizontal Drilling, Inc. v.Jonnet Energy Corp., 11 F.3d
65, 68 (5th Cir. 1994).
The federal common law standard has been described as more flexible. See Presser,
Piercing, supra note 16, § 3.01 & n.5 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (citing Leddy v. Standard
Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383, 387 (2d Cir. 1989)) ("Several federal courts have developed a
federal common law... that allows for more easy piercing."); Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498
F.2d 734, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974). However, that trend seems undermined by United
States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
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garding the corporation's owners241) generally sufficient to show fraud
justifying veil piercing.242
While courts have also stated that veil piercing may be warranted if
the subsidiary is undercapitalized at the time of its creation, in view of the
reasonably expected costs of running the business, this type of veil pierc-
ing too is rare.2 43 As a practical matter, undercapitalization must be egre-
gious before a court will pierce the corporate veil. 244 If the corporation
has been properly capitalized at the outset, later operation with clearly
insufficient assets to cover the corporation's tort liabilities will not suffice
to show undercapitalization. 245 Even undercapitalization ex ante gener-
ally has been insufficient by itself for a court to justify piercing the corpo-
rate veil. 246 In cases where corporations have been found to be under-
capitalized at the outset and the corporate veil is pierced, another factor,
such as the lack of corporate formalities, almost always has been
present.247
241. For example, a corporation might lead "potential creditors to believe that it [is]
more solvent than it really [is]." Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d
953, 959 (7th Cir. 1999).
242. Needless to say, perhaps, if proof of a corporate tort were sufficient to show that
the corporate form had been used to circumvent the law, that prong of the veil piercing
test would be rendered extraneous in all tort cases. See, e.g., Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d
864, 867-69 (Ind. 1994) (engaging in separate analysis of "injustice" in determining
whether to pierce veil to shareholder and holding that a corporation's failure to file an
amended business name certificate with the state, while a breach of corporate formalities,
was not sufficient to impose personal liability on shareholders); see also Huffman v. Poore,
569 N.W.2d 549, 557 (Neb. App. 1997) (holding that veil will be pierced "only where the
corporation has been used to commit fraud, violate a legal duty, or perpetrate a dishonest
or unjust act in contravention of the rights of another").
243. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944) ("An obvious inadequacy
of capital, measured by the nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking, has
frequently been an important factor" in deciding whether to pierce corporate veil); In re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F.
Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987) (citing inadequate capitalization as one of several factors
relevant to veil piercing inquiry).
244. See Thompson, Empirical Study, supra note 146, at 1066 (discussing refusal to
pierce in 25% to 30% of cases where undercapitalization is present).
245. E.g., Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1523 (3d Cir. 1994)
(repayment of stockholder loans when corporation was apparently insolvent did not
'Justify piercing the corporate veil" to stockholder).
246. The Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois law, recently interpreted adequate
capitalization, for veil piercing purposes, as maintaining merely "the minimum
capitalization required by law." Ter Maat, 195 F.3d at 961; see also Pel-Star Energy, Inc. v.
United States Dep't of Energy, 890 F. Supp. 532, 546 n.20 (W.D. La. 1995) ("This startling
leap from undercapitalization to personal liability is legally insufficient to support piercing
the veil."). Minimum capitalization requirements are not likely to be a meaningful
constraint. William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate
Capital, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 837, 843 (1982) (observing the nonexistent or nominal nature
of state minimum capitalization requirements).
247. "Undercapitalization is rarely if ever the sole factor in a decision to pierce the
corporate veil." TerMaat, 195 F.3d at 961. In his empirical study of 1600judicial opinions
through 1985 in which plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil, Thompson notes that
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In short, a shareholder may maintain limited liability despite a high
degree of potential or actual control over a corporation's activity. Exten-
sive control of a corporation by a shareholder-including selection of the
subsidiary's board of directors and control over major financial deci-
sions-is treated by courts as fairly run-of-the-mill and is unlikely to create
a significant risk of veil piercing. 248 Controlling shareholders can ensure
that their interests are fully represented on the subsidiary's board of di-
rectors, or by commonly employed officers, as well as that they have influ-
ence over both large and small corporate decisions, either directly, for
some decisions, or through the board. 249 Parent corporations can weigh
in heavily on a subsidiary's decision to take on debt and on management
and operational decisions. For example, in the case of corporate activity
presenting environmental risks, a parent might influence the decision to
purchase pollution control equipment, litigation decisions, and, of
course, decisions on the timing and amount of corporate distributions. 250
Under current doctrine none of these activities normally will justify a
court piercing the veil. 25 '
undercapitalization was discussed only in a "small minority of the cases," and that courts
"refused to pierce in 25 to 30% of the cases even when undercapitalization was present."
Thompson, Empirical Study, supra note 146, at 1066. Thompson does not discuss whether
undercapitalization was the sole factor in any case justifying piercing the corporate veil.
See also Presser, Piercing, supra note 16, § 1.05[2] (stating that undercapitalization is a
relevant but rarely dispositive factor in deciding whether to pierce the veil).
Some commentators have cited Minton v. Cavaney as a case where undercapitalization
alone justified piercing the corporate veil. 364 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1961). The Minton court
pierced the corporate veil in connection with a drowning in a swimming pool because the
capital of the corporation was "'trifling compared with the business to be done and the
risks of loss."' Id. at 475 (quoting Automotriz Del Golfo De California S. A. De C. V. v.
Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1957)). In Minton, however, as Presser has pointed out, the
court was presented not only with undercapitalization, but with a lack of corporate
formalities distinguishing the corporation from its owners-an alter ego problem. See
Presser, Piercing, supra note 16, § 1.05[2] n.16.
248. E.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 71-72 (1998) (holding that parent
company that actively participated in and controlled subsidiary's operations may not,
without more, be held derivatively liable under CERCLA for pollution from subsidiary's
facility).
249. E.g., Datron, Inc. v. CRA Holdings, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 736, 748 (W.D. Mich.
1999) (holding parent and subsidiary's employment of common officer not beyond "the
parameters of normal oversight by a parent corporation over its subsidiaries"); AT&T
Global Info. Solutions Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 857, 867 (S.D. Ohio
1998) ("Ohio law permits one corporation to own all of the stock of another corporation
as well as to employ common officers and directors, as well as other personnel, without
risking veil piercing.").
250. E.g., Aron M. Bookman, Note, Transcending Common Law Principles for
Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for the Environment, 18 Va. Envtl. L.J. 555, 600
(1999) ("A parent could be fully aware of an environmental disaster, contribute to its
creation through general mandates, make a substantial profit, and not be liable, even
though it is arguably responsible.").
251. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 514 (arguing that observing corporate
formalities and avoiding haphazard withdrawal of funds or commingling of funds probably
sufficient to avoid veil piercing).
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Similarly, that a corporation lacks sufficient assets even to address
liabilities likely to flow from its operations generally is insufficient to
pierce the veil. A shareholder may even influence a corporation to divest
itself of assets (through, for example, the payment of dividends) without
endangering limited liability protections. Shareholders thereby can de-
mand distributions from corporate activity, even if that may leave the cor-
poration with relatively insignificant operating reserves. 25
2
In short, a shareholder must work hard to dominate every aspect of a
subsidiary's operations and also disregard corporate formalities (such as
holding board meetings or preparing corporate minutes) or engage in
fraud in order to run afoul of current veil piercing rules. In mostjurisdic-
tions, the exercise of extensive control over corporate management, in-
cluding influencing management to pay distributions and to operate the
corporation with reserves inadequate to pay tort claims against the corpo-
ration, will not result in veil piercing absent a showing of disregard of
corporate formalities or fraud. 253
2. Managerial Risk Aversion. - As discussed above, managerial risk
aversion generally tends to blunt limited liability's incentive for excessive
corporate risk taking.25 4 However, managers can express their risk aver-
sion preferences only to the extent that they are not tightly constrained
by shareholders. The greater the degree of shareholder control, the less
the degree of expressed managerial risk aversion, since managers will
have reduced latitude to serve their own goals in preference to maximiz-
ing shareholder welfare. Thus, managerial risk aversion will have greater
play when shareholder control is relatively low. For example, when all
shareholders hold less than 1% of stock, exercising control over manage-
ment will be more difficult. Where a shareholder with control is present,
however, managerial risk aversion is unlikely to prevent excessive risk
taking.2 55
252. E.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 11 (N.Y. 1966) (Keating, J., dissenting)
(noting that "all income was continually drained out of the corporations").
253. White argues that veil piercing is likely if a parent "routinely drain[s] the
subsidiary of its assets while satisfying the subsidiary's contract creditors." White, supra
note 50, at 1401. Such veil piercing, however, is likely to be the rare exception. Even the
example given by White, Eastridge Dev. Co. v. Halpert Assocs., 853 F.2d 772 (10th Cir.
1988), involved corporate conduct significantly more egregious than a parent's influencing
of a corporation to make large distributions. The parent company in that case arranged
for all the corporation's revenues to be paid directly to the parent and asserted control
over all the subsidiary's expenses as well. Id. at 776. Corporate formalities were
disregarded; the two corporations lacked any separateness at all. Id.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 188-191.
255. Easterbrook and Fischel also argue that managerial fear of job loss may
encourage a firm to pay a premium in the form of additional insurance. Easterbrook &
Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 53. Certainly, managerial risk aversion might
lead a larger corporation to purchase insurance where a corporation with a single
individual owner-manager would not. As Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge, however,
firms may find it cheaper simply to pay a premium directly to a risk averse manager rather
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3. Statutory Tort Law Changes. - Several commentators also have ar-
gued that state and federal statutes might succeed in impeding corporate
attempts to use subsidiaries to limit tort liability.256 Shareholders are di-
rectly liable under the common law for torts they commit, even when the
shareholder purports to act on the corporation's behalf.25 7 Some statutes
that impose tort-type liability on a broader range of conduct than at com-
mon law also could be read to impose that responsibility directly on
shareholders. Consequently, shareholders might have statutory responsi-
bility for corporate actions that, at common law, would not have exposed
the shareholder to tort liability either directly or vicariously. According
to these commentators, the strongest such statute appears to be the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA, or Superfund), 2 58 which imposes liability for cleaning up haz-
ardous substance releases on a wide array of parties connected with the
release, including the entity that "arranged for disposal" of the hazardous
substance, the transporter, and the owner and operator of the facility
where the release occurred. CERCLA's liability section is perceived as a
fairly radical attempt to expand liability for cleanup costs, notwithstand-
ing the restraints that might be imposed by a host of common law tort
and corporations rules.259 Caselaw under CERCLA over the last fifteen
years or so also has been perceived to be "eroding" traditional corpora-
tion law concepts such as limited liability. 260
A few other federal environmental statutes, including the federal
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, impose liability on polluting behavior
with language similar to that of CERCLA. 26 1 A number of state environ-
than to buy insurance, especially for large potential losses. Firms may even pay managers a
premium while "simultaneously decreas[ing] their capitalization." Id. at 54.
256. See, e.g., Blumberg, Increasing Recognition, supra note 162, at 324 & nn.100-02
(noting courts' expansive construction, with concurrent conservative opposition, of
environmental statutes that impose liability on parent corporations for subsidiaries'
actions); Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional
Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 259, 263 (1992) (defending court holdings as
to shareholder and parent CERCLA liability as in accordance with traditional corporate
law principles); Cindy A. Schipani, Infiltration of Enterprise Theory into Environmental
Jurisprudence, 22J. Corp. L. 599, 601 (1997) ("[E]nterprise liability is making its debut in
CERCLAjurisprudence."); White, supra note 50, at 1404 ("[S]tate and federal statutes that
explicitly decline to recognize corporate separateness of parties might thwart judgment
proofing through subsidiaries."); see also Menell, supra note 123, at 410-14 (noting some
legal uncertainty regarding "liability of parent corporations for the environmental harms
of their subsidiaries").
257. E.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64-65 (1998) (distinguishing direct
and vicarious shareholder liability).
258. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
259. See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 69, at 549-50 (discussing CERCLA
and securities laws); White, supra note 50, at 1404 ("[T]he most notable of these [liability
expanding statutes] is [CERCLA].").
260. See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 256, at 259.
261. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b) (6), (f) (1994) (imposing penalties and
removal costs liability on "owner [or] operator" of vessel or facility from which oil or
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mental cleanup statutes have similar language as well. 2 62 Other statutes
that arguably impose responsibility for corporate statutory violations di-
rectly on shareholders are Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which impose re-
sponsibility for securities fraud on a person who "controls" any liable per-
son, subject to a "good-faith" defense. 263
Indications are, however, that such statutory efforts to hold share-
holders directly liable for corporate torts, as they currently stand, are un-
likely to substitute for directly revisiting vicarious liability rules. The pur-
ported "erosion" of traditional corporation law concepts under CERCLA,
for example, was set back sharply in 1999. In United States v. Bestfoods, the
Supreme Court interpreted CERCLA to include concepts drawn from
limited liability, thereby creating a safe harbor from statutory liability for
parent corporations. 264
Prior to Bestfoods, it was not clear that courts would apply CERCLA or
other environmental law statutes to hold a parent company directly liable
for environmental injury from a subsidiary's operations when there would
be no liability under traditional corporation law doctrines. The federal
courts of appeals had split regarding whether a parent company could,
based on control exercised over a subsidiary, be an "operator" of the sub-
sidiary's disposal facility, so that CERCLA would impose liability for
cleanup costs on the parent company.
265
hazardous substance is released into water); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a) (9) (1994)
(defining "owner or operator" to include one that "controls" stationary source); id.
§ 7413(b) (imposing penalties on "owner or operator" of affected source not in
compliance with permit); see also United States v. Anthony Dell'Aquilla, Enters. &
Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d 329, 329 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that Clean Air Act imposes strict
liability on owners and operators). One court also has imposed liability directly on
corporate shareholders and officers under the federal Rivers and Harbors Act. In United
States v. Pollution Abatement Services, two corporate officers who were "personally involved in
or directly responsible" for the discharge of refuse and storage of thousands of drums of
chemicals on the banks of a creek were held directly liable. 763 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir.
1985). But see United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (5th Cir.
1976) (holding that corporate president with personal involvement in dredging decisions
was not liable under Rivers and Harbors Act because Congress did not expressly impose
liability on corporate officers).
262. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11g(c)(1) (West 1992); see also Marsh v. N.J.
Spill Comp. Fund and Envtl. Claims Admin., 670 A.2d 67, 69-70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996) (holding that "[o]wnership or control over the property at the time of discharge"
suffices for liability under New Jersey statute).
263. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t(a) (1994). In enacting these statutes, Congress was
concerned with the "substantial threat posed by persons with authority to control who default
on their responsibility for Securities Acts compliance and by other persons with significant
power bases who manifest their actual control without due regard for Securities Acts
compliance." Carson, supra note 196, at 280.
264. 524 U.S. 51, 51-52 (1998).
265. See Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 248 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that
corporation's CERCLA liability "stemmed directly from its control over subsidiary's
creosoting plant"); Lansford-Coaldale joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1222
n.13 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that parent company with "pervasive control" would be
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In Bestfoods, the Court granted certiorari on a question of a parent
corporation's direct liability as a CERCLA "operator" for cleaning up the
polluted chemical manufacturing facility of its subsidiary. The parent
company, CPC International (later renamed Bestfoods), had purchased a
chemical manufacturing company through a wholly-owned subsidiary.
Several individuals served simultaneously as managers at both the parent
and the subsidiary, the parent controlled the subsidiary's finances, and a
parent company employee actively participated in environmental matters.
The question was whether the parent company had "operated" the sub-
sidiary's facility within the meaning of CERCLA's liability provisions.
The Court stated that it viewed limited liability for corporate share-
holders, including parent companies, as a "bedrock principle" to be
rarely disrupted and suggested that the corporate veil was appropriately
pierced only on a showing that the corporate form was used for wrongful
purposes such as fraud. 2 66 The Court also cited cases suggesting that it
would look for the presence of an alter ego relationship. 267 Based on the
limited availability of veil piercing, the Court then reasoned that parent
companies normally had a safe harbor for certain types of activities, in-
cluding "'the election of directors, the making of by-laws . . .and the
doing of all other acts incident to the legal status of stockholders."' 268
The Court added that "a duplication of some or all of the directors or
executive officers" would not prove fatal.
269
CERCLA operator); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 & n.3
(11th Cir. 1993) (stating that parent corporation that exercises "'actual and pervasive
control'" of subsidiary would be CERCLA operator) (quoting Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v.
Eppinger & Russell Co., 776 F. Supp. 1542, 1547-48 (M.D. Fla. 1991)); Nurad, Inc. v.
William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that parent
would be liable as CERCLA "operator" if it had "authority to abate damage caused by"
operations of contaminated facility); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26
(1st Cir. 1990) (holding that parent company that exercised pervasive control over
subsidiary's contaminated textile plant was liable for cleanup costs as CERCLA "operator");
Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (holding that corporate
liability depends on corporation's "capacity . . . to prevent and abate damage" from
hazardous waste). But see Donahey v. Bogle, 129 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding
that parent company would have CERCLA liability only when "circumstances justify
piercing the corporate veil"), vacated without opinion sub nom. Donahey v. Livingstone,
524 U.S. 924 (1998);Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 81 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that CERCLA imposes no liability on parent corporations apart from that
imposed by traditional veil piercing doctrine).
266. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61-62.
267. Id. at 62.
268. Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks,
Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale LJ. 193, 196 (1929)).
In some ways, Bestfoods is even more protective of a parent company's prerogatives than
earlier Supreme Court rulings. See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v.
Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 497-98, 501 (1918) (relying in part on
duplication of directors and officers to justify veil piercing).
269. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62.
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So what was the fate of "direct" liability under this federal statute?
The Court reasoned that it applied only to a parent corporation that en-
gaged directly in "operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of
hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regu-
lations."2 70 Thus, even though the subsidiary's operations consisted
solely of running a single chemical manufacturing facility, and the district
court found that the parent exercised "significant control" over the sub-
sidiary's "business and decision-making," the Court found that mere in-
volvement in and control over the subsidiary's operations could not ex-
pose the parent to CERCLA liability because it would be inconsistent with
"common-law standards of limited liability."2 7 1
And, critically, the Court held that a parent company action that
could be characterized as a "normal" part of the relationship with the
subsidiary could not expose the parent to liability under CERCLA, even if
the parent's action related to a hazardous waste disposal decision or com-
pliance with the environmental laws. "[N]orms of corporate behavior,"
in the words of the Court, were to continue to serve as "reference points,"
notwithstanding this far-reaching environmental statute. 272 Excluded
from the "norms" of acceptable behavior are only the limited set of share-
holder behaviors that might lead a court to pierce the corporate veil.
Thus, the Court reinterpreted CERCLA to create a safe harbor from
federal statutory liability for parent corporations. That safe harbor was
directly informed by current veil piercing rules. If a parent could exer-
cise control over a subsidiary without risking limited liability under cur-
rent veil piercing rules, that same behavior would provide a shield from
statutory liability.
In view of its application of the federal statute most often identified
as working a change in the rules of corporate shareholder liability,
Bestfoods strongly suggests that statutory law imposing direct liability is un-
likely to substantially broaden responsibility for corporate sharehold-
ers. 273 These types of statutes consequently are unlikely to be a very effec-
270. Id. at 66-67.
271. Id. at 67-70.
272. Id. at 71. The Court held that a parent company could be held to have
"operate[d]" a facility when it "depart[ed] so far from the norms of parental influence
exercised through dual officeholding as to serve the parent, even when ostensibly acting
on behalf of the subsidiary in operating the facility," or when an "agent of the parent with
no hat to wear but the parent's hat might manage or direct activities at the facility." Id. In
this case, the Court observed, there might have been such an employee-an employee who
worked only for the parent but became directly involved in the subsidiary's environmental
decisionmaking. Id.
273. Lower court cases decided after Bestfoods have continued to find that parent
corporation control "within the parameters of normal oversight"-short of the required
showing of control to justify veil piercing-is immune from CERCLA liability. Datron, Inc.
v. CRA Holdings, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 736, 748 (W.D. Mich. 1999); see also Schiavone v.
Pearce, 77 F. Supp. 2d 284, 290-93 (D. Conn. 1999) (holding that intertwined
management and parent company approval of capital budget expenditures, including
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tive substitute for a direct change to vicarious liability rules for corporate
shareholders and parents.
4. Fraudulent Conveyance Law. - Current fraudulent conveyance law
also is unlikely to provide significant protection for tort victims injured by
a corporate activity that presents excessive risks. A corporation may know
it is engaged in risky activity that could expose it, somewhere down the
line, to the possibility of substantial tort liability. For example, a pharma-
ceutical manufacturing operation may know that one of its products
could present a risk of serious side effects. The corporation may even
have general knowledge, given the size of typical jury awards for defective
products, that if it is held liable in tort for the side effects, the corpora-
tion and its shareholders may not fully bear the costs. Even with this in-
formation, a corporation may, for example, pay contract claims and dis-
tribute dividends to its shareholders if the corporation is still solvent
afterwards-even if the corporation ultimately may be left with insuffi-
cient assets to pay a particular plaintiffs claim.
Until a corporation has actual knowledge that a specific lawsuit is
threatened or pending, a plaintiff will have a difficult time showing that
the transfer was made with knowledge that a lawsuit has been filed or
threatened, 2 74 and hence "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
any creditor. '2 75
Consider a corporate subsidiary that engages in environmentally
risky activity by, for example, discharging wastewater that contains small
amounts of hazardous chemicals, but that also regularly pays substantial
dividends to its parent and pays its contract claimants. A downstream
neighbor later discovers that the chemicals have affected her plant nurs-
expenditures on pollution control equipment, did not render parent company directly
liable under CERCLA for cleanup of subsidiary's creosote plant).
274. See Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(b)(4), 7A U.L.A. 301-2 (1999). The
UFTA has been adopted in thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia, and its
predecessor, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, has been adopted in four states and
the Virgin Islands.
275. Id. § 4(a) (1). A plaintiff may also be able to show a fraudulent conveyance if the
debtor was engaged in a business and had "unreasonably small" assets or reasonably should
have believed that the business would incur debts beyond its ability to pay as they became
due, fthe debtor made the conveyance "without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer or obligation." Id. § 4(a)(2). A showing that a corporation
satisfied a bona fide contract claim, for example, is unlikely to satisfy this latter element,
since the corporation will have received "reasonable equivalent value" in the form of the
services rendered in the contract. Similarly, the preference to pay a dividend rather than
to retain earnings in anticipation of potential future liability from risky activity is highly
unlikely to constitute a fraudulent conveyance, if the dividend payment does not render
the corporation insolvent. See, e.g., Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583
N.W.2d 405, 413 (S.D. 1998) (noting that for conveyance to be fraudulent under section 5
of the UFTA, creditor's claim must arise before conveyance is made); Burke v. Marlboro
Awning Co., 113 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Mass. 1953) (stating that, in context of dividend
payments, "a mere preference is ordinarily not a fraudulent conveyance"). As James J.
White has noted, asset sales for "reasonable equivalent value" also are not voidable under
section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. White, supra note 50, at 1405.
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ery business and that the subsidiary does not have sufficient assets to fully
address the pollution.
Although the amounts the corporation has paid in dividends and to
the contract claimants would help compensate the neighbor, if they were
made available to her, the neighbor would have to overcome several ob-
stacles to recover on a fraudulent conveyance theory. First, as a plaintiff,
the tort victim would have difficulty proving that, at the time the transfer
was made, the corporation had knowledge of or should have anticipated
that her property or business would be injured by the effluent.2 76 The
corporation's knowledge that it was engaged in behavior that could pre-
sent an environmental risk is unlikely to suffice. Second, the plaintiff may
have an even more difficult time showing that the corporation knew or
should have known the tort claimant's identity. Finally, even if the plain-
tiff could show that the corporation should have known that its discharge
of hazardous chemicals would harm her property, leading to an actiona-
ble tort claim, courts generally will sustain a debtor's ability to transfer
assets to legitimate creditors, even when the result is that the debtor lacks
sufficient assets to fully satisfy the later tort judgment.277 In short, fraud-
ulent conveyance law is unlikely to be of much assistance.
5. Free Transferability of Shares in Publicly-Traded Corporations. - Other
commentators have argued that the free transferability of public corpora-
tion shares serves as another disincentive to overly risky projects. Because
shares can be freely transferred, management teams selecting inappropri-
ate projects arguably can be replaced through corporate takeovers. 278
Shares generally are not freely transferable where the corporation is a
close corporation, however, or where it is a wholly- or mostly-owned sub-
276. Dickinson v. Ronwin, 935 S.W.2d 358, 364-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (invalidating
transfer to close family friend on eve of tort judgment and citing George v. Surkamp, 76
S.W.2d 368, 370-71 (Mo. 1934), for proposition that "[c] onveyances made for the purpose
of defeating an anticipated judgment in a case pending or about to be commenced are in
fraud of creditors and void as to such plaintiff").
277. See Wyzard v. Goller, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608, 610 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Civil Code
section 3432 for proposition that "[a] debtor may pay one creditor in preference to
another, or may give to one creditor security for the payment of his demand in preference
to another"); Smith v. Whitman, 189 A.2d 15, 18 (NJ. 1963) (stating that debtors can
choose to pay one creditor over another). In Wyzard, the debtor's preferential transfer of
assets to pay an attorney's bill for representation in a lawsuit was not held to be a
fraudulent conveyance, even though it was apparent that the debtor likely would lose the
lawsuit and that, if the judgment creditor executed on the judgment, the debtor might not
have sufficient assets to pay the attorney's fee. 28 Cal. Rptr. at 612; see also Garton v.
Garton, 533 N.W.2d 828, 833-34 (Iowa 1995) (finding that debtor's transfer of inheritance
to pay debt to bank was not a fraudulent conveyance, even though it rendered him unable
to pay spousal support and child maintenance obligations).
278. Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability, supra note 6, at 95-96; see Demsetz,
supra note 47, at 387 (explaining that shareholders may engage in "a takeover, a rebellion
by a group of cooperating shareholders, or the acquisition of large shareholdings" to "give
proper guidance to, perhaps to 'boot' out, an ineffective management"). But see Goshen,
supra note 188, at 884 (noting that market for corporate control, or the takeover market,
offers only "indirect and expensive" discipline of management).
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sidiary. Even for publicly-traded companies, controlling shares are typi-
cally purchased at a significant premium. 279 Moreover, a project that is
socially inappropriate because of its expected cost might well be favored
by shareholders because limited liability may subsidize those costs. So
shareholders may not be the ones who will wish to discourage such
projects. This argument would have significant force only if tort victims
could help displace corporate managers.2
80
1V. A CONTROL-BASED SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY REGIME
A. The Capacity to Control Rule Proposed
In general, legal structures and rules fail to fully address the
problems flowing from limited liability. Moreover, the justifications for
limited liability are largely confined to the case of the small, passive share-
holder with no ability to control corporate direction. Meanwhile, the ad-
vantages of limited liability can be substantial for controlling
shareholders.
A control-based regime would respond to these concerns. Such a
regime would impose liability for a corporation's torts or statutory viola-
tions on a shareholder (including a corporate parent) when the share-
holder has the "capacity to control" the corporation by virtue of owner-
ship.28 1 To the extent more than one shareholder can be said to possess
the "capacity to control," each would be jointly liable, with a right of con-
tribution. Such a change could be accomplished by a liberalization of the
279. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 Yale L.J. 698, 705 (1982) (noting that sale of a control block of stock will be at a
"premium over the market price"); see also Herman, supra note 193, at 29 ("control is
valuable and will be sought and consolidated"); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 Va. L. Rev. 259, 279 (1967) (observing that in close
corporations, "restrictions on share transferability are very common").
280. On occasion, social activists will purchase shares of a corporation so that they can
attempt to participate in its governance and urge it to select activities that are less socially
costly. However, these efforts have been few and remain the exception rather than the
rule. They generally have not succeeded in significantly budging management that is
otherwise committed to a certain course of conduct. E.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, In PCB Fight,
It's the Nun vs. the C.E.O., N.Y. Times, May 25, 1998, at Bi (describing Sister Patricia
Daly's unsuccessful effort to pass General Electric shareholders' resolution against various
corporate efforts to resist cleaning up PCBs dumped into New York State's Hudson River);
Watchdogs of Corporate Ethics, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1981, at DI (describing church group
efforts to question Rockwell International's nuclear weapons production, among other
corporation policies). Kent Greenfield argues that shareholder power to enjoin a
corporation's illegal acts as ultra vires should be viewed more expansively. Kent
Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on
How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 Va. L. Rev. 1279,
1330-32 (2001).
281. A corporate officer, such as the CEO, who also holds a small ownership stake in
the company as a performance incentive, would not have the "capacity to control by virtue
of ownership." A similar standard is imposed under the "controlling persons" portions of
the Securities Acts. See supra note 263.
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common law rule of veil piercing or through a statutory modification of
the rules of vicarious liability.28 2
The rule would not impose responsibility on the shareholder that
holds only a small percentage of shares. For the individual who pur-
chased two hundred shares of General Motors on the open market, lim-
ited liability would remain a feature of the investment. Nor would the
rule impose responsibility on the pension fund with a small percentage of
shares.
How could one tell if a particular shareholder possessed the "capac-
ity to control" a corporation? A shareholder would be responsible if it
possessed significant ownership and if it exercised "actual control" over a
corporation's activities by virtue of that ownership. Exercise of "actual
control" over even some aspects of corporate operations would be rele-
vant to the question of whether the shareholder possessed the "capacity
to control" the risky activity, even if the actual control was unrelated to
the operations that resulted in a tort or statutory violation. The exercise
of actual control by virtue of ownership suggests the ability to control the
corporation in other respects, either by involvement in the selection of
the corporation's board of directors, the exercise of authority over signifi-
cant asset sales, or participation in other major corporate decisions. 283
For example, in In re Pollution Abatement Services, which dealt with a
close corporation's liability for discharging refuse into and storing
thousands of drums of chemicals on the banks of a creek, the two (of four
total) shareholders that ran the corporation's day-to-day operations
would have had vicarious responsibility under a control-based regime for
the costs of cleaning up the chemicals if the shareholders had possessed
potential control by virtue of their ownership. 28 4 Such vicarious liability
would have been in addition to whatever direct responsibility the share-
holders might have had by virtue of their own actions. 285 In Ventron, for
example, where the subsidiary's mercury processing operations substan-
tially polluted a waterway, such a rule would have resulted in vicarious
environmental liability for the parent company, which owned 100% of
the subsidiary and which elected its own officers to the subsidiary's board
of directors, where the board met monthly and knew the details of daily
operations.
In addition to imposing liability on shareholders exercising actual
control over a corporation by virtue of ownership, a "capacity to control"
282. Whether such a step would best be taken at the state or federal level is beyond
the scope of this Article. Aside from the difficulty of convincing all fifty states to change
their laws, Janet Cooper Alexander convincingly argues that claimants attempting to
invoke expanded vicarious liability under state law would be beset by countless procedural
difficulties. Cooper Alexander, supra note 11, at 388-89.
283. See Herman, supra note 193, at 26 ("[T]he dominant owners occupy the top
offices themselves, or they select (and can readily displace) those who do.").
284. 763 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir.'1985).
285. In Pollution Abatement Services, for example, the court did impose direct liability
on the shareholders under the Rivers and Harbors Act. Id.
1272 [Vol. 102:1203
2002] A CONTROL-BASED SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY APPROACH 1273
regime also would impose vicarious liability for a corporation's torts and
statutory violations on those possessing potential control by virtue of own-
ership in the corporation. A potentially controlling shareholder's at-
tempt to maintain a more passive role would not shield it from liability
for risky corporate activity.
A majority shareholder clearly would qualify as possessing potential
control by virtue of ownership. For shareholders holding less than a ma-
jority of the outstanding shares, whether the shareholder has the "capac-
ity to control" the corporation would have to be decided based on the
facts of the individual case. The American Law Institute takes the posi-
tion that a controlling influence should be assumed where there is owner-
ship and/or possession of the power to vote more than 25% of the corpo-
ration's shares. 286 The SEC has publicly noted the "widely held belief
that the ownership of 20% voting power in a widely held company in
most instances constitutes control."28 7 However, the question whether a
particular shareholder has the capacity to "direct ... the management
and policies of a [corporation]" 288 could in some cases be an issue requir-
ing expert testimony.289
Whether a particular minority shareholder has the capacity to con-
trol the corporation might depend on the total value of the corporation
and consequently the value of the shareholder's holdings; whether there
is a majority shareholder; the relationship between the minority share-
holder and that shareholder or other minority shareholders; or the rela-
tionship between that shareholder's board representatives and those of
the other shareholders. 290 Evidence that the shareholder has asserted a
significant role in corporate organization also might be relevant, al-
though that alone would not be sufficient to find that the shareholder
286. Principles, supra note 199, § 1.10(b); see also Investment Company Act
§ 2(a)(9), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1994) ("Any person who owns beneficially
... more than 25 per centum of the voting securities of a company shall be presumed to
control such company."); Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1962)
(stating that 28.3% owner is "almost certain to have share control as a practical matter").
287. Exchange Act Release No. 27,035, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,490, 30,492 n.23 (July 14,
1989), cited in Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 69, at 549 n.90. Although it is
considered an aggressive position, the SEC staff apparently also has argued that a
shareholder should be considered "controlling," under some circumstances, with a 10%
equity holding. Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 69, at 549; see also Victor
Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganizations, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1072, 1073 n.2 (1983) ("The owner of 5% or 10% of the
outstanding voting power may possess control."); DeMott, supra note 214, at 1135-37
(describing incidents at Datapoint, in which 15% stock ownership was apparently adequate
to confer control).
288. This formulation appears in the securities regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405
(2001).
289. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 193, at 63 (noting that relevant criteria might
include ability to select outside directors and establishment of "power position").
290. See, e.g., id. at 62-63 (noting that in 1975, market value of the median-sized 5%
holding of the 200 largest corporations amounted to $38 million).
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possessed the capacity to control by virtue of ownership. 29 1 For example,
a socially conscious shareholder with 0.1% of ownership that influences a
corporate decision through advocacy at an annual meeting would not
have the capacity to control by virtue of ownership. 29 2 Similarly, suppose
a pension fund with 8% of a company's shares affects-through advocacy
or as a "swing vote"-the election of a corporate director. Because the
capacity to control signifies the consistent ability to exert control over the
corporation by virtue of ownership, such activity would not make a share-
holder one with a "capacity to control."
By comparison, in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minne-
apolis Civic and Commerce Ass'n, each of the two parent companies held
exactly 50% of the subsidiary's shares.293 Although neither held a major-
ity, they had a history of acting together to control the subsidiary's opera-
tions. Given the level of ownership and such a history, the proposed rule
would make them liable for a subsidiary's tort or statutory violations. Sim-
ilarly, where the three individual shareholders of a close corporation to-
gether composed 50% of the board of each of the corporation's subsidi-
aries, so that no decision could be made without their approval, the
individuals would have the "capacity to control. '2 94
Further, in the product liability litigation over breast implants, the
two corporate shareholders clearly would have been responsible for the
liability of the manufacturer Dow Corning Company. Dow Corning was
an incorporated joint venture of Dow Chemical Company and Corning
Inc. Dow Corning was formed originally for the specific purpose of devel-
oping commercial and industrial uses for silicone technology.29 5 Each of
the two shareholders owned 50% of the company. While corporate for-
malities apparently were observed, 29 6 both shareholders had substantial
involvement in the management of Dow Corning. Dow Corning's board
of directors was composed completely of current and former Dow and
Corning officers and directors. 29 7 Moreover, Dow and Corning collabo-
rated with Dow Corning in silicone research and product development.
For several decades, Dow Chemical conducted all the toxicological re-
search on hazards associated with silicone products. 2 98
291. See id. at 26.
292. See supra note 280.
293. 247 U.S. 490, 501 (1918).
294. See, e.g., Plaskon Electronic Materials v. Allied-Signal, 904 F. Supp. 644, 648-49
(N.D. Ohio 1995).
295. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 103 (Nev. 1998).
296. The relationship between Dow Corning and its parent companies included
features typical of an arms-length relationship-for example, the shareholders each lent
money to the joint venture, but on terms advantageous to the joint venture. Further, there
was no indication that Dow Corning paid exceptionally large dividends. See Deborah
DeMott, The Mechanisms of Control, 13 Conn. J. Int'l L. 233, 242 (1999) ("Dow Corning's
finances reflected a policy of retaining a relatively high percentage of earnings as opposed
to distributing earnings as dividends.").
297. Id.
298. Dow Chemical, 970 P.2d at 104.
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In the face of multiple product liability claims relating to silicone
breast implants, Dow Corning petitioned for bankruptcy in 1995.299
However, the courts did not permit plaintiffs to reach the assets of either
parent company under a veil piercing theory.3 00 Tort plaintiffs might
have received more compensation if they had.30 1 Under a control-based
299. See id. at 106.
300. See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1128,
1142 (N.D. Ala. 1993), (dismissing claims of vicarious liability against Dow and Corning in
centralized federal multidistrict litigation), vacated in part, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ala. 1995). In one case, however,
Dow was held directly liable for negligent performance of an undertaking on the theory
that Dow had directly undertaken to evaluate and test the safety of Dow Coming's liquid
silicone and should have "used its influence to halt the marketing" of Dow Corning's
silicone breast implants. Dow Chemical, 970 P.2d at 118; see also 887 F. Supp. at 1459-63
(refusing to dismiss claim, in multidistrict litigation, that Dow was directly liable for
negligent undertaking and mentioning similar rulings in other courts). But see Artiglio v.
Corning Inc., 957 P.2d 1313, 1318-19 (Cal. 1998) (refusing to hold either Dow or Corning
liable on "negligent undertaking" theory).
301. For example, Dow Chemical, the larger of the two shareholders, is one of the
nation's fifty largest companies and is worth multibillions of dollars. See, e.g., Woman
Wins $14 Million in Punitive Damages in Implant Case, Grand Rapids Press, Oct. 31, 1995,
at A7 ("During a hearing on Dow Chemical's financial status, experts testified the Midland,
Mich.-based firm is worth $8 billion to $9 billion.").
Conceivably, the holding discussed above finding Dow directly liable for negligent
undertaking might have been extended to other plaintiffs. See supra note 300. If so, even
in the absence of vicarious liability, some tort plaintiffs might have received compensation
from Dow. Further, Dow is making a contribution to compensating breast implant
plaintiffs through the Dow Corning bankruptcy proceeding. Dow apparently has
contributed to a $2.35 billion fund that will pay to resolve the claims of consenting
personal injury claimants, among others, and a litigation facility of $400 million to address
the claims of non-consenting personal injury plaintiffs, among others. See In re Dow
Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648, 655 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing fund created by Dow Corning
and its product liability insurers and shareholders); In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R.
445, 484 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (discussing size of litigation facility), affd, 280 F.3d 648 (6th
Cir. 2002). Both funds are components of Dow Corning's bankruptcy reorganization plan.
The quid pro quo for the contributions of Dow and Corning, however, is a permanent
injunction, contained in the reorganization plan, preventing any party holding a claim
released against Dow Corning from suing either Dow or Corning, and limiting plaintiffs to
suing the litigation facility. In re Dow Coming Corp., 280 F.3d at 655. In January, 2002, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conclusion below that a bankruptcy
court may enjoin a non-consenting creditor's claim against a non-debtor to facilitate a
reorganization plan, but remanded for further proceedings because the bankruptcy
court's fact findings did not demonstrate the appropriateness of the injunction under the
criteria set forth by the Sixth Circuit. See id. at 653.
Under a control-based liability rule, Dow and Corning could conceivably have
procured similar treatment by a bankruptcy court. Further, it is possible that the amounts
set aside by the bankruptcy court are adequate to fully compensate all the tort plaintiffs. If
either of these conditions obtained, a control-based liability rule would make no
difference. On the other hand, had tort plaintiffs been able to recover directly from Dow
Chemical or from Coming, they might well have received more than they are likely to
under the reorganization plan. In this regard, it is worth noting that an earlier $4.225
billion global settlement, to which Dow Corning contributed approximately half the funds,
and which was approved by a court overseeing a multidistrict litigation in 1994, collapsed
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liability rule, both Dow Chemical and Corning would have been consid-
ered shareholders with the "capacity to control" and would have had vica-
rious responsibility for Dow Corning's product liability for breast
implants. 30 2
Forjudges, the "capacity to control" standard would not be novel. In
the context of cases under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 3°13 for example, courts must consider whether a pension
fund fiduciary has purchased or sold certain assets for "fair market
value." 30 4 In order to determine whether a control premium should have
been paid when a corporate ownership stake is acquired or sold, judges
consider whether a controlling share was involved in the transaction.3 0 5
And, as discussed above, a shareholder that can control a corpora-
tion is responsible for its securities law violations.3 °1 6 The SEC has inter-
preted the statutory language as the "power to direct.., the management
as apparently inadequate when "hundreds of thousands more women than anticipated
filed claims with the global settlement fund." Id. at 653; see also In re Dow Coming Corp.,
255 B.R. at 462 ("Based on the number of claims filed, the claimants would have received
only a small percentage of what was previously promised. Some estimated that the
defendant manufacturers [which included Dow Corning] would have had to jointly
contribute another $24 billion to the settlement fund to pay all the claimants the amount
promised.").
302. The argument has been made that the breast implant tort judgments were not
based on the soundest of scientific evidence. See, e.g., Mike McKeeJunk Science Debate
Rages On, Legal Times, Mar. 22, 1999, at 2 (quoting Dr. Marcia Angell, editor of the New
England Journal of Medicine, as saying that many breast implant plaintiffs got "big bucks"
by using purported expert witnesses who often merely added "a veneer to a foregone
conclusion"). Even if true, however, that would not warrant a different shareholder
liability rule. Arguments about flaws in the tort system should be addressed directly. See
infra note 367.
303. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
304. E.g., id. § 1108(e) (stating that fiduciary may purchase ESOP securities for
"adequate consideration"); id. § 1002(18) (defining "adequate consideration" to mean
fair market value).
305. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 915, 931 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (calculating control premium for sale of interest in privately-held corporation). The
Montgomery court relied on a proposed ERISA regulation, 53 Fed. Reg. 17,632, 17,636 (May
17, 1988), suggesting that "fair market value" should include the calculation of a control
premium if such a premium would be paid by a third party with regard to the securities
being valued, if control would pass with the equity being purchased, and if it is reasonable
to assume that the purchaser's control will not be shortly dissipated. Id.
306. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994) ("Every person who, by or through stock ownership
... controls any person liable under [section 77k or section 771] shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person."); id. § 78t(a) ("Every
person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable ... shall also be liable jointly
and severally with [that person].").
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and policies of a person. ' 30 7  Several courts have taken similar
positions. 30 8
Further, in the context of determining when a parent company
might have CERCLA liability for "operating" the facility of a subsidiary
where a hazardous substance has been released, a number of courts,
prior to the Bestfoods ruling, imposed liability when the entity had "au-
thority to control" the operations of the contaminated facility or deci-
sions involving hazardous substance disposal. For example, in Nurad, Inc.
v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co.,309 the Fourth Circuit ruled that an en-
307. Securities Act Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2001); Securities Exchange Act
Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2001). See generally Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra
note 69, at 548 (discussing controlling persons' liability).
308. A number of courts have held that a person is a "controlling person" based on a
showing of the person's voting authority as a shareholder, sometimes coupled with the
person's position within the corporate organization. For example, in G.A. Thompson & Co.
v. Partridge, the Fifth Circuit held that a 24% shareholder, who had an officership and
directorship and who was involved in day-to-day operations, had the "requisite power to
directly or indirectly control or influence corporate policy," even though the shareholder
had not actually participated in the securities violation at issue. 636 F.2d 945, 958 & n.24
(5th Cir. 1981). And in First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, the court overturned a
district court's grant of summary judgment to a defendant that was a 20% stockholder of a
general partner of a partnership that had violated securities laws. 969 F.2d 891, 898 (10th
Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). Together with his wife, he was a 35%
owner of the general partner; he also was a director and vice president of the general
partners. Consequently, he was in a position of at least indirect control over the developer
and its general partners, which in turn controlled the issuer of the bonds. Id. In Whirlpool
Finance Corp. v. GNHoldings, Inc., the court refused to dismiss a securities law claim against
a parent corporation and two shareholders that later controlled 51% of the corporate
defendant, reasoning that the facts could expose the shareholders to "control person"
liability under the securities laws. 873 F. Supp. 111, 121 (N.D. Ill. 1995), affd, 67 F.3d 605
(7th Cir. 1995); see also Donohoe v. Consol. Operating & Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d 1130, 1139
(7th Cir. 1992) (finding that promoters of oil limited partnerships could be held liable as
control persons under federal securities laws); Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974
F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992) (overturning summary judgment verdict for defendant
because fact issue existed as to whether broker-dealer was liable as controlling person);
Hunt v. Miller, 908 F.2d 1210, 1215 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence was sufficient to
submit to jury the question of whether defendant was liable for securities fraud as
controlling person, arising from sale of partnership interests in real estate venture); Drier
v. Tarpon Oil Co., 522 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that 78% shareholder and
president could be "control person"); Harriman v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 372 F.
Supp. 101, 105 (D. Del. 1974) (rejecting trust company's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, thereby allowing plaintiff to state a cause of action against a controlling
person without alleging any affirmative action on its part). But see Sharp v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that section 20(a) requires "'culpable
participation' in the securities violation").
309. 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992). Other opinions applying a similar standard
include Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 835 (D. Vt. 1988) (imposing liability for
cleaning up waste under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a) (1) (B) (1994), upon individual defendants that were "in a position as a
corporate office or major stockholder, to have 'ultimate authority to control' the proper
handling of mercury at the Staco plant"); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672
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tity's "authority to control" a contaminated facility or hazardous sub-
stance disposal decision would lead to "operator" liability under
CERCLA. 3 10
Under a control-based regime of vicarious tort liability for corporate
shareholders, a court's conclusion that a parent company possessed the
capacity to control the subsidiary would render the parent jointly and
severally liable, with a right of contribution, with the corporation and any
other shareholders possessing the capacity to control. In holding a share-
holder fully responsible, a control-based regime is similar to current veil
piercing rules. Once a veil is pierced under current law, the defendant
shareholder's responsibility for the corporation's obligations is also
complete.3 1
A question remains regarding the time when shareholder liability
would be assessed. There are essentially three choices: an "occurrence"
rule, imposing liability on a shareholder with the capacity to control the
corporation at the time of the occurrence that leads to liability in excess
of corporate assets; a "claims-made" rule, attaching liability to persons
who are controlling shareholders at the time they receive notice that a
claim will be filed against the corporation; and a 'judgment" rule, attach-
ing liability to those that are controlling shareholders at the time of
judgment.
An "occurrence" rule would appropriately encourage those in posi-
tions of control to monitor and influence corporate decisionmaking.
Among the three timing rules, it would best minimize the opportunity for
a shareholder to evade liability by selling its shares immediately after the
occurrence. 31 2 In proposing a pro rata regime, Hansmann and Kraak-
man reject an occurrence-based rule in favor of a modified form of a
(D. Idaho 1986) (holding that parent corporation is owner or operator under CERCLA if
it has capacity to discover and/or prevent and abate the discharge); see also United States
v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (refusing to dismiss CERCLA claim
against parent of wholly-owned asbestos manufacturing subsidiary, despite lack of evidence
of control over disposal operations, in view of "substantial financial or ownership interest
in the subsidiary"; control over "management and operations"; and "capacity to control"
waste disposal practices).
310. The defendants in Nurad included prior tenants and two vice presidents of a
company; the Fourth Circuit found them not liable because they lacked the "authority to
control." 966 F.2d at 842, 844. Although Nurad did not involve a parent corporation or
majority shareholder, the holding has been interpreted to apply to such parties. E.g.,
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 60 n.8 (citing Nurad for proposition that "parent
having authority to control subsidiary is liable as an operator, even if it did not exercise
that authority"); see also 40 C.F.R. § 89.2 (2001) (defining nonroad vehicle or equipment
manufacturer to include "[a]ll nonroad vehicle or equipment manufacturing entities that
are under the control of the same person").
311. If there are multiple "controlling shareholders," they would be jointly and
severally liable for a single corporate tort.
312. It would also address the concern, expressed by Easterbrook and Fischel, that an
expanded shareholder liability rule would deter beneficial control transactions because a
new buyer would wish to avoid the risk of having to contribute to already existing debts.
Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 43.
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claims-made rule.3 1 3 They argue that when a corporate tort spans a pe-
riod of time, determining when the tort "happened" and which share-
holders are liable will present significant administrative difficulties be-
cause of the number of involved shareholders and the prospect that
shares could have changed hands.3 14
These administrative difficulties would be considerably reduced
under a control-based regime because fewer shareholders would be in-
volved. Although some torts might take place over a long period of time
(as they presently do), and controlling shares could change hands during
that period, similar apportionment issues have proved manageable for
courts. For example, courts have had to apportion liability among differ-
ent corporate defendants when a manufacturing operation's activities
have created statutory liability and the operation has changed hands dur-
ing the activities in question. 3 15
Another potential issue would be the conflict of interest between
shareholders at the time a lawsuit is filed and "old" controlling sharehold-
ers that may have liability if ajudgment exceeds corporate assets, but that
no longer hold shares in the firm. New shareholders might be tempted,
for example, to distribute or otherwise dissipate corporate assets to re-
duce the assets available to pay ajudgment, thus shifting the liability costs
to the old shareholders. This conflict of interest would be heightened
under an occurrence-based rule, simply because the greater the length of
time between the occurrence of the tort and the issuance of a judgment,
the more likely it will be that shares will have changed hands. To the
extent that fraudulent conveyance law does not address this concern,
Hansmann and Kraakman correctly argue that any adequate regime of
expanded shareholder liability must include a "duty on management to
avoid opportunism on the part of new shareholders. '3 16
B. Comparison of a Control-Based Regime with Other Regimes
In their proposal for a regime of unlimited pro rata liability,
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that there are "no persuasive reasons" to
prefer a regime of limited liability over their proposed regime. 3 17 They
also argue that pro rata liability for all corporate shareholders is feasible,
even for shares traded on public stock exchanges. 3A8
313. Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1896.
314. Id. at 1897.
315. See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Serv., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1993)
(apportioning environmental cleanup liability among former site owners); Cent. Me.
Power Co. v. F.J. O'Connor Co., 838 F. Supp. 641 (D. Me. 1993) (apportioning
environmental cleanup liability among current and former site owners and companies that
had disposed of scrap at site).
316. Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1899.
317. Id. at 1880.
318. Id. at 1895-99.
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A definitive choice of the "best" shareholder liability regime depends
at least somewhat on a number of empirical issues, including insurance
availability and the precise distribution of corporate ownership. None-
theless, a comparison of the limited liability regime, a pro rata liability
regime, and a control-based liability regime suggests that a control-based
regime is a strong contender as a solution to the problem of limited liabil-
ity's moral hazard. And, depending on the results of empirical investiga-
tion, it might indeed prove superior.
The following analysis compares the three regimes in several ways.
First, in terms of ensuring that those benefiting from risky corporate ac-
tivity internalize the costs of those activities, both a control-based regime
and a pro rata regime are clearly superior to a limited liability regime. As
between the last two, a control-based regime appears superior to a pro
rata regime because controlling shareholders will face inadequate incen-
tives to internalize costs under a pro rata regime. Second, compared to a
control-based regime, a pro rata regime likely will impose greater litiga-
tion costs upon a plaintiff seeking compensation for risky corporate activ-
ity. This will reduce the ability of corporate tort victims to receive com-
pensation. To the extent plaintiffs do overcome the litigation costs
barrier and seek compensation from, among others, very small corporate
shareholders, a pro rata regime may encourage those shareholders to en-
gage in relatively costly monitoring.
On the other hand, a control-based regime also has weaknesses. 31 9
Some asserted weaknesses are common to any regime that imposes
greater liability on shareholders, including the pro rata liability regime.
Assertions specific to a control-based regime include: the prospect of in-
319. In a world without transaction costs, the most efficient solution to the problem of
internalizing costs may be to apportion the costs of a corporate activity in proportion to the
shareholders' expected benefit. That would mean adding a premium or discounting each
shareholder's right to receive dividends depending on the shareholder's ability to control
the corporation. If there were no transaction costs, shares would be tradable because
investors could costlessly monitor each others' holdings and wealth. Further, each
shareholder would face incentives that, to the extent of current tort and statutory law,
correctly internalize social costs and benefits.
Such a rule is unworkable, however, due to the existence of transaction costs. First, it
would be more difficult to trade minority shares, because the value of each share would
depend on, among other things, the ownership distribution of the remaining shares.
Second, transaction costs could prevent a tort victim from collecting from numerous
minority shareholders of a corporation, thus reducing compensation for injuries (and
deterrence) from risky corporate activity. See, e.g., id. at 1899-1900 ("Very large
collection costs ... would lower settlement values and hence reduce the deterrent effect of
tort rules."). Further, calling on the court to add a premium to or discount each
shareholder's responsibility depending on control considerations similarly would make
judicial proceedings considerably more cumbersome. Given the reality of transaction
costs, the control-based regime proposed here is more likely than either the "efficient rule"
outlined above or a pro rata liability rule to ensure that a corporation and the shareholders
that can control it more fully internalize costs of excessively risky operations. It is also
more likely to assure compensation for tort victims and the environment. See supra note
192 (regarding theory of the second-best).
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creased costs from litigation over the meaning of the rule; the inability of
a plaintiff to obtain compensation from excessively risky activity when a
corporation has no shareholder with a capacity to control; overdeter-
rence of some socially beneficial activities when insurance is not available
for the activity; and a change in equity ownership patterns.
1. Internalizing the Costs of Risky Activities. - Both the "capacity to
control" regime and the pro rata regime purport to address limited liabil-
ity's critical problem: the corporate ability to externalize the costs of risky
activities and the resulting incentive to overinvest in those activities. As
discussed below, a control-based regime is likely to be more successful
than a pro rata regime in addressing limited liability's moral hazard.
Under a control-based liability regime, shareholders with the capac-
ity to control, who can most cheaply monitor corporations, more often
would encourage corporate management to resist risky, socially costly ac-
tivities, to maintain appropriate operating reserves, and to insure against
the potential costs of risky activities. 320 Firms would more likely internal-
ize their costs, rather than shift excess costs to involuntary creditors such
as tort victims. Tort and statutory claimants would more likely be
compensated.
Parent corporations and controlling shareholders would have no in-
centive to close their eyes to a corporation's risky business choices. 32 1 A
parent corporation with special knowledge or technology would be more
likely to make it available to a subsidiary as a means of minimizing risk
from the subsidiary's activities.3 22 A parent company could assist a subsid-
iary in locating liability insurance. Finally, a parent company would be
more likely to direct its limited resources to reducing the risks presented
by corporate activities, rather than attempting to avoid paying the costs of
320. See Stone, supra note 7, at 73. See also supra note 71 (observing that
environmental insurance has become increasingly available).
321. Hansmann and Kraakman appear to argue that a reduction in control
premiums-which could result from a control-based liability regime-would be related to
a "decrease in shareholder monitoring of the management of risky firms." Hansmann &
Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1905. This seems to assume that the
number of firms engaged in risky activity will be the same, but that fewer investors will
accumulate large holdings and have the incentive to monitor management closely.
Another possibility is that the reduced investment in firms engaged in risky activity,
together with greater expression of managerial risk aversion, will lead firms to move to less
risky activities. To the extent there is inefficiency from reduced monitoring of
management, it would be offset by reductions in firm investment in overly risky activity.
Even leaving aside investment in overly risky activity, it is not altogether clear that more
shareholder control is more efficient. See infra note 363 and accompanying text.
322. Cf. Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 684 N.E.2d 504, 516-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
franchiser, a large oil marketer, responsible for underground storage tank due to its
knowledge of steel underground storage tank problems and fact that "the solution to the
problem required significant engineering knowledge and resources beyond the limits of
most gas station owners"), transfer granted, 698 N.E.2d 1183 (1998).
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those risks through corporate restructuring. 323 Corporations would thus
be less likely to select excessively risky corporate activities.
Of course, on the occasions when a corporate activity presents a risk
that could not possibly be anticipated, 324 a control-based shareholder lia-
bility rule could not realize this particular benefit. The shareholders
would have no advantage over tort victims in anticipating risks. A control-
based shareholder liability rule then would contribute to efficiency if the
controlling shareholders generally were better risk bearers than the tort
victims. This seems likely. As discussed above, there seems no reason
generally to conclude that tort victims would be better risk bearers than
shareholders or controlling shareholders in particular. For example, a
corporate or institutional controlling shareholder, such as a parent cor-
poration, almost certainly will be a better bearer of risk than a tort victim,
who is very likely to be an individual. 325 Perhaps more important, a con-
trolling shareholder likely can better spread risk than a tort victim be-
cause the shareholder can influence the corporation to buy insurance,
and liability insurance is likely to be more readily available to the corpora-
tion than first-party insurance is to the individual tort victim. 3 26
At an economy-wide level, one would expect to see an overall reduc-
tion in risky activities undertaken by corporations. Under any regime,
control generally confers on the shareholder a greater expected benefit
per share purchased, relative to other shareholders. 327 Under a control-
based liability regime, control also would confer greater responsibility.
An entity that purchased a controlling share of ownership in a highly
risky corporate activity could expect to face higher costs should the risky
business result in a tort liability judgment exceeding the corporation's
assets. For corporations engaged in highly risky activity, especially activi-
ties presenting risks of extremely large injuries, one would expect to see a
reduced demand for controlling shares and a decline in the premium
paid for control. 328 Overall, corporations would be less likely to select
323. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 123, at 410-11 (contending that uncertainty of
limited liability rules weighs in favor of counseling clients to adopt risk minimization
strategy).
324. Schwartz, supra note 77, at 691.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 82-92.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92. On the other hand, for some cases of
truly unforeseeable risks, the effect of a control-based liability rule would be less clear. For
example, suppose a corporate risk is truly unforeseeable and for some reason difficult to
insure, the controlling shareholder is an individual shareholder; is risk averse; and the loss
from the injury represents a large proportion of her wealth. Under these circumstances,
the shareholder might not be a better risk bearer than a tort victim, especially if the tort
victim is one of many and each victim would bear a cost representing a relatively small
percentage of his or her portfolio.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 206-231 (discussing particular benefits
attributable to shareholder control).
328. With a rule of pro rata liability, a similar consequence is likely. See Hansmann &
Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1905 (observing that pro rata rule "clearly
would increase a risk-averse investor's cost of accumulating a large holding in a risky
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risky activities, either because of the presence of a controlling share-
holder with responsibility for tort or statutory liability or because, in the
absence of such a shareholder, managers could more freely express their
tendencies toward risk aversion.
Like a control-based liability regime, a pro rata liability regime would
also encourage shareholder monitoring of corporate operations and re-
duce corporate externalization of the costs of risky activities. However,
the pro rata regime's incentives for controlling shareholders are
inadequate.
Under a pro rata regime, a controlling shareholder would face ex-
cess costs from risky corporate activity only in proportion to its share of
corporate equity. However, the controlling shareholder can expect to re-
ceive more benefit from corporate activity than its pro rata ownership
might suggest.3 29 Depending on the corporation's structure and opera-
tion, the benefit could substantially exceed the controlling shareholder's
pro rata share. A controlling shareholder thus might find desirable risky
activities that a shareholder without control would not, and the control-
ling shareholder might encourage corporate management to choose
these activities.
A pro rata regime would tend to inadequately deter such a control-
ling shareholder from influencing a corporation to select excessively risky
activity. Despite receiving control-specific benefits, such a shareholder or
parent would, under the pro rata regime, bear responsibility for an exces-
sively risky corporate activity only in proportion to the share of equity
held. To the extent expected costs exceed corporate assets, the control-
ling shareholder thus would continue to receive some "discount" on ex-
pected liability from a risky corporate activity, although expected benefits
would not be similarly discounted. The controlling shareholder thus
likely would still encourage overinvestment in such activities, even for
some activities for which the activity's social cost exceeds its social benefit.
More subtly, a controlling shareholder would have a reduced incen-
tive to ensure that a corporation is appropriately capitalized or carries
appropriate insurance in view of the expected costs of its activities. This
is because under a pro rata regime, a controlling shareholder's share of
expected costs from a risky activity would be higher if the corporation is
fully insured or capitalized than if it is not.
Suppose a corporation buys more insurance. The controlling share-
holder would likely bear more than a pro rata share of those costs in the
form of reduced dividends and other benefits. For example, this could
reduce the corporation's total cash flow, which could result not only in a
reduction of dividends (borne on a pro rata basis), but in a reduction in
tax advantages and an increase in the controlling shareholder's cost of
corporation relative to the investor's cost of holding a diversified portfolio" and takeover
premiums for risky firms would decline).
329. See supra text accompanying notes 206-231.
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capital. 330 However, if the corporation were underinsured, the control-
ling shareholder's expected liability would be limited to a pro rata share
of the expected loss in excess of insurance and assets. While incentives to
insure adequately are surely greater under the pro rata regime than
under a limited liability regime, a controlling shareholder still might en-
courage a corporation to underinsure its risky operations.
Further, the presence of litigation costs will render a pro rata rule
less effective than a capacity to control rule in compelling a corporation
with a controlling shareholder to internalize its costs. 33' This will be the
case even if the argument could be made that controlling shareholders
do not realize any additional value from holding control of a corporation
or, on the margin, from a particular corporate activity. Take a corpora-
tion that has a 51% shareholder and numerous small shareholders. As
among all corporations, such a corporation is more likely to select exces-
sively risky activities because of the presence of the majority shareholder.
Under the pro rata liability regime, however, chances are good that a tort
victim injured by the risky corporate activity would recoup only 51% of a
tort liability judgment to the extent it exceeds corporate assets. As dis-
cussed in more detail below, obtaining additional recovery from investors
that each own a tiny fraction of the total shares would involve considera-
ble difficulty and expense. 33 2 Tort victims might well forego this effort.
As discussed above, a considerable number of publicly-held corporations
potentially fit this model. 33 3 Consequently, tort and statutory claimants
would continue to bear some or all of those costs, rather than be fully
compensated.
Even assuming that there is no particular benefit to control, control-
ling shareholders would still obtain some benefits (distributed pro rata)
from the corporation's collective ability to externalize costs as a result of
the transaction costs faced by plaintiffs. As a consequence, controlling
shareholders still would have an incentive to encourage corporations to
overinvest in risky activity.
Hansmann and Kraakman acknowledge that under their regime, the
damages owed to tort victims from risky corporate activity likely would
not be fully paid, despite adequate shareholder assets, because of collec-
330. See supra text accompanying note 223.
331. Cf. Cooper Alexander, supra note 11, at 389 ("The feasibility and costs of
implementing a substantive rule are critical to evaluating what it would actually
accomplish, and whether it would be an improvement over existing laws or possible
alternatives.").
332. E.g., Stone, supra note 7, at 75 ("In the typical giant, publicly held enterprise ...
no ordinary investor's exposure would be more than nominal."). Of course, this problem
will not be as severe for closely-held corporations, since they generally have many fewer
shareholders. Further, to the extent the shares of a public corporation are concentrated in
the hands of a few institutional shareholders, this problem will be less serious. But see
supra note 46 (noting that 500 shareholders at minimum are needed for NYSE listing).
333. See supra text accompanying note 47 (citing Demsetz conclusion that
approximately 50% of publicly-traded companies are "owner-controlled").
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tion difficulties. 334 They argue that public corporations nonetheless
would bear the "bulk of their expected liability costs.
33 5
This would seem to be true primarily when a nonpublicly-traded sub-
sidiary or close corporation is, say, 95% or more owned by the parent.
The shareholder or parent would be almost completely responsible for
judgments that exceeded the assets of the corporation.336 When a signifi-
cant part of a corporation's equity is held by numerous small sharehold-
ers, however, a tort victim seeking compensation in excess of corporate
assets under a pro rata liability regime would be unlikely to recover the
bulk of her damages. Such a firm still could externalize significant costs
of its activities.
This problem would be most significant for a corporation whose
shareholders include at least one with capacity to control and a large
number of additional shareholders. Transaction costs would hinder a
plaintiffs efforts to obtain full compensation from shareholders. Mean-
while, the controlling shareholder would be encouraging excessively risky
activities. As discussed above, this equity distribution profile may be typi-
cal of a significant percentage of publicly-traded corporations.
33 7
By comparison, under a control-based regime, a tort victim could
seek full recourse from the majority or controlling shareholder. The con-
trolling shareholder would be unlikely to prompt management to exter-
nalize costs. The corporation and its shareholders would be more likely
to internalize the costs of their risky activity and to compensate the tort or
statutory claimant.
2. Incentives to Insure. - As mentioned in the previous section, a con-
trolling shareholder would have an incentive, under a pro rata regime, to
encourage a corporation engaged in risky activity to underinsure. Under
such a regime, a controlling shareholder would be likely to bear a greater
share of corporate investments in insurance or capital than the share-
holder would bear if a court actually imposed liability in excess of what
the corporation could pay.
By comparison, under a control-based regime, a controlling share-
holder would be more likely to make sure that the corporation has in-
334. See Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1901.
335. Id. For the privately-held corporation with a small number of shareholders, a
plaintiff seeking to invoke a pro rata liability rule probably will face manageable
transaction costs.
336. Under a pro rata regime, a well-capitalized public corporation would likely bear
the bulk of its expected liability costs, just as it does under the current limited liability
regime. Once it decided it was willing to pay its subsidiary's liabilities, for example, the
Exxon Corporation's payment of liabilities arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill put a
dent in revenues for only one year. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
337. See supra text accompanying note 48 (discussing 1988 survey identifying 650
public corporations with majority shareholders); supra text accompanying note 47
(discussing Demsetz data). To be listed on a public stock exchange, company
shareholders must generally number in the hundreds. See supra note 46 (noting that
minimum of 500 shareholders is needed for NYSE listing).
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sured adequately, given the risks presented by a particular activity. If a
corporation were adequately capitalized or adequately insured for the
risky activities it undertook, the controlling shareholder would share the
expected costs of a particular activity with other shareholders in the same
proportion as it would share the benefits of corporate activities. The con-
trolling shareholder's expected costs likely would consist of reduced divi-
dends and other expected benefits of share ownership, such as reduced
tax benefits or synergy opportunities. Failure to ensure that a corpora-
tion is adequately capitalized or insured would expose the controlling
shareholder to a larger proportion of liability for costs exceeding corpo-
rate assets. 338 In comparison to both the limited liability and pro rata
regimes, the controlling shareholder thus would be more likely to ensure
that a corporation is adequately capitalized or insured.
3. Litigation and Transaction Costs. - Because fewer parties would be
involved in litigation, a control-based liability regime also would tend to
minimize litigation and transaction costs. Under a pro rata regime, a tort
plaintiff interested in full compensation would have to engage in the
costly enterprise of naming all shareholders as defendants-including
identifying, locating, and serving these defendants. 339 Especially for a
publicly-held corporation with a controlling shareholder holding substan-
tially less than all the shares, the number of potential defendants could
be numerous. 340 In comparison, a tort plaintiff in a control-based liabil-
ity regime could name many fewer shareholders to obtain recovery for an
injury caused by corporate activity.
To the extent they do risk a lawsuit, small shareholders also could
incur significant transaction costs under a pro rata unlimited liability re-
gime, relative to a control-based regime. Because of a prospective plain-
tiffs substantial transaction costs, a small shareholder could discount the
338. Some risks, of course, might be uninsurable. Under these circumstances, a
controlling shareholder might simply avoid a risky activity. See infra text accompanying
notes 364-367.
339. For the difficulties facing a plaintiff who wishes to pursue numerous corporate
shareholders under a pro rata liability rule implemented through state tort law, see
generally Cooper Alexander, supra note 11, at 421-24 ("Thus, [pro rata] unlimited liability
would not normally be implemented in a unified proceeding in a single court, but rather
in many different proceedings in many courts, possibly occurring long after the initial tort
suit or suits are filed.").
Shareholders could be required to bear litigation costs. This clearly would enable tort
plaintiffs to obtain more compensation under a pro rata rule. However, tort plaintiffs
could only recoup those costs at the end of an often lengthy legal proceeding which, of
course, presents a risk of loss. Consequently, they still might be deterred from fronting the
costs necessary to pursue all shareholders as defendants. Further, judicial transaction costs
would still be significant. In short, controlling shareholders would still not fully internalize
costs. See supra text accompanying notes 329-337.
340. To the extent that the vast majority of the minority shares in large corporations
were concentrated in relatively few hands-for example, in fewer than forty institutions-
there would be fewer transaction costs. But see supra note 46 (noting that 500
shareholders are needed for NYSE listing).
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likelihood of a lawsuit. However, to the extent small shareholders believe
that they face a significant risk of suit, they would monitor the corpora-
tion to minimize a potential liability risk, or else would simply choose not
to invest.341 The smallest individual shareholders might lack ready access
to information necessary to assess expected liability and, sometimes, the
knowledge or skill necessary to evaluate the information. Effective moni-
toring thus would require significant transaction costs. Because there
would be no limit on a small shareholder's potential liability under a pro
rata rule, diversification could represent only a partial answer.
342
However, a control-based liability regime would focus liability only
on controlling shareholders.3 43 Consequently, truly small shareholders
341. E.g., Halpern et al., supra note 2, at 125 (explaining that "risk-minimizing
response [to unlimited liability] might entail more detailed involvement by owners in
managerial supervision, thus generating increased, and wasteful, transactions costs").
Insurance might provide a partial solution to this problem, but probably only a partial one.
See Cooper Alexander, supra note 11, at 428 (noting that insurers are not likely to provide
shareholders with unlimited liability insurance, which would involve insuring against both
the risk of commercial failure and the risk of tort liability). But cf. text accompanying
notes 91-93 (arguing that controlling shareholders can encourage company to buy more
insurance).
342. Hansmann and Kraakman imply that diversification is still useful under an
unlimited liability regime based on an assumption that "even a catastrophic liability
judgment [is unlikely to] impose costs exceeding a publicly-traded firm's value by more
than, say, a multiple of five." Consequently, a shareholder would rarely be forced into
insolvency. Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1900. The basis
for the assumption is unclear. E.g., Leebron, supra note 2, at 1598 ("[U]nder a pro rata
rule, the effect on portfolio strategy depends on the relationship between the magnitude
of the largest conceivable loss and its probability."). It is worth noting that in the ten years
since Hansmann and Kraakman wrote their article, tort liability awards have continued to
increase. For example, the median jury award in defective products cases more than
tripled from $500,300 in 1993 to over $1.8 million in 1999. See Greg Winter, Jury Awards
Soar as Lawsuits Decline on Defective Goods, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 2001, at Al (noting, in
addition, that total number of product liability cases declined from 1997 to 2000).
343. As under a pro rata standard, however, mutual funds and other investment
intermediaries might face responsibility under a control-based liability scheme. See
Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1904 (noting that collection
mechanism imposing greater liability on large shareholders might "discourage investment
intermediaries such as mutual funds"). However, liability would not be automatic, but
would depend on the size of the fund's holdings and other factors. Individual mutual fund
shareholder liability seems highly unlikely under a control-based regime.
That funds might have liability, but not individual mutual fund shareholders, might
seem anomalous. Such institutional investors, however, may exercise control opportunities
in the companies in which they invest as part of ensuring higher returns for their
investment. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 188, at 2105 ("[T]he influence of institutional
investors ... appear[s] to be increasing."). Further, institutional investors likely would be
in a good position to monitor the companies in which they invest to assure that the
companies are adequately insured. Institutional investors themselves could obtain
adequate insurance and could keep their investments in a particular company below 10%.
In addition, they could presumably include in their contract with individual investors some
additional charge for their willingness to bear the risk associated with investment.
Although the demand for mutual funds could be reduced, individual investors likely would
continue to pay, just as they do now, a premium above what they would pay to invest in
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could avoid their relatively high monitoring costs. The liability of these
shareholders would continue to be limited under a control-based regime,
and they could continue to minimize investment risks by diversifying,
rather than by monitoring. The bulk of corporate monitoring responsi-
bility would be borne by shareholders with the capacity to control, who
most likely face comparatively low monitoring costs. 34 4
To the extent there is more than one shareholder with the capacity
to control the corporation, the controlling shareholders would wish addi-
tionally to monitor each others' wealth to assess potential liability expo-
sure for a corporate tort. However, they probably already conduct some
monitoring to assess relative control. Further, the number of controlling
shareholders for any corporation is likely to be small, so the additional
monitoring burden should not be excessive.
4. Costs from Litigation over the Meaning of "Capacity to Control." - A
control-based regime could be criticized as generating litigation because
it would not impose a detailed ex ante "bright-line" rule and instead
would impose a standard in which detail would be developed through
judicial application. 345 In some instances, such as where a shareholder
owns 35% of shares, or arguably is a member of a shareholder bloc that
can control the corporation, application of a control-based standard
could require a trial judge to evaluate factual evidence and hear expert
testimony, resulting in additional transaction costs for litigants and courts
and creating some uncertainty about precisely when the rule would
apply.3 46
However, even for the case requiring the development of a factual
record, courts are not wholly without experience in addressing the capac-
ity to control issue. In the context of ERISA, securities law, and certain
environmental statutes, courts have had to evaluate whether a particular
individual stocks for the convenience and superior informational access provided by
mutual funds. Finally, to the extent investment intermediaries were discouraged by a
control-based regime, the effect would likely be seen primarily in risky industries.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68. Finally, like the limited liability
regime, a control-based regime would continue to make wealth accumulation
opportunities available more democratically. Less wealthy shareholders, who tend to hold
small percentages of a corporation's stock, would face greater costs under a pro rata
regime than a control-based one. Avoiding the "tax" of litigation and a pro rata judgment
would require these shareholders to spend substantial sums on information to monitor
their corporate investments. Under a control-based regime, less wealthy individuals could
invest-as they do now-without risking their entire portfolio. See Presser, Thwarting,
supra note 16, at 161-62. Of course, these opportunities also would be available to wealthy
individuals who elected to buy only small shares of ownership of a corporation.
345. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
Duke L.J. 557, 597-99 (1992) (comparing economic effect of detailed rules with
nonspecific standards in a variety of settings).
346. E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1932 ("In
short, it is very difficult to determine where to drive the piton into this particular slippery
slope."); cf. Note, supra note 59, at 996-97 (describing litigation reduction as an advantage
of limited liability).
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shareholder has actual or potential control over a corporate entity.
3 47
There might be more litigation over the issue of liability for a particular
shareholder under a control-based regime, compared with a pro rata
rule. However, the question is certainly no more difficult to answer than
liability under the current veil piercing standard, which requires a court
to evaluate whether the parent is the subsidiary's "alter ego" or has fraud-
ulenfly used the corporate form. 3 48
Perhaps more critically, the lack of a detailed ex ante rule might re-
quire a potential corporate shareholder to expend resources determining
whether it would face potential "capacity to control" liability in the event
of a tort or statutory judgment exceeding corporate assets. Further, the
lack of a bright-line rule might deter individuals who wish to invest in
mutual funds or pension funds. These fears might result in reduced in-
vestment, especially if these institutions held large stock positions in a
particular company.3 49
The group of shareholders that would need to spend resources on
determining possible exposure would be limited. For example, it is clear
that a majority shareholder and a shareholder with a smaller stake in a
public corporation would be vicariously responsible and not responsible,
respectively. However, shareholders possessing or considering the acqui-
sition of large nonmajority shares of equity would face the costs of deter-
mining whether they have the "capacity to control." Similarly, a potential
mutual fund investor might demand assurance from the mutual fund that
it will keep investments in particular companies to below 10% of equity or
perhaps assume any risk of excess liability.
Nonetheless, the costs associated with a less detailed standard still
seem outweighed by the problems that would be created by trying to de-
vise a detailed bright-line rule. Permitting the detail of a control-based
regime to be developed in the context of particular cases still seems the
best approach for several reasons. First, assuming that courts do not reg-
ularly make legal errors, the cost for a private shareholder to determine
whether it possesses the "capacity to control" the corporation is likely to
be relatively low. The shareholder that must make this determination
typically will hold a significant block of stock. Such a shareholder is likely
to have control over or inexpensive access to the information necessary to
determine whether it has the "capacity to control" within the meaning of
the rule: for example, the proportion of shares held by others, the share-
holder's ability to select directors, and whether the shareholder is viewed
by the market as possessing "control."
347. See supra text accompanying notes 303-310.
348. Concededly, at least at the outset, tort victims likely would sue shareholders more
than they currently do, which could increase transaction costs. On the other hand, the
liability of very large and very small shareholders is clear even under a control-based rule.
349. See also supra note 343 (discussing risk of increased liability for mutual funds
and possible responses).
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Second, a rule that ex ante is more detailed, with less room for ad-
justment in individual cases, is likely worse. It could be both significantly
underinclusive and overinclusive. For example, a more detailed rule that
selects a precise level of stock ownership, such as 35%, as "control," would
impose no responsibility on the 34% shareholder that is the largest cor-
porate shareholder, is strongly represented on the board of directors,
and is the only shareholder to hold more than 0.5% of stock. However, it
might mistakenly include the 36% shareholder in the corporation that is
controlled by a 64% shareholder. In other words, a proper determina-
tion of "capacity to control" should depend, at a minimum, not only on
the shareholder's absolute share of ownership, but also on the share of
ownership compared with the shares held by others. The potential for
dramatic case-by-case variation weighs in favor of not attempting a de-
tailed ex ante definition of the shareholder with the capacity to
control.3 50
It is worth noting, however, that a similar sounding rule developed
by a federal appeals court in the context of lender liability under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act has been subjected to substantial criticism. In United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., the Eleventh Circuit held that a lender with the "capacity to
influence" its borrower's operations would have statutory cleanup liability
in the event of improper waste disposal. 35 ' The criticism of Fleet Factors
stemmed, in part, from lenders' concerns about the uncertainty they
would face about their potential liability.352
Concededly, a control-based liability standard for shareholders
would create some uncertainty, just as it did for lenders after Fleet Factors
350. See generally Kaplow, supra note 345, at 559 (offering an economic analysis of
the extent to which legal commands should be promulgated as rules (ex ante) or as
standards (ex post)).
351. 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied en banc, 911 F.2d 742 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991). I am grateful to Ronald Mann for pointing
out the potential similarities between a control-based liability regime for shareholders and
the Fleet Factors lender liability standard.
352. E.g., G. Van Velsor Wolf, Jr., Lender Liability After Fleet Factors: Perceptions and
Realities, in Fourth Annual Advanced ALI-ABA Course of Study: The Impact of
Environmental Law on Real Estate and Other Commercial Transactions 183, 197-99
(1991) (noting lenders' reaction to Fleet Factors); Widespread Havoc Predicted by ABA
[American Banking Ass'n], Others Supporting Fleet Factors Review, 55 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 792, 792 (1990) [hereinafter Widespread Havoc] (indicating ABA's urging of U.S.
Supreme Court to review Fleet Factors); Dennis R. Connolly, Superfund Whacks the Banks,
Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1990, at AlO (discussing effect of Fleet Factors decision on banks); Fleet
Factors Files in Supreme Court, Says Ruling Disrupts Commercial Lending, 55 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 586, 586 (1990) (reporting Fleet Factors Corp. filing review petition to U.S.
Supreme Court; arguing Fleet Factors decision "threatens to disrupt 'normal and prudent
commercial practices"'). For some of the commentary on Fleet Factors, see George Anhang,
Cleaning up the Lender Management Participation Standard Under CERCLA in the
Aftermath of Fleet Factors, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 235, 236 (1991); Michael B. Kupin, New
Alterations of the Lender Liability Landscape: CERCLA After the Fleet Factors Decision, 19
Real Est. L.J. 191, 209-15 (1991).
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until the decision's import was weakened by administrative guidance and
ultimately reversed by a statutory amendment.35 3 However, the Fleet Fac-
tors liability standard was perceived to be considerably broader than the
shareholder liability standard discussed here. Some believed the Fleet Fac-
tors standard would impose liability on any lender with a secured interest
because of standard monitoring provisions in commercial loan con-
tracts. 35 4 Further, a number of other criticisms led to Fleet Factors being
considered an infamous decision, including that it would have imposed
greater statutory liability on lenders than on parent companies, other
shareholders, or managers of a company that had improperly disposed of
hazardous waste.3 55 These types of criticisms were particular to the statu-
tory regime at issue and would not apply to a control-based shareholder
liability regime.
5. Exclusion of Companies Without Controlling Shareholders. - The com-
pany without a single shareholder in a position of control presents a spe-
cial case. Such a corporation might, for example, fit the Berle-Means pro-
file of a corporation run by managers and owned by numerous individual
shareholders, none of whom individually (or as a bloc) possesses the ca-
pacity to control the corporation. To the extent large tort liabilities ex-
ceed corporate assets, a control-based regime would authorize no addi-
tional recovery from the corporation's shareholders. Consequently, the
corporation would not fully internalize the costs of its risky behavior. By
comparison, the proportional liability rule urged by Hansmann and
Kraakman would, in theory, provide for a pro rata recovery from each
shareholder.
Whether this situation would arise frequently depends on, among
other things, the extent of excessive risk taking attributable to these types
of corporations. Even without further empirical investigation, several fac-
tors suggest that the theoretical difference in treatment of corporations
without controlling shareholders may not create a substantial practical
difference between the regimes. First, even of the largest corporations, a
considerable number have a controlling shareholder. 3 56 Furthermore,
close corporation ownership is generally highly concentrated. Given the
353. Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 2501-2502, 110 Stat. 3009-462, 3009-462-69 (1996).
354. E.g., George Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand Lenders' Risks Under
Superfund, Nat'l LJ., Sept. 17, 1990, at 19 ("A 'capacity to influence' test may well make all
secured creditors vulnerable on the grounds of some inherent power to affect their
borrowers' behavior."); Connolly, supra note 352, at 10 ("Lenders may be reluctant to
finance clients with any involvement in environmental clean-up . ..for fear that such
financial arrangements, in and of themselves, might establish a sufficient level of control to
trigger liability."); Widespread Havoc, supra note 352, at 792 (noting American Bankers
Association argument that the decision "has denied lenders the benefit of the secured
credit exemption under the Superfund law").
355. See Kupin, supra note 352, at 209-15 (critiquing Fleet Factors; advising lenders on
ways to avoid CERCLA liability).
356. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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state of current information, the best conclusion is that a corporation
lacking a shareholder with capacity to control is unlikely to occur in the
universe of close corporations and probably does not represent the bulk
of public corporations. A control-based liability regime could create an
incentive for shareholders to avoid control completely, so that corpora-
tions would no longer have controlling shareholders. However, such an
outcome seems unlikely in view of the substantial benefits of possessing
control.3 5 7
If that were to happen, however, managerial risk aversion would con-
tinue to deter these corporations from selecting excessively risky actions.
In the absence of a shareholder with the capacity to control, managerial
risk aversion will be relatively unhindered. Managers can better serve
their own goals-like keeping their jobs-in preference to strictly maxi-
mizing shareholder profits. As discussed above, even in the absence of a
new liability regime, managerial risk aversion in corporations without
controlling shareholders is likely to temper limited liability's moral
hazard. 358
Moreover, a pro rata rule is unlikely to offer significant practical ad-
vantages in the treatment of a corporation without a controlling share-
holder, even if such a corporation were to engage in excessively risky ac-
tivity. Under a pro rata rule, a plaintiff would face substantial difficulty in
obtaining compensation due to transaction costs. In the case of a public
corporation without a controlling shareholder, for example, a tort or stat-
utory claimant would be compelled to pursue hundreds or thousands of
small shareholders, each for only a small fraction of the tort victim's total
loss. Considerable transaction costs could consume much of the poten-
tial recovery. For example, a claimant with $5,000,000 in injuries, faced
with suing 5000 individual shareholders each for $1000, could conceiva-
bly be deterred by litigation costs from embarking on the process at
all. 359
357. See supra text accompanying notes 206-231.
358. The presence of stock options is unlikely to reduce managerial risk aversion
significantly. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
359. Joseph Grundfest also has argued that the capital markets will circumvent a pro
rata liability system by "strategically generating a large clientele of investors who are de
facto attachment-proof in actions seeking recovery of proportionate damages." See
Grundfest, supra note 7, at 389. Grundfest's argument that, as a practical matter, very
small shareholders are "naturally immune" to a proportionate liability system, see id. at
397, of course does not apply to a control-based liability system. As argued above,
shareholders are unlikely to avoid control altogether because of the significant benefits
control confers. See supra text accompanying notes 206-231. Further, Grundfest's
arguments that people will invest in a company in other forms, such as through debt, will
simply concentrate equity in a smaller group of individuals or institutions. That is unlikely
to seriously undermine the application of a control-based liability rule, unless that smaller
group is judgment-proof, which also seems relatively unlikely. See Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited Liability? A Response to
Professor Crundfest, 102 Yale L.J. 427, 430 (1992) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman,
Do Markets Compel Limited Liability?] ("The supply of high rollers with just the right
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6. Changes in Equity Ownership Distribution. - The capacity to control
rule might be conceptualized as a tax on control. Even if shareholders do
not avoid control altogether, the rule will likely result in some change in
the distribution of equity ownership. 360 Because the acquisition of con-
trol would be accompanied by new potential liabilities, the price of ac-
quiring a controlling share in a risky business is likely to decline. Under a
control-based liability regime, the tax is "flat." If a shareholder were to
acquire the "capacity to control" by virtue of share ownership, the share-
holder's decision to acquire further shares in the company would not be
accompanied by any further increase in liability exposure. So, for a
shareholder that would have held control in a corporation under a lim-
ited liability regime, one might expect the same shareholder either to
hold a greater percentage of shares under a control-based regime or else
to avoid the acquisition of a controlling share altogether.
This could be termed an inefficient "distortion." For example, to the
extent shareholders completely stop acquiring controlling shares of cor-
porations, agency costs would increase and managers would be moni-
tored less. Such an outcome, however, appears unlikely in view of the
obvious benefits of control.361
Assuming a shareholder elects to retain control, but the presence of
the rule results in the shareholder holding a greater percentage of
shares, the efficiency effect of the "distortion" is unclear. The share-
holder may have greater expropriation opportunities, but agency costs
may decline. Meanwhile, numerous other distortions are present in the
corporation as a profit maximizing enterprise. Consequently, the fact of
a new "distortion" in ownership distribution alone cannot be assumed to
reduce social welfare. 362 For example, one study has suggested that di-
luted ownership firms and extremely concentrated ownership firms both
tend to outperform firms where the largest shareholder is medium-
combination of capital, risk preference, and management expertise to pursue this strategy
is likely to be very limited."). Grundfest also argues, however, that to the extent
shareholders are foreign, asserting jurisdiction over and collecting judgments from them
will be very difficult. Grundfest, supra note 7, at 397-98. While this problem is not a trivial
one, it could be addressed through targeted regulations, such as domestic ownership rules
or insurance requirements. See Hansmann & Kraakman, Do Markets Compel Limited
Liability?, supra, at 433.
360. In the absence of a capacity to control rule, the marginal benefit to a controlling
shareholder of, say, the share that gives it majority control (51% of the voting shares) is
likely to be quite high. By comparison, the marginal benefit of the share that gives the
controlling shareholder 98% control, rather than 97% control, is likely to be considerably
less: the entitlement to receive additional dividends from an enterprise that the
shareholder already controls. Of course, the value of the share still would be higher than
the marginal benefit of a share to a shareholder that had no capacity to control the
corporation.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 206-231.
362. See supra note 192 (regarding theory of the second-best).
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sized.3 63 Moreover, agency costs associated with monitoring managers
and other shareholders may vary depending on the size and sophistica-
tion of the shareholder. At bottom, the implications of such a change are
unclear.
7. Overdeterrence of Some Socially Beneficial Activities. - Another criti-
cism of a control-based regime is that it could overdeter certain risky, but
socially beneficial activities, if they present a risk of tort or tort-like statu-
tory liability in excess of corporate assets. Because a shareholder with
capacity to control would bear all the excess costs if the corporation faced
a tort judgment, the shareholder might find that the shareholder's ex-
pected costs from a new risky project (the losses resulting from increased
corporate costs of paying liability judgments, together with the stock-
holder's share of the costs that exceed corporate assets) outweighed the
expected benefit to the shareholder, even if, overall, expected benefits
exceeded expected costs. 3 6 4 A 60% parent corporation, for example,
with the capacity to control (and hence exposure to 100% of tort liabil-
ity), but with the right to receive significantly less than 100% of the mar-
ginal value of a new corporate activity, might oppose a corporate activity
whose social benefit exceeds the social costs if the activity presented the
risk of tort or statutory liability in excess of corporate assets. The share-
holder might attempt to deter corporate management from undertaking
the project.
If a corporation were to be properly capitalized or insured, however,
there would be no overdeterrence effect. Only if insurance (or capitaliza-
tion) were inadequate would a controlling shareholder face a risk of lia-
bility disproportionate to the shareholder's expected gain from the activ-
ity. As discussed above, the incentive for a controlling shareholder under
a control-based liability regime thus would be to encourage the corpora-
363. See Nagar et al., supra note 44, at 3-4, 22-23 (discussing close corporations).
The effect of ownership concentration in large corporations, however, is less clear. Cf.
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Luigi Zingales, Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go
Public, in Concentrated Corporate Ownership 55, 58-59 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000)
(noting that going public and diluting control may reduce company's value because of
"agency costs thereby created"); see also Demsetz & Villalonga, supra note 47, at 1 (finding
"no systematic relation between variations in ownership structure and variations in firm
performance"). In any event, while a control-based regime might encourage a shareholder
seeking control to hold more shares, rather than fewer, it is far from clear that the
shareholder would try to acquire the nearly complete control that would best facilitate
expropriation opportunities.
364. Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull describe a related situation:
If [under unlimited liability] the wealthy shareholder buys more shares, then the
probability distribution of his end of period wealth becomes more symmetric,
since he has more claims to the firm's earnings in the event of profitable
operations to match his large potential loss in the event of default and the
insurance provided to other shareholders is reduced. This will result in the stock
price of the wealthy investor's holdings being less negative or even positive.
Therefore, a capital market will exist, and wealthy shareholders will purchase
equity claims of corporations.
Halpern et al., supra note 2, at 130-31.
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tion to acquire insurance or to capitalize more appropriately. When in-
surance and capitalization are adequate, a controlling shareholder is
likely to view a business opportunity as privately advantageous when it is
socially advantageous. By comparison, under the pro rata regime, a con-
trolling shareholder's incentive to make sure a corporation is fully in-
sured or well-capitalized will be inadequate.
365
Any overdeterrence effect from a control-based regime would there-
fore most likely occur in connection with a risky corporate activity that is
uninsurable. Should a controlling shareholder be presented with socially
beneficial activities presenting uninsurable risks, however, such a share-
holder might elect to avoid them.
The significance of an overdeterrence effect would depend not only
on the presence of uninsurable risks, but also on several other factors.
The larger the shareholder's proportion of ownership and the value at-
tached to control of the corporation, the smaller the overdeterrence ef-
fect. A parent corporation or controlling shareholder with all or nearly
all of a corporation's shares, for example, would not likely be overdeter-
red because the shareholder could expect to receive nearly all the bene-
365. See supra text accompanying notes 329-337. Some also might argue that
unfairness is inherent in the control-based regime's placement of 100% responsibility for
tort liabilities in excess of corporate assets on, say, an 80% shareholder because such a
shareholder does not have the right to collect 100% of the company's dividends.
Nevertheless, the primary effect of a control-based regime likely will be that a controlling
shareholder will want its corporation to be properly insured. If the corporation is properly
insured, then the controlling shareholder's share of costs will not be disproportionately
larger than its ability to benefit. In the case of losses exceeding a corporation's assets, the
control-based regime admittedly would not treat every shareholder alike. The goal of
treating every shareholder alike, however, is something of a red herring, since they are
alike in their ability to benefit financially from the corporation only in that they all have
the identical per share entitlement to receive dividends. See supra text accompanying
notes 206-231 (discussing unique advantages of control).
In that sense, the control-based regime would be no different from veil piercing rules
as presently applied, or from the "controlling persons" liability imposed by the securities
law. Under current law, only those shareholders whose circumstances or conduct satisfy
the veil piercing standard are responsible for the corporation's liability. For example, in
State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Specialized Finishers, Inc., after finding that veil piercing was clearly
appropriate, the court apportioned environmental liability unequally among a
corporation's four shareholders (each of which held one-fourth the shares), with the
shares ranging from 10% to 48%. 604 N.E.2d 842, 851 (Ohio Com. P1. 1991). See supra
note 25 (discussing Wisconsin and New York statutes holding only largest shareholders
responsible for unpaid wage claims); cf. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs., 763
F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding two of four shareholders directly liable under Rivers
and Harbors Appropriations Act); Vermont v. Staco Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 835 (D. Vt.
1988) (holding some, but not all, individual stockholders directly liable under RCRA based
on "authority to control" corporation's mercury releases).
Finally, a control buyer's preference regarding liability exposure will be reflected in
the price that a control buyer is willing to pay for a controlling share. If such a buyer
values a controlling share less as a result of the potential responsibility that accompanies it,
the buyer will simply pay less for it. There could, of course, be some unfairness for current
controlling shareholders in risky industries when a capacity to control rule is first
implemented.
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fits, as well as the costs, distributed by the firm as a result of a particular
activity. The evidence on the value of control discussed above suggests
that it is quite valuable-control premiums very often range upward of
30% to 40% of share prices.3 66 However, a shareholder with, say, a 60%
share of corporate ownership, but with control assumed to be worth only
an additional 10%, might choose to forego a socially beneficial project
that presents significant uninsurable liability risks in excess of corporate
assets.
Control is likely to be fairly valuable, and shareholders often will
have more control than assumed in this example. Moreover, depending
on the activity, controlling shareholders very often can choose the middle
ground of influencing the corporation to invest in safeguards that will
minimize the activity's potential risk.
Ultimately, however, the precise scope of any overdeterrence of un-
insurable activities-and how that would compare with the underdeter-
rence effect under a pro rata regime-depends on empirical questions,
including the distribution of ownership in corporations, the value of con-
trol, and the availability of insurance for risky corporate activities.
3 67
8. General Objections to Expanded Shareholder Liability. - Another set of
objections flows from the attempt to replace limited liability with any rule
that imposes greater shareholder liability, whether it is a pro rata rule or a
control-based regime. Many of these objections have been effectively an-
swered by Hansmann and Kraakman in their defense of the pro rata rule.
Consequently, discussion of these objections is not a central focus of this
Article. The following discussion is intentionally brief and contains only
a few additional comments beyond those of Hansmann and Kraakman.
a. Public stock markets. - Some commentators have argued that any
change from limited liability would impair the tradability of shares on a
public stock exchange. Such arguments are ill-founded. The argument
had been that under a shareholder liability rule, the price of a particular
share would depend not only on the wealth of the individual shareholder,
but also on the wealth of every other shareholder. Shares would no
366. See supra note 207.
367. A related argument is that an expanded shareholder liability regime would
impose too much tort liability. This criticism rests on a belief that the tort system is deeply
flawed and should be reformed and that expanding shareholder liability would tend to
increase the impact of those flaws by bringing more potential defendants into the tort
system.
However, retaining shareholder limited liability as a partial solution to tort reform
issues seems both underinclusive and overinclusive. To the extent the tort system is flawed,
the class of affected defendants stretches far beyond corporate shareholders. Moreover, to
the extent a tort suit legitimately seeks compensation and to set correct incentives for
conduct, inappropriately shielding shareholders would fail to address the uncompensated
externality that is the focus of this Article.
Even conceding that tort liability rules require reform, that problem should be treated
transparently. Rather than trying to reduce the problems of a flawed tort system by
retaining limited shareholder liability, the focus should be directly on reform of the tort
law.
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longer be homogeneous s6 8 Hansmann and Kraakman, however, have
persuasively argued that the public tradability of shares would be unaf-
fected under a pro rata unlimited liability regime because a share would
have the same expected value for each shareholder.
3 69
A control-based regime would, of course, affect the prices at which
controlling shares were traded, since an ownership share conferring ca-
pacity to control on its owners would confer not only the higher expected
benefits of control, but also a greater component of responsibility for cor-
porate risk taking. Since they would be jointly liable in the event of a
liability exceeding corporate assets, owners of control blocks likely would
wish to monitor each others' wealth. However, controlling shares in pub-
licly-traded corporations generally are not traded at published market
prices, but are bought and sold at a negotiated premium above that
price.3 70 Further, as noted above, shareholders with control probably al-
ready monitor each other to assess relative control. Finally, the group of
controlling shareholders is likely to be small. 371
As discussed above, the market might perceive uncertainty in some
circumstances about whether a court would deem a particular share-
holder to have the capacity to control a corporation, and hence to be
liable under a control-based regime.3 72 If this were true, that could im-
pair the tradability of marginal shares that could give such a shareholder
the capacity to control. Other than these shares, the tradability of other
shares on public stock exchanges would be unaffected.
b. Disinvestment in socially beneficial industries. - A second possible
criticism is that a shareholder liability rule might generally reduce the
incentive to invest in certain industries that are risky but widely agreed to
be socially beneficial, such as pharmaceutical research. 373
368. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 6, at 42-43.
369. Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1903-04.
370. The only exception here would be the attempt to quietly assemble a block of
shares in a publicly-traded company. However, this is a relatively rare form of acquisition,
and once an acquirer has obtained 5% of a company's stock, a report must be filed with
the SEC. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1999).
371. E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1891-92
(arguing that it is feasible to negotiate among close corporation shareholders under
unlimited liability rule). Further, historical evidence suggests that even in the absence of
homogeneous shares, individuals will invest in transferable shares in business enterprises.
See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 2, at 581-82 (discussing extensive individual
investment in English joint stock associations).
372. See supra text accompanying notes 345-350.
373. Relatively little systematic empirical research appears to have been conducted
comparing investment levels in limited liability regimes with those in unlimited liability
regimes, either joint and several or pro rata liability. One recent study, however, argues
that California's move from pro rata liability to limited liability in 1931 had no detectable
effect on share prices. Mark I. Weinstein, Share Price Changes and the Arrival of Limited
Liability in California (Univ. of S. Cal. Marshall Sch. of Bus., Dep't of Fin. & Bus. Econ.,
Working Paper No. 01-14, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taPabstract-
id=286799 (last visited Feb. 6, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Under a control-based regime, however, the incentive would be for a
controlling shareholder to ensure that a corporation is adequately capi-
talized or insured in view of the risks of its activities. To the extent there
is a social need for "uninsurable" risky activities, limited liability rules
would seem to go considerably further than necessary to address it.
These rules encourage all risky activities, without distinguishing uninsur-
able activities or those that society might wish to subsidize from those that
it does not. A preferable approach would be to subsidize particular so-
cially beneficial activities selectively.3 74 For example, to the extent phar-
maceutical research is difficult to insure-hence leading controlling
shareholders to avoid socially beneficial research opportunities-we
might choose to offer tax credits for money spent on pharmaceutical re-
search or to subsidize the research outright.
c. More 'fly-by-night" corporations in risky industries. - A third potential
criticism is that excessively risky activities would be undertaken more by
"fly-by-night" corporations, which are poorly capitalized, owned by
individuals with few assets, and financed with debt.3 7 5 Hansmann and
Kraakman term this the "high roller" problem. Under either a pro rata
or a control-based regime, these corporations would not fully bear the
costs of their activities because their shareholders would be judgment-
proof once they are relieved of their few assets. These entities would ef-
fectively continue to have limited liability even in the presence of a share-
holder liability rule. As a consequence, the investors in the riskiest activi-
ties would be those with the smallest incentive to minimize the risks. This
could not only undermine the effectiveness of a shareholder liability rule
at eliminating limited liability's moral hazard, but also somehow make
matters worse by putting "fly-by-nights" in charge of the riskiest activities.
"Fly-by-night" corporations might take fewer precautions or insure less;
374. See Leebron, supra note 2, at 1577 (arguing that unlimited liability serves a
"valuable regulatory function" because enterprises "would have to identify themselves and
request government assistance").
375. E.g., Richard B. Stewart & Bradley M. Campbell, Lessons from Parent Liability
under CERCLA, Nat. Resources & Env't, Winter 1992, at 7, 8 (contending that eliminating
limited liability would result in "incentives for ownership by undercapitalized or marginal
firms with fewer assets at risk"); Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2,
at 1911-13 (discussing "high roller" problem).
A related problem-also common to the pro rata regime-would be that the decline
in the price of a controlling share might lead corporations to seek more debt, rather than
equity, financing. In addition to creating the "fly-by-night" problem discussed in the text,
this might lead overall to less monitoring of management and greater inefficiency. But see
Leebron, supra note 2, at 1640 (arguing that shift from equity to debt more likely to be
seen under limited liability regime than under unlimited liability regime; "[u]nlike
unlimited liability, limited liability is not neutral with respect to its effect on the capital
structure of firms"). In any event, it is unclear why lenders would be less sophisticated
monitors of corporate managers than equity investors. See George G. Triantis, Debt
Financing and Motivation, 31 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1323, 1326 (1997) ("Debt contracts have a
relatively under-appreciated role in deterring, detecting and correcting managerial slack-
that is, lapses in managerial competence or effort, as well as excessive managerial
compensation or perquisite consumption." (footnote omitted)).
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risky activity could be undertaken more by these corporations not be-
cause they are expert at managing such activities, but because the "fly-by-
nights" would be more judgment-proof and hence more risk preferring.
Further, they would be likely to seek higher levels of debt financing,
which in turn would impose "efficiency losses in the form of the agency
costs of risky debt. '376
The prospect of judgment-proof shareholders is, of course, equally
likely under limited liability, since generally all shareholders, not just
owners of "fly-by-nights," are 'judgment-proof' under limited liability.3 77
The other consequences could potentially occur under either a pro rata
regime or a control-based regime. Hansmann and Kraakman have rea-
soned that the other consequences are unlikely because for most unusu-
ally hazardous activities, a significant investment in a specialized plant
and equipment is required. Consequently, a significant problem associ-
ated with "fly-by-night" corporations would only arise if there were a large
number of very wealthy individual shareholders who also did not espe-
cially mind the prospect of personal bankruptcy. 378 In view of the stigma
and general discomfort associated with individual bankruptcy, this seems
unlikely.379 Declaring personal bankruptcy is generally not appealing, re-
gardless of an individual shareholder's wealth.3 80
Finally, even assuming a "fly-by-night" problem, a control-based re-
gime would still be preferable to a limited liability regime. 38 1 The "fly-by-
night" strategy is already available under current law. Under control-
based liability, a "fly-by-night" might have a comparative advantage in
bearing the risks of excessively risky corporate activity and thus might be
more likely to enter a relatively risky industry. A control-based regime
would certainly be less effective in compelling a corporation to internal-
ize liability if its shareholders were largely judgment-proof.
376. Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1912.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 1912-13.
379. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 77, at 707 ("Persons dislike bankruptcy and strive
to avoid it.").
380. One recent empirical paper confirms that the prospect of personal bankruptcy
does indeed affect individual decisionmaking. The larger the size of a state's bankruptcy
exemptions, say, for personal residences, the more likely individuals were to use a
noncorporate form for businesses they started. Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal
Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial Activity 20-22 (July 2000), available at http:/
/www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/00-013.htm (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
381. The concern would remain that, to the extent they are drawn to risky industries,
"high rollers" might not be the individuals most skilled in managing highly risky
enterprises, resulting in efficiency losses. Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability,
supra note 2, at 1912. As noted, however, the distasteful prospect of personal bankruptcy
that the ultimate owners of risky enterprises would face is likely to deter many individuals
from selecting excessively risky activities simply because they might possess the
"comparative advantage" in bearing judgments. Further, the concern seems outweighed
by the overall improvement in the incentives for businesses to take care when entering into
these industries.
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However, even if some "fly-by-night" corporations moved into risky
industries under a control-based regime or other regime of expanded
liability, the remainder of corporations, with wealthier shareholders,
would be less able to externalize the costs of excessively risky activities.
Moreover, even if "fly-by-night" corporations could externalize some of
their costs under a capacity to control rule, they would still internalize
more costs than under the current regime.382 Under a control-based re-
gime, all shareholders with a capacity to control, even less wealthy ones,
would have their assets at stake. Shareholders of such corporations would
have to be sufficiently risk preferring to "incur a substantial chance of
personal bankruptcy if tort damages should prove large."388 Again, the
stigma and discomfort that generally accompanies personal bankruptcy is
likely to prove a deterrent.
In short, even though such corporations might be relatively more
risk preferring than well-capitalized corporations under a capacity to con-
trol rule, they would still likely be less risk preferring overall than under
current law. Consequently, while an empirical question remains, the un-
dertaking of excessively risky activity by "fly-by-night" corporations would
still likely be lower, at an absolute level, under a control-based regime
than under a limited liability regime.
d. Disaggregation. - This is a different version of the "fly-by-night"
problem. Large companies might seek to disaggregate their risky busi-
nesses and spin them off piecemeal to small, less well-capitalized firms,
but then continue to do business with those firms.3 8 4 The large company
would, through contract, continue to engage in the risky activity, but
would shift the liability risk to a more risk-tolerating entity. Hansmann
and Kraakman give the example of a large oil company, which, rather
than continuing to ship its oil in tankers that it or a subsidiary owns,
might sell the tankers to small companies and then contract with them to
transport the oil.38 5 Another example might be a metal smelting opera-
tor that purchases a mine in order to guarantee a supply of ore to the
smelter. Under an expanded shareholder liability regime, the smelter
operator would instead approach a mine operator and contract to supply
ore. The disaggregation/contracting phenomenon is likely to be seen
primarily in vertically integrated businesses, which typically invest in risky
businesses as a way of ensuring supply or distribution for other parts of
the business.386
382. As discussed earlier, a pro rata liability rule would generally be less effective than
a control-based liability regime in ensuring that firms internalize their costs. See supra text
accompanying notes 329-337.
383. Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1912.
384. Id. at 1913-15.
385. Id. at 1913-14.
386. E.g., Arrow, supra note 61, at 140-41 (noting that companies vertically integrate
to minimize market risks that might lead to variations in supply).
1300 [Vol. 102:1203
20021 A CONTROL-BASED SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY APPROACH 1301
Imposing a shareholder liability rule might reduce a parent com-
pany's incentive to integrate vertically. However, the incentive for a com-
pany to purchase those goods or services, rather than to integrate them
into the firm, would be offset by the loss of the very features that make
vertical integration attractive in the first place. Such features include
economies of scale and quality of management, greater assurance that a
product will be effectively marketed, and the smaller risk of a shortage of
a critical material.3 87 Anecdotal evidence suggests that disaggregation/
contracting is not likely to be a dominant strategy. After the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, in which Exxon elected to bear responsibility for the oil spill of
its subsidiary's tanker, some oil companies did divest themselves of their
tankers. 388 However, other oil companies believed the best practice was
to own the tankers to ensure that they were managed appropriately for
safety.
3 8 9
CONCLUSION
To date, writing on limited liability has not delved significantly into
the different incentives that may be faced by particular shareholders.
Among other things, controlling shareholders are in a position to moni-
tor and control managers and to reap additional benefits, beyond their
pro rata share of ownership, from corporate activity. Consequently, lim-
ited liability's moral hazard is likely to be most severe when a corpora-
tion's shareholders include one (or more) with the capacity to control.
At the same time, the efficiency justifications for limited liability, which
largely depend on a prediction that shareholders will face significant
monitoring costs, are strongest in the case of the individual shareholder
that holds a small percentage of stock and are quite weak in the case of
387. Id.; Hansmann & Kraakman, Unlimited Liability, supra note 2, at 1914; Leebron,
supra note 2, at 1616 ("If there are in fact no efficiencies from integration, then we have
lost nothing by forcing the disintegration as a result of the veil-piercing threat.").
Knowledge-based considerations-the costs of acquiring the information needed for
vertical integration versus the cost of purchasing the service elsewhere and having those
individuals acquire the information-might also create an incentive to integrate vertically.
E.g., Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in The Nature of the Firm 159,
172-73 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991) (noting that because
information costs for new business are not significantly greater, steel manufacturing firm
may find it worthwhile to set steel "into its structural places" rather than to sell steel
unriveted to construction companies). For an example of the risk of relying on other
companies to provide marketing services, see Candy Sagon, Frozen Out: How a Pint-Sized
Company Learned a Giant Lesson, Wash. Post, May 3, 1995, at El (describing how small
company, Sharon's Sorbet, lost its market because its distributor, Haagen-Dazs, decided to
end distribution contract and market its own sorbet). See generally Demsetz, supra, at
162-64 (discussing calculus for firm's choice of "in-house production" rather than external
procurement).
388. Alan Abrams, Oil Companies Shed Tankers to Reduce Liability Risks, J. Com.,
Feb. 28, 1995, at IA.
389. See id. (" 'If you want to control liabilities in large oil companies, you ought to
bring it in-house."' (quoting ARCO executive)).
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the controlling shareholder. Empirical evidence suggests that for a sub-
stantial number of corporate shareholders, limited liability's promise of
transaction cost reductions enhances efficiency little, if at all, despite the
potentially significant efficiency costs it imposes in the form of corporate
opportunities to externalize costs.
Although it represents one solution to limited liability's moral haz-
ard, the pro rata liability regime alternative does not fully address share-
holder differences, especially the special position of controlling share-
holders. As a consequence both of this and of the significant transaction
costs facing a plaintiff trying to obtain compensation from shareholders,
the pro rata liability regime might not ensure that corporations fully in-
ternalize the costs of risky activities.
A control-based liability regime would focus more particularly on the
special position of controlling shareholders. By holding them fully re-
sponsible for tort liabilities that exceed a corporation's assets or insur-
ance, the regime likely would get corporations with controlling share-
holders to internalize their costs. Furthermore, controlling shareholders
would be far more likely to insist that a corporation purchase insurance at
an adequate level. To the extent a corporation has not done so (or an
activity is uninsurable), tort plaintiffs still would face many fewer transac-
tion costs than under a pro rata regime. While it has its own shortcom-
ings, a control-based liability regime is a strong candidate as a solution to
limited liability's moral hazard.
A definitive comparative analysis of these regimes requires evaluating
the varying empirical assumptions each makes regarding the location and
significance of different types of transaction costs. Limited liability de-
fenders presume that under a regime of expanded shareholder liability,
shareholders would incur substantial information-gathering and monitor-
ing costs, and that, on balance, limited liability is justified by the need to
minimize these costs. This assumption seems highly questionable in the
case of controlling and institutional shareholders, but it deserves fuller
empirical investigation as to other shareholders. Similarly, the position
that shareholders are better risk bearers than tort victims seems open to
doubt, especially for corporate and institutional shareholders and those
shareholders with the capacity to control. The risk aversion issue too de-
serves further empirical investigation, especially in connection with indi-
vidual shareholders.
Proponents of pro rata shareholder liability also make implicit em-
pirical assumptions regarding transaction costs. They assume that under
such a regime, small shareholders would not need to expend resources
on monitoring because diversification would remain a viable strategy for
minimizing risk, and that tort plaintiffs seeking compensation from multi-
ple corporate shareholders under an expanded liability regime would be
able to obtain compensation (and corporations would internalize their
costs) because litigation costs would not prove a significant impediment.
Both these assumptions also are open to question, and empirical investi-
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gation would be worthwhile here as well. Moreover, the extent to which a
controlling shareholder can obtain benefits from corporate activity, in
excess of its pro rata ownership share, clearly bears on the likely success
of the pro rata regime in preventing corporations from externalizing
their costs.
Finally, a definitive comparative assessment of the control-based lia-
bility regime with the pro rata regime and limited liability regimes also
would require empirical investigation into the ownership composition of
corporations. For example, if a significant proportion of public corpora-
tions have controlling shareholders that hold significantly less than 100%
of shares, then it is likely that a control-based regime would be more suc-
cessful than the pro rata regime in compelling corporations to internalize
their costs. However, if corporations generally are owned almost 100% by
a corporation or individual shareholder, or if they have no controlling
shareholder at all, the advantages of the control-based liability regime
over a pro rata regime would be reduced. Similarly, the advantages of the
control-based regime would be reduced if corporations attempt to exter-
nalize costs significantly despite the absence of a controlling shareholder.
Finally, if many corporate activities are uninsurable, the possibility that a
control-based liability regime would overdeter those activities would be
more significant.
At base, however, a thorough consideration of shareholder liability
issues cannot presume that all shareholders are identical. Developing an
appropriate solution must include not only a more detailed empirical in-
vestigation, but also a consideration of the special position of the share-
holder with the capacity to control.
